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Ghana's economic program after independence  external lending was unavailable until 1984.
emphasized public investment and spending as  This policy led to high inflation, negative real
the road to growth, a strategy that led to recur-  interest rates, an overvalued currency, and the
ring fiscal deficits and declining growth.  By  emergence of black markets.  These forces
1983, per capita income was 10 percent lower  further eroded the tax base and ultimately
than in 1957. Since the 1984 Economic Recov-  increased the deficit.
ery Program, Ghana's  fisco' deficits have
declined and the public seLor has been rational-  The authors also find that high levels of
ized. Average growth rates have become  inflation, combined with government restrictions
positive.  on private currency holdings, affect the demand
for assets in Ghana, leading to a Laffer curve
Islam and Wetzel provide two different  effect in goveinment seigniorage:  After a certain
definitions of the fiscal deficit in Ghana. The  point, an increase in the inflation rate actually
first, more conventional approach aggregates the  causes a reduction in seigniorage revenue.  Yet
components of the public sector, including the  given the government's  dependence on monetary
central government, the social security and  finance, reduced seigniorage meant more money
national insurance trust, state-owned enterprises,  creation and higher inflation.
and the cocoa marketing board.  However,
because of the lack of data, this method of  According to Islam and Wetzel:
treating the deficit may understate its true value.
*The  fiscal deficit has had only little effect
The second way looks at the total financing  on private consumption; lagged consumption and
flows to the public sector.  Data on the central  disposable income were more important.
government debt are supplemented with data on
the claims of the central bank and banking  * Public sector investment in Ghana has
system against state-owned enterprises and data  mostly substituted for private investment.  The
on public external debt.  current program of divestiture of state-owned
enterprises shouli lead to an increase in private
Islam and Wetzel examine the ways Ghana  investment.
chose to finance its deficits and how these
affected the financial side of the economy. They  * The fiscal deficit had a significant negative
find that before implementation of the adjust-  effect on the external side.  The official real
ment program of 1983, the government relied  exchange rate tended to appreciate, the trade
mainly on money creation for financing, though  balance worsened, and the black market pre-
this was more by default than by choice since  mium rose.
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This is a revised version of a paper prepared for the World Bank
Research Project 675-31 and presented at the World Bank conference
on the "Macroeconomics of the Public Sector Deficit" held on July
11-13, 1990.  We are grateful for the comments and sugrestions of
William Easterly, Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Vikram Nehru ar.d  the
conference participants.I. INTRODUCO>QO
A pervas *e  macroeconomic  phenomenon  in  both industrial
and developing  countries  has been  the growth  and  persistence
of fiscal  deficits.  The issues  surrounding  fiscal  deficits  are
certainly  not new,  but the economic  developments  of the past
decade  have led to renewed  interest  in fiscal  themes.  In the
developed  countries,  the growth  of the U.S. federal  deficit
provided  the impetus  for  a reassessment  of the effect  of
fiscal  deficits  on economic  activities.  In the developing
countries,  fiscal  policy,  particularly  the reduction  of fiscal
deficits,  has been one  of the cornerstones  of short-term
stabilization  and medium-term  adjustment  programs.
The macroeconomic  theory  concerning  fiscal  deficits  has
undergone  a considerable  transformation  since  Keynes
emphasized  fiscal  policy  in his General  Theory.  Rational
expectations  and the proposition  of Ricardian  equivalence  put
the effectiveness  of traditional  demand  ranagement  policies
into  question.  Much of the discussion  over fiscal  policy  in
the past fifteen  years  has addressed  the question  of whether
fiscal  deficits  and the  way in which  they are financed  will
have an effect  on economic  activity.
While  the theoretical  debate  continues,  in practice
fiscal  deficits  continue  to be an important  issue.  In
developing  countries  in  particular,  economic  programmes  in
recent  years  have  emphasized  demand  reduction  via reductions
in fiscal  deficits.  The underlying  assumption  is that fiscal2
deficits  will  have an effect  on demand.  The idea  that fiscal
deficits  are something  that  can be measured  and  managed is
implicit  in that  assumption,  yet as experience  in both
developed  and developing  countries  shows,  deficits  may not be
so easy to measure  nor to control.
This study  presents  an empirical  investigation  of fiscal
deficits  in Ghana  and assesses  their  effect  on the financial
and real  side of the economy. The case  of Ghana is
interesting  because  of the  major  role  that fiscal  deficits
have  played in  her economic  history.  At the  moment  of
independence  Ghana  was perceived  to be at the forefront  of the
African  countries.  Her population  was well  educated  and
economic  infrastructure  was strong.  Under  Nkrumah,  the first
government  led a statist  economy  that  emphasized  public
investment  and public  spending  as the road  to economic  growth.
As time  went on, governments  became  more and  more profligate
and deficits  increased.  Over  the same  time  period,  economic
conditions  degenerated.  In 1983,  the nadir  was reached  --  per
capita  income  was over ten percent  lower  than  its 1957  level. 1
In 1984,  the government  initiated  the Economic  Recovery
Programme (ERP)  in an attempt  to rescue  Ghana's  economy.  An
important  component  of this  programme  has been  the reduction
of fiscal  deficits  and the "rationalization"  of the public
I  For  an  interesting review  of  Ghana's economy  since
independence  see Rimmer (1989).3
sector. 2 The ERP is still  in place  and fiscal  deficits  have
been reduced  relative  to their  levels  in the 1970s.  Average
annual  growth  of real  GDP has averaged  6 percent  in the post-
1983  period  as compared  to -3.4  percent  in the period  from
1978  to 1983.
Given  the  multitude  of factors  at work in the Ghanaian
economy,  it is difficult  to attribute  the decline  and renewal
of the economy  to any one
factor.  We will instead  try to evaluate  the impact  that fiscal
deficits  may have  had on certain  macroeconomic  variables  which
may in  turn have  affected  Ghana's  economic  performance.
The study  is set out in three  sections.  In the first
section,  we consider  various  measures  of the fiscal  deficit  in
Ghana.  An ideal  measure  would  include  all components  of the
public  sector  including  central,  state  and local  government,
decentralized  agencies,  state-owned  enterprises  and even  the
central  bank.  Although  the data for  all these  levels  of the
public  sector  are not available,  we construct  a measure  of the
consolidated  fiscal  deficit  from  the available  information.
We then  construct  an alternative  measure  of the fiscal  deficit
b>ssed  on the flow  of funds  to the  public  sector.
In the second  part,  we focus  on fiscal  deficits  and
financial  markets.  We first  consider  how the way Ghanaian
deficits  have been financed  may influence  certain
2 Other components  of the programme  are devaluation  of the
exchange rate, liberalization  of the trade regime and  ,  more
recently,  financial  reform.4
macroeconomic  variables,  particularly  inflation.  We then
assess  how inflation  affects  demand  for  money  and quasi-money.
A simple  model i6 constructed  that  allows  us to assess  the
relationsh:?  between  fiscal  deficits,  inflation,  and
seignorage.
The third  part of the study  addresses  the effect  of
fiscal  deficits  on private  consumption  (  NB: private
investment  is discussed  in the companion  paper  by Ms. Islam).
The relevance  of the  variouRa  theories  concerning  the effect  of
fiscal  deficits  on private  sector  demand  is considered  by
estimating  a consumption  function.
The relationship  between  fisca1  deficits  and the external
sector (the  real  exchange  rate  and the trade  balance)  is also
considered  in the companion  paper.
The empirical  nature  of the study  calls  for  a caveat.
Generally,  the data for  developing  countries  is not always  as
complete  and as consistent  as developed  country  data.  Data
difficulties  and limitations  are  particularly  acute  in African
countries  and Ghana is  no exception. z.  general,  the most
reliable  data sources  available  were  used,  but there  is no
guarantee  that  the measurement  of any  given  variable  was
consistent  over time.  Given  the severe  lags in accounting  and
general  instability  in the Ghanaian  economy  during  the period
that  we cover (1970-1988),  it is quite  likely  that there  is a
fair  amount  of "noise"  in the data  used,  which  may affect  our
regression  results.  In addition,  because  of data limitations,5
we tend to use fairly simple equations for estimLtion. While
thase equations may not represent the frontier of econometric
modelling, they do let us glean some information about the
basic relationships betweent  fiscal deficits and other
macroeconomic variables.
The principal conclusions of our anal;sis are as follows:
1.) Because of the lack of data, the conventional approach to
treating the deficit may present a misleading picture in
Ghana. Determining the deficit using financing flows to the
public s3ctor provides an alternative measure of the claims
that the public sector makes on resources that differs
considerably from the conventional measure. Using either
measure, Ghana has had significant public sector deficits over
the past two decades.
2.) Lack of access to external lending and weak domestic
financial markets imply that the bulk of the public sector
deficit was financed by money creation. AcceQs  to external
lending allowed the government to substitute foreign financing
for money creation after 1984, but money creation did not fall
as much as one would expect. In the mid-late seventies, the
correlation between money creation and inflation was high,
suggesting that fiscal deficits contributed to the high levels
of inflation at the time. This relationship is less clear cut
in  the  eighties,  but  this  is not  surprising  given  some6
substantial  supply  shocks  during  the  period,
3.) Inflation  has a significant,  negative  Influence  on the
demand  for  money  and the demand  for  deposits.  The domestic
interest  rate  was not found  to have  any significant  effect  on
either  the demand  for  money  or the demand  for  deposits.  One
possible  explanaticn  of these  results  is  the highly  regulated
nature  of Ghana's  financial  markets  until  recently.
4.) A simple  model set  out in section  II indicates  that  high
rates  of inflation  provided  the Ghanaian  government  with
seignorage  revenue  only 1 to 2 percent  of GDP greater  than it
would  have received  with an inflation  rate  of 20 percent.
Since  1984,  the level  of seignorage  has not differed  greatly
from the level  that would have existed at a 20 percent rate of
inflation.  The model  also  suygests  that  had the government  not
appropriated  private  currency  in the currency  conversion  of
1979,  seignorage  revenue  would  have  been  higher  throughout  the
period.
5.)  Lagged  consumption  and disposable  income  were found  to be
the principal  determinants  of private  consumption.  The results
of this estimation  indicate  that  neither  pure  Ricardian
equivalence  nor the pure  Keynesian  theory  'nold.  The
significance  of disposable  income  indicates  that  liquidity
constraints  affect  consumption  decisions.  Numerous  fiscal7
variables  were tested  as set out in  the research  proposal,  but
none  were found  to be significant.
6.) Private  investment  was found  to be negatively  affected  by
public  investment,  thus indicating  that some  crowding-out  did
occur  in Ghana.  Private  investment  is also  positively
influenced  by a relaxation  of credit  constraints  and by
corporate  tax revenues.  (This  suggests  t.-.at  corporate  tax
revenues  might  be highly  correlated  with  corporate  profits.)
The real interest  rate  was not found  to have a significant
influence  on private  investment.
7.)  Public expenditure has had a significant impact on the
official  real  exchange  rate,  the trade  balance,  and on the
black  market  premium.  Increased  public  expenditure  was found
to have a negative  effect  on the trade  balance.  It was also
found  to have  a negative  effect  on the official  exchange  rate
(higher  public  expenditures  tended  to appreciate  the real
exchange  rate).  The empirical  results  also  show  that  a rising
public  sector  deficit  along  with stringent  restrictions  on
foreign  exchange  transactions  lead  to a very high  black  market
premium.8
XI. MEASURING  THE DEFICIT
Implicit  in the  notion  of targeting  the fiscal  surplus
or deficit 3 is the idea  that  one is able  to obtain  a
reasonable  measure  of the deficit.  This is not necessarily  as
straightforward  as it  might  seem.  Keynesian  theory  initially
vtewed  the deficit  as exogenous.  It soon  became  clear  that  the
deficit  was actually  endogenous,  given  talat  tax revenres  and
government  expenditures  are partly  determined  by the level  of
economic  activity. Various  r7easures  of the deficit  have heen
developed  to adjust  for cyclical  movements  in the economy  and
to incorporate  the effects  of certain  macroeconomic  variables
(particularly  inflation).  As ir normally  the case,  the most
appropriate  measure  of the deficit  depends  upon the  purpose  of
the analysis.
Tanxi  and Blejer  (1984)  discuss  what  they call  the
"conventional  deficit"  with reference  to the definition  set
out in  the International  Monetary  Fund's  "Draft  Manual  on
Government  Finance  Statistics".  This  measure  arranges  the
payments  and receipts  of the  government  sector  accounts  as
follows:
Fiscal  Deficit  - (Revenue  +  Grant,'  - (Expenditure  on Goods
3  For the rest of the discussion we will refer only to
deficits  as they  are generally  the  more common  phenomenon.9
and Services +  Transfer Payments +  Net
Lending),
or alternatively,
Fiscal Deficit =  Borrowing +  Net Decrease in Cash Uloldings  -
Amortization
This approach does have its shortcomings. First, the
definition emphasizes cash flow concepts rather than accrual
concepts of accounting. At times, the cash flow concept may
not  fully reflect underlying trends. For instance, if a
government purchases goods and services and delays payment
(builds up arrears), the cash concept may not reveal in the
current year that the level of spending has changed. Tanzi and
Blejer point out that while capturing the monetary impact of
the budget, the cash concept may not capture the income-
reating  (i.e.,  the Keynesian) impact. Thay note that in the
heyday of Keynesian economics  (the  mid-sixties), the accrual
concept was generally preferred to the cash concept.
The classification of grants as a revenue source rather
than as a financing item is also a practice that is
questionable. Grants are not usually permanent sources of
income and therefore may fluctuate. (In  Ghana they have
fluctuated dramatically over the years.)  Unless grants are a
guaranteed source of revenue, it might be advisable to10
classify them as a financing item.
Similar questions may be raised as to whether net lending
should be included as part of the public sector's deficit. If
the net lending is extended to the private sector then it does
not necessarily reflect public sector usa of resources, but
rather, it reflects the public sector's role as a financial
intermediary. If the net lending is extended to the public
sector (say from the central government to a state-owned
enterprise) then it does imply a public sector claim on
resources, in which case net lending probably should be
included on the expenditure side. In practice, in many
developing countries at least, lending between the various
levels of the public sector is often not repaid and thus
effectively becomes a net transfer.
Tanzi and Blejer note a final issue concerning this
measure of the deficit. When inflation is significant it may
be difficult to distinguish in an economic sense between
amortization payments and interest payments. As all interest
payments are considered as an expenditure item and no
allowance is made for the repayment element implicitly
included in the interest payment, the size of the deficit may
be overstated.
The World Bank's "World Development Report 1988"
discusses different measures of the deficit.4 It first cites
the Rublic sector borrowinga  reuirement  (PSBR) as a useful
4  See World Bank (1988),  p.56.11
indicator  of the public  sector's  net  use of financial
resources.  The PSBR  represents  the total  excess  of expenditure
over  revenue  for  all government  entities,  all of which  must  be
financed  by new  borrowing  net of repayment  of previous  debt.
This  measure is also  referred  to as the "consolidated  public
sector  deficit".  In the calculation  of the PSBR  expenditure
includes  wages  of public  employees,  spending  on goods  and
fixed  capital  formation,  interest  on debt,  transfers  and
subsidies.  Expenditure  does  not inclade  amortization  payments
on government  debt or accumulation  of financial  assets (net
lending). Revenue includes  taxes,  user charges,  interest  on
public  assets,  transfers,  operating  surpluses  of public
coijanies,  and sales  of public  assets.  Revenue  does not
include  the drawdown  of cash  reserves.
A measure  that is often  used is  the "orimary  deficit".
This subtracts  all interest  payments  from  the PSBR in order  to
obtain  a measure  of the current  policy  stance.  The argument  is
that the interest  payments  currently  being  made reflect  past
policy  decisions  rather  than  present  policy.  In order  to
evaluate  current  policy,  these  payments  should  not  be included
in the deficit  measure.  Another  concept  of the  deficit
excludes  only  the inflationary  component  of interest  payments.
Finally,  the Report  discusses  the "structural  deficit".
This measure  presents  the deficit  adjusted  for  up- and down-
turns in the business  and/or  commodity  cycle  and for factors12
that  might  cause  temporary  deviations  from  the  trend level  of
expenditure  and tax revenue.  Such  temporary  deviations  might
be caused  by any  temporary  expenditure  or tax policy  such  as a
tax amnesty  or a decision  to withhold  government  sector  wages.
While in theory  the structural  deficit  is clear  cut in
practice  it is often  difficult  to calculate,  particularly  in
developing  countries.
Recent  research 5 has emphasized  the importance  of
obtaining  a complete  picture  of the  public  sector  claim  on
resources  by including  all levels  of the public  sector.  Thus
the consolidated  public  sector  deficit  should  include  data  not
only  on the central  government  accounts,  but on regional  and
local  accounts  as well as on decentralized  public  agencies  and
state-owned  enterprises.
The measures  of the deficit  discussed  to this  point  have
largely  been  pragmatic  ones in that  they provide  measures  that
are for  the most  part  practicable  given  the average  level  of
data  availability.  Both  Boskin  (1982)  and Buiter  (1983)  note
that  these  measures,  and the way they  are calculated,  may be
quite  far from  the analytical  concepts  that  are  used in the
theoretical  debate  over  the effects  of the fiscal  deficit.6
5 See Easterly (1989a,  1989b),  Marshall and Schmidt-Hebbel
(1989)  and World  Bank (1988).
6  Boskin  (1982)  also  makes  the important  point  that,  given  the
difficulties inherent in obtaining a  measure of the  deficit,
econometric  analyses  of the impact  of the deficit  may be based  on
analytically  inappropriate  concepts  or on substantial  measurement
error  and  that  the issues  at hand  are not  being  analyzed  or tested
in an appropriate  manner.13
Buiter  (1983)  goes into  some  detail  in presenting  a set of
stylized  accounts  that  corresponds  to an estimate  of the
comprehensive  net  wealth  or permanent  income  accounts  for  the
public  sector.  From  these  accounts  he derives  the government
budget  constraint.  He essentially  extends  the permanent  income
hypothesis  to the public  sector. 7 Buiter  argues  that in a
first  best world  not only  private  agents,  but governments  and
international  organizations  as well,  would decide  on spending,
saving,  lending,  production  and portfolio  allocation
constrained  only by comprehensive  wealth  or permanent  income.
Buiter  goes on to argue  that  both  the conventional  analysis  of
the public  sector  balance  sheet 8, and the comprehensive  wealth
accounts  that  he outlines,  should  be incorporated  into  an
analysis  if the public  sector.  The conventional  accounts
provide  a guide  to the binding  constraints  on public  sector
behavior  in any given  period.  The comprehensive  accounts
provide  an indication  of the real  net  worth  of the public
sector  over  time and hence  optimal  policy  when the only
constraint  is permanent  income.  We have  not attempted  to
construct  these  comprehensive  wealth  accounts  for Ghana.
7 The permanent  income  hypothesis  set out  by Friedman  in 1957
argues that  current consumption decisions are  determined by
expected  lifetime  income  (as  opposed  to only  current  income).  The
theory  in its simplest  form is represented  by the optimization  of
intertemporal  consumption  subject  to lifetime  wealth. While the
theory  ordinarily  discusses  private  consumption,  Buiter  extends  it
to public  sector  decisions  as well.
8 These  typically  contain  only  marketable  financial  assets  and
liabilities.14
We first  consider  in  detail  the data  that are available
for Ghana  and construct  a measure  of the consolidated  public
sector  deficit  from  the income  and expenditure  accounts  of the
government.  The definition  of the  deficit  used follows  that  of
Tanzi and Blejer (1984).  We then consider  the effects  that
economic  and  policy  variables  have  had on the conventional
deficit  based  on the framework  set out in  Marshall  and
Schmidt-Iiebbel  (1989).  Because  the conventional  measure  of the
deficit  underestimates  the true  public  sector  deficit,  we then
construct  a measure  of the public  sector  deficit  from  the
financing  side  using information  that is  available  on the
total  stock  of domestic  and  external  public  sector  debt  which
provides  an alternative  assessment  of public  sector  claims  on
resources.
1.)  The conventional  aDRroach-to  the  public  sector  deficit
Discussions  of the fiscal  deficit  in  the literature  on
Ghana  generally  focus  on the accounts  of the central
government  with reference  made to the importance  of other
parts  of the public  sector  (e.g.  state-owned  enterprises).9
Reports  of the international  organizations  include  more
detailed  information  on components  of the public  sector  such
as the Social  Security  and National  Insurance  Trust  and the
Cocoa  Marketing  Board,  but no attempt  at consolidation  is
9  See Green (1987),  Huq  (1989),  Killick (1978),  and Rimmer
(forthcoming).15
made.  There  are a number  of reasons  why a consolidation  of the
public  sector  has not been  undertaken.  One reason  is that  data
on the state-owned  enterprises,  which  constitute  a sizable
portion  of the industrial  sector,  are not available  until
1984,  and even then  they are  not complete.  Another  difficulty
is that some  of the accounts  of public  sector  institutions  are
kept on a fiscal  year  basis  while  others  are kept on a
calendar  year  basis.
a) The consolidated  public  sector  deficit
With  these  difficulties  kept in mind  one can at least
gain an idea  of the order  of magnitude  of the fiscal  deficit
by taking  into  consideration  the data that  are available.
Figure  2.1 shows  the public  sector  revenue,  expenditure,  and
deficit (as  a percent  of GDP) that  consolidates  all the
available  information  including  data on the central  government
accounts 10, the Social  Security  and National  Insurance  Trust
accounts,  and data  on the net profits  or losses  of the Cocoa
Marketing  Board (through  1988)  and the Ghana  Industrial
Holding  Corp (through  1986)11.  Very little  data is available
10 Note that the data presented on the central government
exclude  capital  expenditure  financed  through  external  project  aid
and the corresponding  grants  and loans.  To the extent  that these
loans a.-e  disbursed, the  figures presented may  underestimate
capital expenditure  and thus may give a figure  for total public
sector  expenditure  that is underestimated.  The exclusion  of this
information  becomes problematic  in the years after 1984, when
project  aid into  Ghana increased  dramatically.
11  The consolidation  added  up the central  government  accounts
and the social security accounts. The net operating surpluses
(deficits)  of the Cocoa  Marketing  Board and the Ghana Industrial
Holding  Corp.  were  added (subtracted)  to (from)  the revenue  side.FIGURE  2.1
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on local  government  revenues  and expenditure  in  Ghana.  In
general,  the government  has traditionally  been  very
centralized  and the central  government  has provided  over half
of the revenue  of the local  governments  in  the form  of
budgetary  transfers.  The absence  of data on local  government
finance  therefore  does  not pose  major  problems  for  our measure
of the fiscal  deficit.  In  contrast,  the absence  of data on the
state-owned  enterprises  other  than  the Ghana  Industrial
Holding  Corp.  does imply  that  we are  missing  an important  part
of the claim  on public  sector  resources.  The effect  of this
absence  will be discussed  below.
Considering  Figure  2.1  which is  based  on a consolidation
of the above-mentioned  accounts,  we see that for  the majority
of the past two  decades  public  sector  expenditure  has
surpassed  revenue  and that  public  sector  deficits  have  been
significant.  Consolidated  gublic  sector  expenditure  was
approximately  19  percent  of GDP in the 1969/70  fiscal  year  and
peaked  at 26 percent  of GDP in 1975/76.  It dropped  sharply
after  1975/76,  reaching  a minimum  of roughly  8 percent  of GDP
in 1983.  Since  1983  consolidated  public  sector  expenditure  has
risen  and has reached  a plateau  at about  14 percent  of GDP.
While  an attempt  was  made  to take  intergovernmental  transfers  into
account, the  breakdown of  information  did  not allow for the
complete  removal  of all double  counting.  Prior  to 1984,  data  on a
fiscal year  basis  and  that  on  a  calendar year  basis  were
consolidated  by classifying  calendar  data  under  the fiscal  period
ending  with the given year. For example, 1975 yearly data  are
classified  with 1974/75  fiscal  year data. It was not possible  to
reclassify  fiscal  year data into  calendar  year  data.18
Consolidated  gublic  sector  revenue  peaked  in 1970/71  as a
result  of a sharp increase  in revenue  from import  and export
taxes  on cocoa.  Consolidated  public  sector  revenue  declined
from  this  point  onward  reaching  a trough  in '.80/81  of about  5
percent  of GDP.  After 1983,  revenue  collection  improved
sharply  rising  to 18 percent  of GDP in 1987  and then  dropping
slightly  to 17 percent  of GDP in 1988.
Based  on this  data,  the  public  sector  deficit
(expenditure  minus  revenue)  moved  from  a surplus  of a little
bit more than one percent  of GDP in 1970/71  to a deficit  of 13
percent  of GDP in 1975/76.  The deficit  dropped  to about  4
percent  of GDP in 1979/80  but  then inrreased  sharply  in
1980/81  due to a sharp  drop in public  sector  revenue.  After
1982,  the deficit  declined  and moved  into  a surplus  of
approximately  2 percent  of GDP and has remained  at about  that
level.  Due to the lack  of data  on the state-owned  enterprises
and due to the fact  that all  capital  expenditure  financed  by
tied external  loans  or grants  is excluded,  we are fairly  safe
in assuming  that the deficit  that results  from  the
consolidation  of these  accounts  is not giving  a complete
picture  of the resources  that  are  being  claimed  by the public
sector.  Before  going  on to alternative  approaches,  let us
consider  briefly  the components  of the consolidated  deficit
that we have just  described.
i) The central  government
Given  the absence  of detailed  accounts  on the state-owned19
enterprises,the  pattern  shown  by the consolidated  public
sector  is dominated  by the revenue  and expenditure  of the
central  government.  Central  government  expenditure  as a share
of GDP is only  slightly  less  than  that  for consolidated  public
sector  expenditure  as seen in Figure  2.2.  This is explained  by
the fact  that  data  on the Cocoa  Marketing  Board  and on the
Ghana  Industrial  Holding  Corp.  are in the form  of net profits
or losses.  They  were  thus included  in the consolidation  on the
revenue  side.  The difference  between  consolidated  public
sector  expenditure  and _entral  government  expenditure  reflects
the expenditure  of the Social  Security  and  National  Insurance
Trust.
A breakdown  of central  government  expenditure  over the
period  from  1969/70  to 1988  is presented  in Table  2.1.  The
most striking  point  brought  out by the expenditure  breakdown
is the dominance  of central  government  expenditure  on
consumption  over expenditure  on investment.  Throughout  the
period  central  government  consumption  remained  steady  wnile
investment  by the central  government  varied  considerably  in
line  with general  economic  conditions.  Neither  interest
payments  nor current  transfers  take  a large  part  of central
government  expenditure,  although  interest  rates  have increased
in the 1980s.  Net lending  is low  throughout  the period.
As seen  in Figure  2.2,  central  government  revenue  as
a share  of GDP has varied  considerably  over the past  two
decades.  It peaked  in 1970/71  at almost  20 percent  of GDP,FIGURE 2.2
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dropped  sharply  over  the next two years  and had a second,  but
lower  peak in 1974/75  at 15 percent  of GDP. Central  government
revenue  then  declined  sharply  over  the next  six years  reaching
a low of 4.52  percent  of GDP in the 1980/81  fiscal  year.
Revenues  increased  slightly  over  the next few  years  and in the
period  between  1983  and 1986  they increased  sharply  and have
since  leveled-off  at about  15  percent  of GDP.
The decomposition  of central  government  revenue (see
Table  2.2)  shows  that  Ghana,  like  many  other  African
countries,  receives  the greatest  part of its  revenue  from
taxes  on international  transactions  and from import  and export
duties  in particular.  As other  studies  on Ghana  have noted' 2,
the taxation  of cocoa  exports  has been  particularly  heavy.  The
percentage  of total  revenue  and grants  from indiract  taxes
averaged  66 percent  over  the period.  Import  duties  provided  an
average  of 16  percent  of total  revenue  over the period  and
export  duties  contributed  an average  of 22 percent.  Other
indirect  taxes  on domestic  goods  and services  averaged  27
percent  of total  revenue  over  the period.  In contrast,  the
percentage  of total  revenue  and  grants  from  direct  taxes such
as those  on income,  corporate  taxes,  and payroll  taxes (not
including  contributions  to social  security)  averaged  21
percent  over  the period  from  the 1969/70  fiscal  year  to 1988.
The  dependence  on  export  taxes  as  the  primary  source  of
12 See  Rimmer  (1989).OmMa  015331  G  hINO  MVaUi  4AS A ftIh3I  OF bIDAL 8(V1()
3101IG10  91011  1913112  t1613/)  ISV  9134 54/15  1915/16  3916/l  i  1912IS1111  1919180  IWO0/At  3983/82  1190  1583  1964  19583  1186  38  ISO
t.  TW0  K  S  92.34  3.9  80.61  89.31  65.89  09.1IS  66.93  93.01  10.84  91.26  93.31  90.5  SS  .01  84.54  82.59,  19.19  80.61  63.49  85.-46  14-02
A.  Set#  1*805  19. Il  13.04  SO.94  22.40  19.40  30.36  24.93  21.14  39.16  11.49  20.16  26.04  29.43  28.60O  31.9?  18.23  19.316  39.16  31.69  20..14
win58 am ImC.  P3ITS:  39.12  13.02  11.91  22.38  19.49  19.15S  24.29  23.00  19.31  11.40  19.93  13.60  19.91  16.49  12.20  33.66  33.330  13.69  16.11  23..d3
INIOVISM3.  6.16  5.1  8.39  16.08  8.42  6.49  10.23  9.65  11.12  9.68  10.16  3.89  6.31  5.8as  3.40  3.21  2.9?  2.42  3.22  3. Jo
6611T  30.98  1.34  1.52  12.30  11.01  11.28  14.01  11. 35  I  625  1.12  9. 12  13.71  13.60  12.64  8.61  10.61  10.8.4  31.21  12.95  11.s6
P*3IL  0.00  6.00  0.60  0.60  0.34  0.31  0.31  0.19  0.33  0. 09  0.01  9.82  S.  5)  8.40  S.  04  4.0Q2  4.62  4.70  4.10  3.91
lD*1cm  1311  0.03  0.02  6. 02  0.03  6.00  0.23  0.24  0.56  0.2*  0.00  0.11  2.62  3.01  1.13  0.13  0.33  0.13  D.  11  1.42?  I  1-1
om¶1v  TAXES  0.03  0.82  0.02  0.03  0.60  0.00  0.00  0.31  0.13  6.00  0.00  0.32  0.22  0.31y  0.312  0.04  0.06  0. *5  0.06  0.00
613(8  0.80  0.66  0.66  0.00  0.80  0.23  0.24  0. Is  0.13  0.00  0.31  2.50  0.19  1.  54  P.62  0.  30  0.61  0.12z  1.36  1.  13
L.  laIVSI  1*15  I1.SS  16.60  48.32  64.43  65.13  68.9  62.01  69.32  31.08  13.16  13.10  64.51  62.64  51.94e  64.62  60.91  61.53  65.31  63.11  51.68
Xmas  ~~~~~26.13  32.16  21.63  21.42  16.23  16.42  29.10  32.13  26.18  19.00  31.26  42.99  42.04  40.90  15.90  24.56  22.26  26.65  23.36  25.15
013(86.5*1*.  Tuba.  vA?  I0.38  6.66  6.50  10.13  5.66  5.13  6.41  6.08  4.69  3.93  3.50  S.46  *  11  5.33  2.32  1.95  2.92  4.33  1.53  8.03
S(351s a  a  16.21  14.31  31.44  11.39  10.13  10.49  32.39  25.G8  21.04  15.01  23.16  31.62  33.43  28.62  13.58  22.62  19.34  22.34  16.03  31.13
O66M33  mamliN  80  VA  NA  is  Ng  80  NA4  NA  MA  80  8A.  NA  IA  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.49  8.96  4.50  1.45
WESIVanSnICEES  0.22  0.41  0.39  0. 30  0.22  0.32  6.24  0.31  0.45  0.00  0.00  5.92  4.31  6.95  80  8  NA  MA  Ng  80
1LI  44.8"2  53.8  40.10  31.81  49.49  52.  S5  32.11  31.30  44.90  54.1is  45.84  21.52  20.51  15.04  40.12  36.40  39.25  38.66  40.20  32.53
sa.I  11111S  33.1)  11.17  34.62  15.32  1903  17.21  9.16  11.41  35.68  16.26  14.35  14.12  14.12  30.81  19.25  13.95  16.35  19.34  16.03  16.62
cup"  simIE  11.66  12.3  10.62  18.14  35.3  13.21  L.83  C.8  25.61  16.31  11.91  13.11  14.66  9.41  14.46  10.50  13.49  13.40  10.95  9.31
0130  601080(S  1.33  4.61  3.40  0.49  LO6  4.06  4.33  4.59  0.159  0.05  2.64  0.61  2.34  1.41  4.19  3.45  4.86  5.93  5.01  1.33
1363  IRS  3.301  54  3  5.4  2.69  23.31  30.21  35.34  32.95  31.13  18.11  3.5St  30.56  0.0S  0.13  0.04  28.64  21.91  22.15  19.33  24.19  15.91
am  ~~~~~33.5  550 3650.1  0  23.66  38.4  34.61  21.96  31.63  '8.66  3. 14  30.36  0.00  0.00  0.00  21.34  19.91  21.18  18.95  24.11  15.9'
01m0  6.19  8.16  0.19s  0.35  1.41  0.84  0."5  0.10  0.5St  6.  1  0.30  0.05  0.13  0.  04  1.31  2.005  0.117  0.3  0.02  0.0(0
GUM TAXES056  13L.3  1UASIS  0.8  L.OD  0.80  0.38  0.39  0.66)  0.601  0.66  6.66  0.66  0.53  1.31  3.54  4.33  0.802  0.48  0.15  0.00  0.00  0.00
am66  TAM0  B.64  1.32  6.61  0.66  0.33  0.42  0.66  0.80  0.80  0.66)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
II.  lIam  OE80M  1.50  6.31  13.13  30.64  13.32  30.24  13.69  6.93  9.09  0.12  6.13  8.00  6.19  14.41  36.85  16.11  35.33  30.25  9.13  8.46
,%%I  OF  GM.  F1(5  ETC.  2.31  1.62  1.55S  2.49  1.92  1.80  3.41  2.23  1.69  1.39  1.45  3.16  Z.  48  3.88  NA  0.06  2  01  kh  IsA  8A
980808  Dim  3.33  4.44  9.11  10.64  10.5  1i  .94  30.64  6.23  1.00  1.22  4.19  5.95  4.00  1.44  MA  IS. to  10. Z9  NAk  8.20  tAA
MN11  N.3LC  (AITM1InalS  2.5S3  3. T4  6.42  6.37  9.179  6.31  9.66  4.00  3.5  1I  .12  4.19  5.19  3.93  1.33  8A  80  kA  80  8.20  kSA
KaWS.  Wv*sISS.1011gESI  0.80  0.10  1.29  1.46  0.12  1.58o  0.98  2  23  3.53t  0.09  0.00  0.35s  0.01  0  33  "A  0.00  kA  k0  k0  80
16M585  9033013(8  ((VlLS  OFCO  1.11  0.93  0.66  0.05  0.02  0.30  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.09  0.03  0.0E0  000D  0.00  80  0 00  0.0  ISo  A  NA  kA
013(8033.468980*13  3.03  3.38  1.20  0. 45  0.81  0.32  0.96  0.41  0.26  0.23  0.46  0.96  0.31  3.14  NA  0 09  Z. '1  NA  0.91  ftA
153.  CAPitA.  Inflaw3  0.00  0.00)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.80  0.00  0.00i  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00(  0.00  0.00  0.00u  0 00  0 00  0.00  0 00  000o
MAL  1.531*13  99.92  99.32  3000.00  99.95  99.319  99.99  300.00  300.00  9.  94  100.00  300.00  96.63  98.86  99.03  19.44  lit, 9  ¶11.~98  14.15  94 16  9?.~  41
IV.  6*841  (9WsAs)  0.00  0.48  0.00  0.05  0.61  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.00  1.  31  1 34  0 ¶59  0.56  4.0U4  4.02  5.25  5.44  7t.11
TOIL  KLlA  We  mats1  300.00  166.030.00  100.  6610.0  30.0308  00.00  100.00  300.00  100.00  300.00  100.00  300 00oo-  100.00  100.00  10o13io  (JO  300 00  300.00  100.00  300.00
...  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...  . . . . . . . . . ..  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...  . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -24
revenue has led to a certain degree of instability in the
revenue intake and this has also affected the composition of
revenue. The early peaks in revenue collection seen in Figure
2.2 (1970/71 and in 1974/75) correspond to those years in
which export duties peaked. Changes in export tax revenue were
also the result of changes in the tax rate (it  was especially
high in the early 1970s). These factors explain the slight
changes in the composition of revenue during these years.
Another rather dramatic shift in the composition of revenues
occurs during 1980/81, 1981/82 and in 1982. During these years
there is a dramatic drop in revenue from international trade
transactions --  import duties remained fairly stable but there
was a virtual collapse in revenue from export duties. 13 This
had a considerable effect on the composition of revenue:
direct taxes provided about 30 percent of total revenue and
taxes on domestic goods and services jumped from 27 percent of
total revenue in 1979/80 to 43 percent in 1980/81. By 1984,
however, the traditional pattern re-emerges.
With expenditures consistently more sizable  than revenue
over the two decades, the central government was constantly in
deficit. The central government deficit peaked in 1975/76 at
13  The  collapse in export duties  seems to be the result  of
several factors. A general collapse of economic conditions meant
that more people were turning away from commercial activity into
subsistence. An overvalued cedi combined with a decline in cocoa
production meant reduced exports and hence, reduced receipts from
export taxes  (and reduced receipts due to lower import levels).
This was compounded by the growth of  black market cocoa exports and
of the parallel market in  general which is  not subject to taxation.
(see Rimuer  (1989) and May (1985))25
just under 14 percent of GDP.  It  gradually declined to about 5
percent of GDP in the first few years of the eighties. With
the onset of the Economic Recovery Program, central government
deficit fell even further and in 1986 the central government
budget was more or less balanced. Since 1986 the central
government budget has been in surplus at about .5 percent of
GDP.
ii.j Social Security and the National Insurance Trust
The Social Security Fund (later renamed the Social
Security and National Insurance Trust - SSNIT) was established
in 1965 and its surpluses have been an important source of
finance for the central government. The scheme provides mainly
pension benefits, but there are also provisions  for
invalidity, survivor's, sickness and employment benefits. It
is financed by contributions equivalent to 12.5 percent of the
employees remuneration from the employer and 5 percent from
the employee himself. Any establishment with over five
employees  is required to join the scheme. Government workers
have taken part since 1973. While contributions to the system
have not always been up to date (in 1974/75 the known arrears
in contributions amounted to 033 million 14), the Social
Security Fund has not yet had to pay out much in the way of
benefits and thus has had consistent surpluses over the past
twenty years  (see Table 2.3).
14  World Bank data.It.  13 OKMIIS  SIflm5  OW  01DE  NtIC  Ct9  Iinlil1S  eIu  I  OF  G
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Until 1986,  the SSNIT  was required  to invest  its
surpluses  in government  paper  and  as a result  it was a
substantial  holder  of medium-term  government  securities.  When
such  securities  were not available,  the SSNIT  deposited  the
balance  of the surplus  with  the Bank  of Ghana (until  the
government's  next issue  of securities).  Since 1986,  the SSNIT
has been  allowed  to make its own choices  regarding  its  asset
structure.
iii)  The state-owned  enterprises
The state-owned  enterprise  sector  (SOEs)  in Ghana  is
quite  large.  Most of the state  enterprises  were created  in the
19609  and early 1970s  to meet  particular  economic  and social
objectives.  In 1986,  the state-owned  sector  consisted  of 181
companies  in which  the government  had majority  ownership  and
54 companies  in which  the  government  was minority  shareholder.
In general  the state-owned  sector  has not lived  up to
expectations  and the return  on the sizable  investment  required
and on loans  has been low.  As a result  the state-owned  sector
has placed  a heavy financial  and  managerial  burden  on the
central  government.  Data  back  to 1970  are available  for  two
parts of the state-owned sector --  for the Cocoa Marketing
Board  and for  the Ghana  Industrial  Holding  Corp.  For the rest
of the state-owned  sector  data  only  become  available  in 1984.
After  considering  the data on the Cocoa  Marketing  Board  and on
the Ghana Industrial  Holding  Corp.,  we will  take a look  at  the
scattered  evidence  on the rest  of the SOEs to get a general28
idea of the effect that they had on the public sector deficit.
a) The Cocoa Marketina Board.  The Cocoa Marketing Board
(CMB) was established as a means of regulating domestic
aspects of cocoa marketing and particularly as a means of
stabilizing the price paid to domestic cocoa producers. It is
responsible for organizing and financing the purchase and
transport of cocoa beans to ports and processing plants and
for marketing Ghanaian cocoa on the world market. As seen
above, the most important source of central government revenue
has been the export tax on cocoa. The duty payable is based on
the f.o.b. export price received by the CMB for cocoa sales;
the duty takes the form of a 100% tax on  all receipts above a
set price. This price (the price that producers receive) is
set by the CMB and has often been considerably lower than
world market prices.
In addition to the duties paid to the central government,
the CMB at times provided loan capital to the government. At
other times, however, the CMB deferred paying its taxes --
some 030 million in 1971/7215.  It also found itself with a net
operating deficit (after taxes) in a number of years. These
have been financed directly by the Central Bank. Table 2.3
shows the net operating surpluses and deficits of the CMB
(after taxes) dating back to 1969/70.
Is  World Bank data.29
b) The Ghana Industrial  Holding  Corp.  The Ghana Industrial
Holding  Corporation  (GIHOC)  was established  as a holding
company  in 1967  to take  over  the functions  of the State
Enterprises  Secretariat.  It controls  the sixteen  divisions
that  originally  belonged  to the Secretariat  and has taken  on
ten more since.  16 Some  of the divisions  of the GIHOC,
including  distilleries,  canneries  and pharmaceuticals,  have
generally  been  profitable.  Others,  such  as bricks,  tiles  and
vegetable  oils,  have continually  made losses.  In general,  the
GIHOC  did not contribute  to any  great  extent  to the
consolidated  public  sector  deficit.  If anything,  it helped  to
very slightly  offset  the deficit (see  Table  2.3).
c)  Other  state-owned  enteRxrises.  For a number  of reasons,
there  is no series  of data  on the profits  and losses  of the
majority  of state-owned  enterprises  prior  to 1984.  This  makes
assessing  the deficit  of the consolidated  public  sector
particularly  difficult.  While  complete  information  is not
available,  state-owned  enterprises  clearly  dominate  the
industrial  sector,  and it is worth  considering  the information
that is available.
The sources  available 17 all indicate  that  most of the
non-financial  state  enterprises  have been  making  substantial
16 See Huq (1989),  p.242.
17 Huq (1989);  Killick (1978);  Rimmer (1989),  and World  Bank,
Country  Economic  Memorandum  (various  years).30
losses  or  earning  meager  profits.  The only  major  exception  to
this  case  has  been  the  Volta  River  Authority 18. Over  the past
two decades (and  before)  many SOEs  did not revalue  their
assets  and  many more  have stopped  fulfilling  contractual
obligations  by not paying  interest  or social  security
contributions.  Many are not even  paying  income  tax 19.
A report  from  the  mid-1970s,  discussed  some  of the profit
and loss  figures  for a few  of the SOEs.  In 1972,  the
Electricity  Corporation  had a profit  of 00.6  million  and the
Post &  Telecommunications  had a profit  of ¢1.2  million.  Ghana
Railways  and Harbours  made a loss  of ¢0.9  million  in 1971/72
and in the same  year  the Ghana  Water  and Sewerage made a loss
of 02.2  million.  The State  Gold  Mining  Corp  made a loss  of
06.6  million  in 1971/72,  but turned  a profit  in the next
fiscal  year. 20
The available  information  suggests  that  there  was a
significant  deterioration  in  the SOEs functioning  in the 1979-
83 period.  It is estimated  that  the operating  deficit  of about
100  public  enterprises  increased  from  092  million  in 1979  to
02.9  billion in 1982  or 3  percent  of GDP....The  net flow  of
budgetary  transfers  to the public  enterprise  sector  was
considerable  during  the 1979-83  period,  converting  on average
to about  ten percent  of total  government  expenditure.  Moreover
i8  see  Huq (1989),  p. 241.
19 Huq (1989),  p.242.
20  World Bank  data.31
the rate of interest  charged  on government  loans  was only  a
fraction  of the market  rate,  entailing  a significant  implicit
subsidy.  While  the government  was the major  source  of outside
financing  of operating  deficits  and investment  programs,  the
domestic  banking  system  made  up for  the remainder  of the
financing  needs.  21
The scattered  evidence  available  indicates  that through
1983,  the state-owned  enterprises  placed  a considerable  burden
on the public  sector.
A series  of data  on the "core"  state-owned  enterprisesU
is available  from  1984  onward.  These  enterprises  combined  with
the Cocoa  Marketing  Board  constitute  approximately  70 percent
of SOE output  and therefore  data on their  operations  is a
useful  guide  to how the state-owned  sector  is currently
influencing  the public  sector  deficit.  As seen in  Table 2.3,
the consolidated  accounts  of these  SOEs indicates  that  since
1984,  their  results  have been  good.  These  consolidated
accounts,  however,  mask somewhat  the fact  that  a number  of the
21  World  Bank  data.
22 The "core"  state-owned  enterprises  include:  Ghana  Water  and
Sewerage  Corporation,  Electricity  Corporation  of  Ghana,  Volta  River
Authority,  Ghana  Posts  and  Telecommunications  Corp.,  Ghana  Airways
Corp., Omnibus Services Authority,  State Transport  Corp., City
Express Services, State Shipping  Corporation  (Black  Star Line),
Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority,  Ghana Railway Corp., Ghana
National  Petroleum,  Ghanaian  Italian  Petroleum  Co.,Ghana  Oil Co.,
State  Gold  Mining  Corp.,  Ashanti  Goldfields, Ghana  Supply
Commission,  Ghana  National  Procurement  Agency.  The  Cocoa  Marketing
Board is also considered  one of the core Stat-owned  enterprises,
but since it has been discussed  above, it will not be included
here.32
state-owned enterprises still operated at a loss. Subventions
from the central government during these years amounted to
0488.2 million in 1984, 0679.7 million in 1985 and 01144.7 in
1986.3  Although there is no way to extrapolate
backwards from the more recent data to earlier years for the
"core state-owned enterprises", the anecdotal evidence does
seem to point to the fact that the state-owned enterprise
sector placed a considerable burden upon the public sector.
Hence, the measure of the consolidated public sector deficit
that has been set out above should be considered as a lower
bound to our estimate of the actual figure.
iv). The Central Bank
Another factor that should be taken into account when
considering the public sector deficit, but that has not been
taken into consideration in the consolidated deficit discussed
above, is the loss incurred by the central bank. This is often
referred to as the quasi-fiscal deficit. 24 The most  common
source of central bank losses is lending to the non-financial
public sector at no or at a very low interest rate. They also
may result from rescuing troubled financial institutions,
exchange guarantees and from the effect of a change in the
a  Based on World Bank data.
24 See Teijeiro (1989)  for  a general discussion of Central Bank
losses and how to account for them.33
real  exchange  rate  on the net foreign  asset  position5.  The
difficulty  in including  these  losses  into  the  public  sector
deficit  is that  accounting  practices  vary  widely  between  the
central  bank and the central  government.  It is clear  that in
Ghana the central  bank  has incurred  substantial  losses.  One
recent  report  stated  that  the accumulated  valuation
adjustments  on net foreign  liabilities  reached  0243  billion  by
end-June  1989,  equivalent  to more than  three  and a half  times
the net domestic  credit  of the banking  system  as a whole and
over 20 percent  of the GDP 26. These  devaluation  losses  are
essentially  a liability  of the Treasury.  The above
consolidation  does not  take the losses  of the central  bank
into  consideration.
The consolidation  of all of the available  data  on the
income  and expenditure  (and  net operating  profits)  of the
various components  of the public  sector  showed  us that,  even
excluding  complete  data on the state-owned  enterprises,  fiscal
deficits  in  Ghana  over the  past two  decades  have  been
significant.  A shortcoming  of this  approach,  however,  is the
fact  that it does not incorporate  the state-owned  enterprise
sector.  Another  difficulty  is that  capital  expenditure  tied  to
project  lending  and grants  has been excluded.  The evidence
25  Note that the central bank also makes gains from the
inflation  tax.
26  World Bank data. This is a nominal loss which should  be
adjusted  for  domestic  inflation.34
that is available  concerning  these  two factors  indicates  that
in excluding  them from  our  measure  of the consolidated  deficit
we may be underestimating  the claims  that  the public  sector
makes on resources.  One  way to address  these  problems  is to
define  the deficit  based  on the financing  requirements  of the
public  sector.
2) Defining  the public  sector  deficit  based  on itg financing.
An alternative  way of considering  the size of the deficit
is to consider  the  total financing  that  the government  has
received.  Data on the total  stock  of central  government  debt
outstanding  can  be supplemented  with the claims  that the
central  bank and the banking  system  have against  the state-
owned  enterprise  sector (from  IFS)  and with  the data on public
and publicly  guaranteed  external  debt (from  the World  Debt
Tables),  in order  to derive  a  measure  of the  total  outstanding
stocks  of debt of the public  sector.  Differencing  these  data
on stocks  provides  us with an alternative  flow  measure  of the
financing  that  was provided  to the public  sector  and thus  an
alternative  measure  of the fiscal  deficit.
As seen in Figure  2.327,  the public  sector  deficit  as
determined  by these  data is somewhat  different  than  that
determined  by consolidating  the accounts.  This is particularly
27 See  Table  3.1  for  the information  on stocks  underlying  this
figure.FLCLRE 2.3
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true after 1984 when external borrowing rises markedly. The
line marked with squares represents domestic flows to the
public sector. The line marked with crosses represents the
combined domestic and external flows to the public sector.
(Therefore the area between the two lines represents external
borrowing.) The fiscal deficit as determined by public sector
borrowing is  roughly 2 percent of GDP in  1971.  It rises
sharply, reaching 10 percent of GDP in 1973 due to a large
jump in  external borrowing over 1972 and 1973. Public sector
borrowing drops off in 1974 and 1975 only to jump to just 15
percent of GDP in 1976, 1977 and, 1978. This high level of
borrowing is all the more remarkable given  the lack of
external ±..^  sce. The deficit falls again to 5 percent of GDP
in 1979. Three more peaks follow in 1980, 1982, and 1986 with
public sector borrowing reaching 7.5, 9.7 and 10.24 percent of
GDP respectively. In 1987, total public sector borrowing
declined to 9.5 percent of GDP and in 1988 it dropped sharply,
reaching  a surplus of 0.38 percent of GDP."
In general the figures given here are considerably larger
than those provided by aggregating the public sector accounts.
There are two principal reasons for this. The first is, as
mentioned above, that the Ghanaian deficit, based on the
government accounts  (discussed above) exc'udes capital
expenditure  financed  through  external  project  aid  and  the
D  Note  that  the  revaluation  effects  on  the  external  debt
due  to  changes  in the  cedi/$  rate have been excluded  from the
total financing required in Figure 2.3.37
corresponding grants and loans, in other words, aid is treated
as income. The project aid and other such financing are
included in this measure of the deficit. This becomes
particularly important after the implementation of the
Economic Recovery Programme in 1984.  The second reason that
the finance-based estimate is larger is that it includes
information on the borrowing requirements of the public
enterprises, which was not complete in the government
accounts.
In the case of Ghana, determining the public sector
deficit from the financing side seems to provide a more
comprehensive estimate than using the conventional methr  I
where the various levels of the public sector are
consolidated. There are, however, some caveats to using this
measure. In particular, while in principal the differencing of
the stock measures should give us an accurate measure of net
flows, in practice this may not always be the case. In the
World Debt Tables, for example, the differencing of the total
stock of public and publicly guaranteed external debt does not
give us figures equal to the net flows of public and publicly
guaranteed debt as listed in the Debt Tables. This is largely
due to dollar revaluation effects, accounting discrepancies,
and to cancellation of loan contracts. Another potential
difficulty of using data on stocks to derive flows is that the
effect of inflation on the value of total debt stocks is not
taken into account. We address the effect of inflation on the38
flgws  of public  sector  debt  below,  but no attempt  to consider
the effects  of inflation  on total  debt  stocks  has been  made.
With the above  caveats  kept  in mind, it  might in some
cases  be more  appropriate  to use this second  definition  of the
deficit,  particularly  those  where  we are considering  financial
markets.  In part II on the effect  of fiscal  deficits  on
financial  markets  we use the  public  sector  deficit  based  on
its financing.  For the other  parts  of the study  we use the
conventional  measure  of the consolidated  fiscal  deficit  as set
out in section  1 above.
3) economic  and  polio,  determinants  of nublic  sector  defioits.
198Q821=8A
Before  considering  how the fiscal  deficit  affects  the key
macroeconomic  variables  in the economy,  it is useful  to
consider  the impact  that such  variables  may have on the fiscal
deficit.  Inflation  is likely  to affect  the fiscal  deficit  by
increasing  nominal  interest  payments.  In Ghana,  we might  also
expect  to find  the Oliveira-Tanzi  effect  in  which  direct  tax
revenue  declines  during  periods  of high inflation  as the
result  of collection  lags.  The level  of the  official  real
exchange  rate is also likely  to affect  the fiscal  deficit;  any
part of the deficit  that is denominated  in foreign  currency
will  be affected.  Changes  in  the real  exchange  rate  might  also
have an effect  on import  duties  and export  taxes.  Finally,
changes  in  the real  domestic  interest  rate  will affect  the39
deficit,  principally  through  its  effect  on the cost of
servicing  domestic  debt.
This section  decomposes  the conventional  measure  of the
consolidated  public  sector  deficits  according  to its  main
economic  and  policy  determinants,  including GDP growth,
inflation,  the real interest  rate,
and a number  of domestic  fiscal  and policy  variables.  The
period  we consider  covers  the fiscal  years  1980/81  through
1988.30  The methodology  used is a simplified  version  of that
set out in Marshall  and Schmidt-Hebbel  and also follows
closely  that  of the Zimbabwe  paper  by Morande  and Schmidt-
Hebbel.  The approach  starts  by identifying  the  main budgetary
items  of the consolidated  public  sector  deficit.  By using
estimated  tax revenue  functions,  and some  simple  variable
transformations,  one can decompose  changes  in the public
sector  deficit  into  quantifiable  macroeconomic  and policy
determinants.
a)Tax  revenue  functions
The first  step in the  methodology  is  to estimate  the
2  Because  the  decomposition calls  for  a  detailed
breakdown of the components  of the deficit and because this
detailed information  is not necessarily  consistent  with the
"financing-based"  deficit  measure, we  choose  to  use  the
conventional  measure of the deficit.  It is likely  to be more
appropriate  to use the conventional  measure in this instance,
because  it is the one  most frequently  used  by policymakers.
0 Ghana  switched  from  a fiscal  year accounting  basis  to a
calendar  year  accounting  basis  in 1982.40
behavioral  equations  for the tax revenue  functions.  For  Ghana
we have  estimated  four  separate  functions:  direct  taxes,
export  taxes,  import  duties,  and other  indirect  taxes (sales
and excise  taxes).  These  functions  were estimated  for  the
1970/71-1988  period;  the results  are set out in Table  2.4.
Direct  taxes  depend  positively  on GDP which  is used as a
proxy for  the tax base.  The relationship  between  direct  taxes
and inflation  is a negative  one,  indicating  that the negative
effects  on income  tax revenue  due to collection  lags.  etc.
(the  Oliveira-Tanzi  effect)  outweighs  the positive  effect  that
inflation  may have on direct  tax revenue  due to "bracket
creep" (  the effect  traditionally  discussed  in the tax
literature  in reference  to inflation  in developed  countries).
There  is a positive  relationship  between  the real exchange
rate  and inflation  which  may be explained  in  two ways.  A real
exchange  rate  depreciation  (  an increase  in our measure)  is
likely  to lead  to increased  exports  and thus  higher  income,
which  would increase  the intake  on tax revenues.  Tax rates  may
also  be higher  in  the traded-good  sectors  than in the non-
traded  goods sectors,  leading  to an increased  revenue  intake
with a depreciation.  Three  dummy  variables  were included  to
take  policy  changes  with respect  to the tax regime  into
account.  The first  is for  the 1974-79  period;  the second  marks
the "first  coming"  of Rawlings  and both  the political  and
economic  uncertainty  as well as a massive  deterioration  in  the
performance  of the tax administration  over the  period:  the41
Table 2.4A
Estimation  Results for  Tax Revenue  Functions  (1970/71-1988)
A. Direct  Taxes
DTt  8  ao  +  a,Yt  +  al'rt  +  a3RER,  +  a,D7479  +  a,D7983  +  a,D84  +  et
Rearession a.  a,  as  . O  M  DW  R'
1.  -9.41  1.38  -.64  1.05  .610  .560  .370  1.91 .941
(-2.95)  (5.51)  (-3.87)  (6.03)  (4.71)  (3.38)  (3.91)
B.  Export  Taxes
ETt  0a  +  PLEXt +  Prt  +  3RERt  +  *TOTt  +  PsD8082  +  £t
Rearession  Bo  a  _  B.  B I.  B  B.  DW  R'
1.  7.39  .54  -. 09  .44  .905  -6.17  2.63  .982
(6.57)  (1.94)  (-.14)  (.801)  (1.53)  (-16.11)
2.  8.61  .49  - - - -6.49  2.03  .978
(28.57)  (2.66)  (-22.4)
C.  Import  Duties
IDt  - *  y+  7IXt  +  y2t  +  y3RERt  +  y,TOTt  +  at
Rearession  v  ,  'T  7.  v-  DW  Rl
1.  6.41  .743  .429  1.20  .624  2.29  .84
(17.56)  (3.37)  (1.40)  (5.22)  (2.11)
2.  6.63  .708  - 1.03  .714  2.58 .82
(19.54)  (3.13)  - (5.14)  (2.39)
D. Other Indirect  Taxes
OITt  - AG +  A 1Yt  +  AaWt  +  A3D79  +  A,D73,  + et
Ragression  Aa  A.  A.  A.  A.  OW  R'
1.  -16.5  2.05  -1.41  -.28  -.66  1.93 .78
(-2.85)  (4.53)  (-6.26)  (-1.17)  (-2.64)
2.  -14.7  1.91  -1.40  - -.62  1.63 .76
(-2.60) (4.32)  (-6.17)  - (-2.49)
Note: All regressions  were performed  on real variables in logs
(except  for those variables  that are indices  and dummies)  using
OLS.  Residual  autoregressions  for  each  final  equation  did  not show
evidence  of autocorrelation.42
last  marks  the beginning  of the structural  adjustment  program
and  efforts  to improve  revenue  mobilization.  All three
variables  have a positive,  significant  relationship  with
direct  tax revenues.
For  export  taxes,  an  index  of  export  volume  was  used  as
the base. Inflation,  the real  exchange  rate,  the terms  of
trade,  and a dummy  for  the period  between  1980-82  were also
included  in the estimation,  but only  exports  and the dummy
variable  were significant.  Export  taxes  are  positively  related
to  exports  and very  strongly  and negatively  related  to the
dummy  variable.  This  dummy  variable  reflects  three  years  when
export  tax revenue  plummets  (as  discussed  above).  The cause
may be because  in the early  eighties  those  cocoa  producers  who
were still  producing  were likely  to be selling  their  cocoa  on
the black  market.  Another  factor  that  may have  contributed  is
the breakdown  in  tax administration  due to the severe  economic
crisis  during  those  years.
Import  duties  were regressed  on an index  of import
volume, inflation,  the real  exchange  rate  and  the terms  of
trade.  An increase  in imports  is shown  to have a positive
effect  on import  duties.  Inflation  was found  to be
insignificant.  An depreciation  in the real  exchange  rate  was
found  to have  a positive  effect  on import  duties.  This  may
result  from  the fact  that  an increase  in the real  exchange
rate  would assist  exports  thereby  improving  access  to the
foreign  exchange  necessary  to import.  To the extent  that  the43
ability  to export  increases  the ability  to import,  a
depreciation  in the currency  could  lead  to a rise in revenue
from import  duties.  A depreciation  also  raises  import  tax
revenue  by increasing  the  domestic  value  of imports.  An
increase  in the terms  of trade (defined  here  as the unit  value
of exports  over  the unit  value  of imports)  was also found  to
increase  import  duties.  This is likely  to be due to the fact
that  an improvement  in the terms  of trade  allows  a country  to
import  more and thus to increase  its  revenue  from  import
duties.
The last  revenue  function  estimated  is that for "other
indirect  taxes"  e.g.  sales  taxes  and  excise  duties.  We regress
other  direct  taxes  against  GDP (a  proxy  for  the tax base)
inflation,  the real  exchange  rate  and a number  of dummy
variables  for  policy  shifts  and/or  changes  in regime.  Other
indirect  taxes  are  positively  related  to GDP, and negatively
related  to inflation  . A dummy  variable  for  a shift  in regime
in 1973 is significant  and  negatively  related  to other
indirect  taxes.  The other  dummy  variables  tested  were not
significant.
b) Decomoosition  of the public  sector  deficit
According  to the methodology  set out in Marshall  and
Schmidt-Hebbel  (1989),  Table 2.5  sets  out the changes  in the
main economic  and  policy  determinants  of the fiscal  deficit
from 1980/81  through  1988.  The domestic  macroeconomic44
Table 2.6
Ghana 
Chenge  of  Ee.onele  and Pelley
Dtrctminonte  of  Conselidated Nen-Financial
Public  Sector Deficit  1/
60/S1  61/62  130  10  18  1914  13n5  1930  1307  1son
1.  Doesai  variable.l
Real GOP (Y  )  0.070  -0.202  -0.153  0.007  0.020  0.051  0.052  0.049  0.062
Exports  (EX')  -0.045  -0.001  0.049  -0.279  0.020  0.211  0.105  0.077  0.128
Imports  (!M)  -0.022 -0.162 -0.217 -0.102  0.270  0.112  0.148  0.129  0.047
Domestic  I  rate-real  (dr)  -0.149  0.1O  0.276  -0.94  0.709  0.284  -0.191  0.066  0.062
Doesetic  Inflation  (dP  )  0.170  -. 10  -0.821  0.06  -0.674  -0.229  0.211  -0.025  -0.057
Real exchange  rate  (RER')  -0.860  -.809  -0.071  0.467  2.044  0.417  0.448  0.277  0.042
2.  Foreign  Veriables
Foreoign  I  rate  n(die)  0.020  -0.006 -0.017  -0.021  0.010  -0.021  -0.015  -0.001  0.008
Terse of  Trade (TOT')  -0.170  4O.253  4.105  0.067  0.802  -0.059  0.126  -4.0O3  -4.073
8.  Policy  Variables
foreoign debt  (De/P*)  4.06  -0.061  -0.020  0.019  -4.070  0.06  0.29,  0.246  0.012
Domestic debt  (D/P)  -0.1lf -0.042  0.061  -0.205  -0.218  -0.049 -0.058  4.821  -0.847
Wage  bill  (WS/P)  0.10  -0.299 -0.109 -o.22  -. 017  1.279  0.278  -0.015  0.082
Goods  and servicee  (CS/P)  0.108  -0.070  0.021  4.103  1.060  0.086  -4.131  0.108  0.095
Transfer.  and subsidies  (TS/P)  -0.155  -0.248  0.116  -O.151  -0.276  0.160  -0.121  -0.064  0.108
SOE  net  op.  surplue  (PD/P)  2/  i.9J3  -4.017  -1.241  -0.282  2.201  -4.730  5.919  0.402  -0.882
Investment  (I/P)^  8/  0.839  -0.517 -0.179 -O.88  0.075  0.720  -0.027  0.862  0.220
Policy  duey-  dir  taxe  (d07479)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Policy  dumy-  dir  taxes  (d7983)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -1.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Policy  duiy-post  U4  dir  tax(db94)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  -1.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Policy  dumy-3082,  gxp.  tax  (dD0i"2)  1.000  0.000  0.000  -1.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Policy  dummy-oth.ind.taxes  (d078)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
1/  Due  to  limited  data availability  Includoe  central  govornment,  SSIIT  CMi, OKHC,  but not other stat.-owne
enterprises.
2/ Net  operating surpluse  or defleto  of the $SNIT,  CII  and  ODIOC.
8/ Caplitl  expenditure of central  govern_ent  and  SSNZT.45
variables  considered  are real  GDP,  real  exports,  real imports,
the real interest  rate (as  defined  by the Fisher  equation),
inflation  (as  measured  by the change  in  the GDP deflator),  and
the real exchange  rate.  Two foreign  variables  are considered,
the nominal  interest  rate  and the terms  of trade.
A set of policy  variables  is also  considered  including
the real  domestic  and foreign  debt  stocks,  the government  wage
bill,  government  spending  on other  goods  and services,  and
government  transfers  and subsidies.  Public  sector  net
operating  surpluses  (for  those  SOEs for  which  the data is
available)  and public  investment  are also  considered  as policy
variables.  Finally,  there  are five  "policy"  or "regime"
dummies  which  are indicative  of either  changes  of regime  or
periods  where  there  was massive  erosion  in tax collection.
Table 2.5 shows  that  until  1983  real  GDP growth  was close
to zero  or negative.  Since  1984  it has picked  up considerably
reaching  6.2 percent  in 1988.  Both  export  and import  growth
have  picked  up since  the adjustment  program  in 1984.  Changes
in the domestic  real interest  rate  have  been  erratic,  largely
reflecting  dramatic  changes  in  the inflation  rate  given
controls  on the nominal  rate.  Inflation  has been  unstable  over
the period  under  consideration,  though  in recent  years  the
changes  have not been so dramatic.  Finally,  the changes  in the
real  exchange  rate  reflect  the cedis  depreciation  over  the
period.  Particularly  noteworthy  is the depreciation  of more
than 200 percent  in 1984.46
The changes  in foreign  variables  indicate  that the
nominal  foreign  interest  rate  has for  the most  part remained
stable.  The terms  of trade  on the other  hand  has not.
Finally,  table 2.5  also  shows  some  of the policy
variables  over  which  the government  has somewhat  more control.
From 1984  onward  foreign  debt increased  dramatically  and
domestic  debt  declined  dramatically.  The real  wage  bill fell
throughout  the  period  until  1985  when there  was a large  jump.
The changes  in spending  on goods  and services  were  mostly
negative  until 1984  when a large  jump  occurred.  After 1984
spending  tended  to increase  from  year  to year.  Transfers  and
subsidies  have not followed  any systematic  pattern.  Nor have
SOE net operating  surpluses  which  show  significant  changes
from  year  to year (both  positive  and negative).  Prior  to the
adjustment  program  public  investment  fell  dramatically.  Since
1984,  it has grown  considerably  each  year (with  the exception
of 1986).
Table 2.6 sets  out  the decomposition  of the consolidated
public  sector  deficit  into  the main  budgetary  variables  (This
breakdown  reflects  a simplified  version  of equation  (17)  in
Marshall  and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1989)  or alternatively  equation
(4)  in the appendix  of the Zimbabwe  paper.).  Note that  both
domestic  and foreign  interest  payments  have  been  determined
implicitly,  using  the interest  rate  and the stock  of domestic
and foreign  debt,  respectively.  The table  also includes  a
residual  which incorporates  those  items  of the deficit  which47
Table  2.6
Ghana
Decoeposition  of  the  Consolidated
Non-financial  Public  Sector  Deficit  /1
According  to  Changes  In Budgetary  Vailables
(Ratio.  to GOP)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
60/31  81/82  1982  t.8e  1984  1985  to6  1907  e196
I.  Changes of  Included  Variables
Wages  0.004  -0.010  -0.002  -0.006  -0.001  0.023  0.009  -0.00  -0.001
Other  Goods S  Serv.  -0.002  -0.001  0.001  -0.004  0.019  -0.001  -0.007  0.002  0.001
Transfers  A Subs.  -0.00  -0.006  0.004  -0.004 -0.007  0.001  -0.003 -0.002  0.000
Direct  Taxes  -0.002  0.002  0.001  -0.007  0.006  0.007  0.006  0.006  0.006
Export  taxes  -0.026  0.000  -0.000  0.016  0.002  0.006  0.001  0.008  -0.018
Import  duties  -0.006  0.002  -0.008  0.004  0.001  0.006  0.009  -0.004  0.000
Other  Indirect  Taxes  0.001  -0.000  0.001  -0.01  0.012  0.006  0.012  -0.008  0.001
Doe.  i  payments  (impl.)  -0.000  -0.008  -0.006  0.002  -0.001  -0.002  -0.000  -0.006  -0.006
For.  i  payments  (impI.)  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  0.001  0.009  0.001  0.002  0.009  0.003
SOEo  os.  (.udof,  - sur)/2  -0.006  0.02S  -0.026  0.00.  -0.00  0.009  -0.018  -0.007  0.010
Investment  0.007  -0.012  -0.002  -0.004  0.006  0.009  -0.002  0.006  0.004
Explained  Sum  0.004  -0.00  -0.080  0.004  -0.009  0.020  -0.046  -0.007  0.001
II.  Chgx.  of  Exci.  variables  /3  0.022  0.013  -0.009  -0.022  -0.009  -0.006  0.005  -0.006  0.011
Consolidated  Public  Sector  Deficit  0.027  0.005  -0.039 -0.018  -0.017  0.013  -0.041 -0.012  0.012
_________________  ________________  _________________  ________________  ...  __  _  _  --  - --  - - - _____________________________---
/1  Data  for  the  Consolidated  Public  Sector  in  Ghana  Include  the  Central  Government,  Social  Security  and  National
Insurance  Trust,  the  Cocoa  Marketing  Board,  and  the  WHane  Industrial  Holding  Corp.Data  for  other  SOE.  not  availabi
/2  This  Is  the  net  operating  surplus/  deficit  of  the MSNIT,  CUS  and  01GOC.
/3  Residual  which  Includes  changes  in  those  factors  not  considered explicitly.48
were not explicitly  treated  either  for  lack  of detailed  data
or because  they  are relatively  insignificant.
Finally,  Table  2.7 sets  out the final  results  of the
decomposition  which allows  us to identify  the changes  in  the
consolidated  fiscal  deficit  according  to their  underlying
macroeconomic  and policy  causes.  The effect  of the main
macroeconomic  variables  has by and large  been negative.
Consider  1984  as an example.  In this  year the  main
macroeconomic  variable  contributing  to a reduction  in  the
deficit  was inflation;  the positive  effect  of a reduction  in
inflation  reduced  the deficit  by 21.6  percentage  points  of GDP
(note  that in 1983  the converse  happened  and inflation
contributed  to an increase  in the deficit  by 35.8  percentage
points).  At the same  time  changes  in the real interest  rate
increased  the deficit  by 11.3  percent  of GDP. The positive
effect  of GDP growth  on tax  bases (the  economic  effect)
contributed  to a reduction  in the deficit  of  .7  percentage
points  of GDP; and  the "denominator  effect" (due  to the fact
that  the deficit  and every  budget  item  are expressed  as ratios
to GDP) reduced  the budget  deficit  by .2  percentage  points  of
GDP.  The other  variables  can be analyzed  in a similar  way. The
table indicates  that  the dramatic  changes  in  macroeconomic
variables  in 1983  and 1984,  particularly  changes  in the
inflation  rate  had a strong  impact  on the fiscal  deficit.
These  effects  have  become  less  pronounced  over  the past five
years  as the Ghanaian  economy  has grown  more stable.49
TAILS 2.7
OMNA
DECOMPOSITION  OF  THE  CHANES  IN  CONSOLIDATED
NON-FINANCIAL  PUBLIC  SECTOR  DEFICITS  1/
ACCORDING  TO  CHANCES  IN ECONOMIC  AND  POLICY  VARIABLES
(Ratio,  to  COP)
..  . ______....____,._._.....  ........  ................................. ,__,,.............  _._  ....  - -.  _.__.  --------... _,.._  , IO/St  81/52  IM3  I93"  1914  1SI5  1918  191?  01116
1.  Changec  Due to Domestic  Variables
Real  GOP  (Y')-denominator  -0.006  0.027  0.019  -0.001  -0.002  -0.004  -.005  O  -.00  -0.004
R"l  CDP  (Y')-  numrator  -0.017  0.057  0.042  -0.002  -0.007  -0.013  -001O  -0.012  -0.016
Exports  (EX')  0.002  0.000  -0.002  0.012  -0.001  -0.007  -0.004  4.003  o.Sti0
Imports  (IMi  0.001  0.011  0.012  0.004  -0.011  -0.006  -0.008  -0.008  -0..
Domestic  I  rates  (real-dr)  -0.084  0.034  0.051  -0.191  0.113  0.028  -0.021  0.006  0.006
Domestic  Inflation  (dP^)  0.069  -06007  4.110  0.a6  -0.210  -06OO5  0.067  -0.006  -0.013
Real  Exchange  Rate (RER  )  0.003  0.005  0.001  -0.004  -0.026  -0.016  -0.021  -0.028  -0.004
2.  Changes  Due  to  Foreign  Veriablos
Foroign  nom.  1.  rate  (di*)  0.002  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  0.001  -O.OO  -0.003  -0.000  0.004
Term of  Trade  (TOT')  0.011  0.016  0.005  -000  -0.014  0.004  -0.00?  0.006  0.004
S.  Changes  Due  to  Policy  Variable
Foreign  Debt (De/Pe)'  -0.001  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.001  0.004  0.004  0.000
Domestic Debt (D/P)'  -0.006  -0.001  0.002  -0.004  -005  -0.001  -0.001  -4.007  -4.005
Wage  Bill  (UI/P)  0.004  -01012  -0.008  -0.006  -0.000  0.025  0.012  -0.001  0.002
Goode  and Services  (CS/P)  -4.001  -0.002  0.000  -0.004  0.020  0.001  -0.005  0.003  0.003
Trnnstore  and Subsidles  (TS/P)'  -0-05  -0.007  0.008  -0.004  -0.006  0.002  -0.002  -0.001  0.001
50  net  op.  surplus  (PD/P)^2/  -4.005  0.027  -0.020  0.001  -0.009  0.009  -0.019  -0.008  0.009
Invstment  (I/P)  3/  0.007  -4.018  -0.002  -0.004  0.007  0.010  -0.001  0.007  0.006
Policy  du_y-  dir  taxes  (dD747)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Policy  dumy-  dir  taxes  (d7983)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Policy  dumy-post  64 dir  tax(dD84)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000
Policy  dumy-002  I  EXp. tax  (d88082)  0.019  0.000  0.000  4.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Poliey  dumy-oth.ind.taxes  (d47T)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0°000  0.000  0.000
SUM  OF  EXPLAINED  CHANCES  0.062  0.016  -04.02  0.154  -0149  -0.020  -0.024  -0.01  -4.001
UNEXPLAINED  CHANCES  -0.03a  -0.011  0.012  -0.172  0.131  O.O4  -0.017  0.024  0.013
CHANCE  IN CPSD  0.027  0.005  O  .- 009  -0.018  -0.017  0.013  -0.041  -0.012  0.012
1/ Due  to  imited  data  availability  Includes  central  government  SSNIT,  CB, OINOC,  but  not  other  state-owned
enterprises.
2/  Net operating  surpluses  or  deficits  of  the  SSNITi CMI  and C2HOC.
3/  Capital  expenditure  of  central  governeant and SSNIT.50
Finally, Table 2.7 shows that the policy variables under
the government control have generally not had as much impact
on the deficit as the macroecononic variables have had. We see
that the large wage increase in 1985, contributed  a 2.5
percentage increase in the deficit, but that the effects of
other policy variables in this year were relatively small. As
with the macroeconomic variables, more stable policy variables
in recent years have led to much smaller impacts upon the
deficit.51
XIX.)  FIXCAL  DUIXCXT8  AND FINANCThL  MARRUTo
It was not until  the  mid-sixties  that the economic
literature  began  to integrate  the effects  of deficit  financing
on asset  markets  into  discussions  of fiscal  policy.  Earlier
analyses  did not allow  for  the fact  that fiscal  and monetary
policies  might imply  changes  in private  sector  portfolios  and
hence  changes  in  private  sector  wealth.  The early  analyses
(Christ  (1968),  Blinder  and Solow (1974))  are referred  to as
the "government  budget  constraint  literature."  As its name
implies  this literature  sets  out the government  budget
constraint  (the  fiscal  deficit  must equal  the sum  of domestic
borrowing,  external  borrowing  and money  creation)  and
considers  the impact  that  changes  in the  method  of financing
the  deficit  have on portfolio  holdings  and  the resulting
effect  on output.
The strand  of the literature  concerning  the relationship
between fiscal  deficits  and inflation  is referred  to as the
"public  finance  approach  to inflation",  31  and is  based  on the
work of Phelps (1973),  Dornbusch  (1977),  and Buiter (1983,
1985),  among  others.  Van Wijnbergen  (1982),  van Wijnbergen  et
al (1989)  and Easterly  (1989a)  extend  and undertake
applications  of this framework  in  various  developing
countries.
Like the  government  budget  constraint  literLture,  this
strand  relies  on the  government  budget  constraint,  but the
31  See  van Wijnbergen  (1989),  p. 1.52
focus  here is on money  creation  as a source  of finance.  In
these  models,  inflation  is  determined  as a residual  tax. It is
a residual  because,  given  constraints  on external  borrowing
and the  willingness  of the public  sector  to hold  public  debt,
the government  must turn  to money  creation  to cover  the gap.
To the extent  that rate  of money  creation  exceeds  the rate  of
growth  of the demand  for  money  balances  it  will be
inflationary.  Inflation  acts  as a tax because  it forces  the
private  sector  to reduce  expenditure  just  to maintain  the real
value of money  balances  it  wishes  to hold for  a given  rate-of-
return  structure.  Van Wijnbergen  et  al (1989)  emphasize  that
in the short  run demand  pressure  or cost-push  factors  may be
important  determinants  of inflation,  but they  argue  these
factors  contribute  little  to the  understanding  of sustained
inflation.
In the previous  section  we saw that  over  the  past two
decades  Ghana  has had large  public  sector  deficits.  This  part
of the study  focuses  on the  way in which  Ghana  chose  to
finance  these  deficits  and  how these  decisions  may have
affected  the financial  (as  opposed  to real)  side  of the
economy.  In general,  until  the imiplementation  of the
adjustment  program,  the  government  relied  on money  creation  as
the principal  method  of finance  which led  to high rates  of
inflation 32. In the heavily  controlled  Ghanaian  economy,  these
32  Other factors,  such as supply  shocks,  as well as money
creation  contributed  to the two price  shocks  of 1981  and 1983.
See Chhibber  and Shafik (1990).53
high rates of inflation resulted in negative real interest
rates and, because of the fixed nominal exchange rate, in
overvaluation of the currency. These in turn implied implicit
taxes on financial intermediation and reduced incentives for
exports. They also implied increasingly high returns in the
informal economy which eventually became pervasive. All of
this served to erode the tax base, thus increasing the deficit
and leading to more money creation and the continuation of the
vicious circle.
In the first half of this section we consider the means
of finance that the government used and trace through some of
the implications for the economy. In the second half we focus
on the tradeoffs between inflation and seignorage revenue in
Ghana and consider some alternative scenarios using a simple
model based on the model suggested in Appendix II of Easterly
et al (1989).
Z.) Flvanging the Deficit
Table 3.1 provides a detailed breakdown of the financing
components of the public sector deficit. As discussed in the
previous section, access to external borrowing prior to 1984
was limited. External debt flows (minus  revaluation) generally
ianged between -0.74 and 1.62 percent of GDP with the
exception of 1973, in which the flow of external financing was
4.86 percent of GDP. With the Economic Recovery Programme and
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borrowing  increased  reaching  9.89  percent  of GDP in 1987.
Before  the ERP, Ghana  was effectively  required  to finance  her
deficits  domestically.
The decomposition  of domestically  held  public  debt shows
that  the principal  financier  to the  government  has been the
Bank  of Ghana.  In the first  years  of the seventies  debt held
by the monetary  authorities  was relatively  small,  even
negligible  in 1973.  It increased  to 3.25  percent  of GDP in
1974 (presumably  to pay back  the debts  owed  to the commercial
banks  and the Social  Security  Fund  given  the negative  sign  on
their  lending  flows  in that  year).  Over  the next four  years
the government's  reliance  -on  the  monetary  authorities  was
extremely  high: 5  percent  of GDP in 1975,  8.23  percent  in
1976,  9.14  percent  in 1977,  and 9.37  percent  in 19781  It then
dropped  sharply  to -0.13  percent  in 1979,  rose  again  to 3.32
percent  in 1980  and 2.38  percent  in 1981.  In 1982,  central
bank financing  was 2.11  percent  of GDP and rose  to 4.12
percent  of GDP in 1983.  After  1984,  reliance  on the central
bank  was greatly  reduced.  In at least  half  of the years
considered,  the financing  provided  by the central  bank  to the
central  government  was greater  than  all other  domestic
financins  sources  combined.  Over  the same  period,  the state-
owned  enterprises  also  depended  on the central  bank for
financing.
The other  notable  source  of finance  for the central
government  is the Social  Security  Fund.  As mentioned  in part56
II, the Social  Security  Fund  was until  recently  required  to
invest  its surpluses  (which  in  many  years  were considerable)
in government  stocks.  Thus  the Social  Security  Fund  was a
captive  source  of finance.
The reliance  on borrowing  from  the commercial  banks  has
generally  been low,  with  a peak  of 2.02  percent  of GDP in
1977.  Borrowing  from  the secondary  banks  has also  been fairly
low, ranging between  -0.58 and  .59 percent of GDP. As can be
seen from  Table  3.1, in  more recent  years  the  government  has
actually  been  paying  off its  debt  to the central  bank and to
the secondary  banks.  Borrowing  from  the private  sector  and
from  public  enterprises  has  not been a significant  source  of
finance  for the government.
From 1985  onward,  domestic  borrowing  falls  relative  to
the rest  of the period.  The rise  in external  borrowing  during
this  period  suggests  that  with  the onset  of the structural
adjustment  program  the  government  has been  able  to substitute
external  finance  for  domestic  finance.
The overall  picture  is thus one  where  the government
relied  heavily  on borrowing  from  the central  bank to finance
its  deficits  until  1985,  when it obtained  the option  of
substituting  foreign  borrowing  for  domestic  borrowing. To the
extent  that borrowing  from  the central  bank led  to an increase
in  the supply  of money  balances  that surpassed  the increase  in
demand  for  money  balances,  such  borrowing  implies  inflationary
consequences.57
In Fiqure 3.1 the GDP deflator and CPI inflation rates
are set out. The two indices more or less follow the same
pattern with three price shocks coming in 1977, 1981, and
1983. If we compare these inflation rates with Figure 2.3 of
public sector deficits defined from the financing side, and
with the data on the government's sources of financing, the
relationship between the reliance on money creation in the
mid-late seventies and high levels of inflation seems fairly
clear. Heavy dependence on monetary finance began in 1976, the
year in which the sharp rise in inflation began. In 1977 and
1978, reliance on money creation remained high but inflation
began to drop, and in 1979 both fell sharply.  For the rest of
the period, however, the relationship between the deficit and
inflation seems somewhat less clear. In 1980, borrowing from
the central bank is 3.32 percent of GDP (as opposed to 9.14
percent of GDP in 1977). It falls to about 2.11 percent in
1982. It rises to 4.12 percent of GDP in 1983, the third year
of  price shock. Thereafter the reliance on borrowing from the
central bank declines, and in 1987 and 1988 the government
pays back some of its debt to the central bank.
The inflation that results from money creation  (and from
other sources) affects other areas in the economy. In Ghana
interest rates have been controlled until very recently. The
high inflation rates that Ghana experienced over the periodFIGURE 3. 1
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thus  imply  negative  real  interest  rates".  Figure  3.2  shows
nominal  and  real  deposit  and  lending  rates  from  1971  through
1988.  We can  see  from  these  figures  that  both  deposit  and
lending  rates  have  been  negative  throughout  the  period.
Despite  the  recent  liberalization  of  interest  rates,  with  the
exception  of  1985,  real  rates  have  remained  negative.  The
spread  between  the  nominal  deposit  and  lending  rate  is  also
presented  in  Figure  3.2.  Up until  1980  the  spread  between  the
two  rates  was  fairly  stable  at  about  3.33  percent  through  1974
and  then  at  2.5 percent  through  1980.  In  1981  the  spread  fell
to almost  zero,  it  then  jumped  dramatically  to  over  5
percent 3 4.  It  has  varied  considerably  over  the  rest  of  the
period.  Such  an  interest  rate  spread  reflects  the  costs  of
financial  intermediation  as  well  as  implicit  taxes  on  such
intermediation  in  the  form  of  reserve  requirements,  deposit
restrictions  etc.
Nevertheless,  negative  real  interest  rates  and  taxes  on
33  Real  interest  rates  are  calculated  as  ((l+r)/(l+p)-
1)*100,  where  r  is  the  nominal  rate  of  interest  and  p  the  CPI
inflation  rate.
34  While  some  of  the  instability  after  1981  may  be
attributed  to  inflation  the  sharp  decline  and  rise  in  the  spread
is partly  due  to  sizeable  changes  in  the  nominal  deposit  rate.
In  1980,  the  nominal  rate  on  12  month  deposits  was  13  percent  it
increased  by  six  percent  in  1981  to  19  percent  and  then  dropped
dramatically  to  9  percent  in  1982.  It  then  rose  to  12.5  percent
in  1983.  The  lending  rate  was  slightly  more  stable  at  16,  16.5,
19.5,15  and  17.3  percent  for  the  years  mentioned.It  seems  quite
plausible  that  this  instability  was  caused  by  the  change  in
government  during  those  years  given  that  interest  rates  were
heavily  controlled  at  the  time.I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I61
financial  intermediation  reduce  the return  on assets  in  the
economy  and thus reinforce  any tendencies  toward  financial
disintermediation  that  may have already  occurred  as the result
of inflation.  In Ghana,  the negative  real interest  rates  in
the formal  financial  system,  combined  with strict  credit
allocation,  encouraged  the development  of an extensive  network
of informal  credit  markets.  Financial  disintermediation  was
also encouraged  by a currency  conversion  in 1979,  whereby  a
proportion  of the currency  holdings  in private  hands  was
expropriated  and by demonetization  of the largest  currency
notes (50  cedi) in 1982.
In addition  to leading  to negative  interest  rates,  the
inflation  that  was at least  partly  engendered  by reliance  on
money  creation  for financing  the deficit  led  to overvaluation
of the official  exchange  rate,  given  the fixed  nominal  rate.
This overvaluation,  not only  affected  Ghana's  trade
performance,  but increased  the premium  on parallel  market
activity (defined  as the black  market  exchange  rate  over  the
official  exchange  rate)  and lead  to increased  activity  in  the
parallel  markets.  May (1985)  estimated  that  parallel  market
activity  reached  32.41  percent  of the official  market  GDP in
1982.35  Increased  black  market  activity  resulting  from
inflation  also  eroded  the tax  base (particularly  from  cocoa)
3s  See Azam and Besley (1989),  May (1985)  and Pinto (1987)
for discussions  of parallel  markets in Ghana. The effect of
fiscal  deficits  on the official  and parallel  exchange  rate is
discussed  in the companion  paper  by Ms. Islam.62
as normally  taxable  activities  slipped  into  the parallel
market (recall  from  part  II the  dramatic  decline  in cocoa
export  duties  in the early  eighties).  To the extent  that  this
loss in revenue  implies  increased  deficits  that are financed
via inflationary  means,  the cycle  could  be never-ending.  With
the onset  of the structural  adjustment  program,  however,  the
government  devalued  the cedi  and  has progressively  deregulated
exchange  markets  so that  inflation  is no longer  necessarily
translated  into  higher  black  market  premiums.
Finally,  high inflation  resulting  in  part from  money
creation  contributed  to the erosion  of the tax  base.
Overvaluation  of the currency  led to reduced  exports,  an
important  source  of revenue  in  Ghana.  Reduced  exports  implied
less  foreign  exchange  for  the financing  of imports  and hence,
a reduction  of revenue  from  import  duties.  Lower  economic
activity  resulting  from  lack  of imported  inputs  also  implied
lower  sales  and excise  taxes.
To sum up, prior  to 1984  Ghana  was constrained  to finance
her fiscal  deficits  domestically.  For the most  part,  the
deficits  were financed  by money  creation.  This  was
particularly  the case in 1977  and 1978.  Extensive  reliance  on
this  method  of finance  implied  an increase  in the  money  supply
and a sizable  increase  in the rate  of inflation.  After  this
period  the effects  of domestic  financing  on inflation  become
less  clear  but still  seem  to contribute  to high inflation
rates  up until  1984.  In this  year the  government  substituted63
external  finance  for  domestic  finance , and to the extent  that
the increase  in net foreign  assets  was monetized  it also  has
had inflationary  consequences.  In the heavily  controlled
Ghanaian  economy,  the resulting  inflation  made real interest
rates  negative  thus inhibiting  financial  intermediation.  It
also led to overvaluation  of the currency  and an increase  in
the black  market  premium.  Both  negative  real interest  rates
and the overvalued  currency  contributed  to increased
incentives  to operate  in the parallel  markets.
2) Inflation,  the Demand  for Assets.  and  Beignorage
This section  considers  how inflation  in  Ghana  affects  the
demand  for  both  money  and quasi-money  and in turn,  how these
demands  affect  seignorage  revenues.  A simple  model is used  to
consider  the effect  on seignorage  revenue  of a lower  rate  of
inflation.  We also  consider  the effect  that the  expropriation
of currency  during  1979 (and  in later  years)  may have  had on
money demand  and in turn  on seignorage  revenue
a) The model
The model  used is a simple  version  of that  proposed  in
Appendix  II of Easterly  et al (1989)  and is based  on the
"public  finance  approach  to inflation"  literature  discussed
above.  The basic  equation  of the  model is the  budget  identity:
(1)  DEF-  EF  + DCg  + L64
This states that the government deficit muist  be  equal to
the sum of external finance (EF), domestic credit to the
government  (money creation), and domestic borrowing from the
banking system. 6 External finance is assumed to be exogenous.
The specification of the portfolio demands of the private
sector  determine the private sector demand for currency and
the allocation of their remaining assets between deposits and
foreign currency:
(2)  N  =  f(wr,  id, Y)
(3)  D =  f(r,  id' Y)
Where  r  is the rate of inflation, id  is the real interest
rate on deposits and Y is income. The demand for foreign
currency is determined as a  residual.
Loans to the government is the residual after private
credit needs have been met:
(4)  Lo m D  (1 -P  )  -
where  e  is credit to the private sector and is taken as
given.
36  For simplicity we have assumed that domestic and external
interest payments are zero.65
Domestic credit to the government is determined as high
powered money  (H) minus net foreign assets  (EFW)  plus any
additional net liabilities (NOL):
(5)  DC 9 - H -EF  - NOL,
High powered money is equal to reserves on deposits and
currency:
(6)  H = AD +  (c +  A(l-c))M,
where A  is the reserve ratio on deposits, D is deposits, c is
the currency/Ml ratio and M is Ml.
The above relationships are used to determine
equilibrium in the market for domestic debt and in the market
for high powered money. Both are functions of the rate of
inflation:
(7)  L=  f(r)  f 1 < O
(8)  H  gq(r)  g1 >  O
In equation  (7), the market for domestic debt will be
negatively related to the inflation rate because inflation
depresses deposits and thus for a  given level of private
credit, reduces the amount available of credit to the
government. The equilibrium equation for the money market66
implies  that  the deficit  financeable  through  money  creation
will be a positive  function  of inflation  as long  as the
maximum  point  of the Laffer  curve  has not  been  passed.
Using  this framework,  we specify  the  demand  for  money  and
quasi-money  and,  given  the rate  of inflation,  solve  for
seignorage  revenue.  Before  considering  some  alternative
scenarios,  consider  the demand  equations  for  Ml and quasi-
money.
b) The DemI'd  for  )tbnev  and  Quasi-money
Figure  3.3 shows  Ml and quasi-money  as a percent  of GDP.
Ml as a share  of GDP ranges  from  between  11 and 23 percent  of
GDP. Demand  or Ml peaks in 1976  and 1977  and drops  off
sharply  after  1978.  We might  expect  that the  high levels  of
inflation  of 1977  and 1978  led  to a decline  in the demand  for
currency.  The currency  conversion  of 1979  might  also  have
affected  demand  for  Ml. We also see  a sharp  drop in demand  foi
Ml in 1982  which  may be the result  of several  measures  taken
in the early  eighties  including  demonetization  of the 50 cedi
note in 1982,  the freezing  of bank  deposits  in excess  of
50,000  cedis  pending  investigation  for  tax liability,  the
recall  of bank loans  for  the financing  of trade  inventories,
and the requirement  that  business transactions  in excess  of
1,000  cedis  be conducted  by checks.  Such  actions  are likely  to
have  prompted  movement  into  foreign  and informal  assetFIGURE 3.3
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markets.
Figure 3.3 also shows quasi-money as a percent of GDP.
The demand for quasi-money to GDP follows a similar pattern to
Ml, declining from 9 percent of GDP in 1976 to about 3 percent
in 1984. It is also likely to have been affected by the
measures discussed above.
The basic equation we use to estimate money demand is as
follows 37:
Mt  = ao  + a,frt  +  a2Yt  +  a3rt  + ju  (1)
where M  is equal to the log of real M1, X  is equal to the
inflation rate calculated from the GDP deflator, Y is equal to
the log of real GDP, and r is the real deposit rate, all
indexed to time t. The coefficients of X  and r will be the
semi-elasticities of real base money with respect to inflation
and the real deposit rate, respectively. As inflation
increases we would expect the demand for real money balances
to decrease as private agents substitute into real goods or
perhaps into foreign assets. We thus expect to find a  to be
negative. We would also expect a.  to be negative because as
real deposit rates increase, private agents are likely to hold
3  There  is a large literature on money  demand and money
demand  equations. Because our interest is in the relationship
between inflation and the demand for assets and interest rates
and the deuand for assets, rather than in  the functioning of the
monetary sector as a whole, we use very simple equations for our
estimations.69
less  money  and keep  more in deposits.  The coefficient  on Y,
22,  represents  the elasticity  of money  demand  with respect  to
income.  We would  ex:  bct  this  to be positive  because  as income
increases  the  demand  for  money  balances  rises.
The equation  was estimated  for  the 1966-1988  period.  The
estimation  indicated  the  presence  of autocorrelation  of the
errors  so a lagged  dependent  variable  term  was incorporated
into  the equation.  The results  of the estimation  are as
follows:  (Figures  in brackets  below  coefficient  estimates  are
absolute  values  of the t-statistics.)
M =  -3.02 +  .846 Ml(-l) - .389r +  .376Y - .248r,  R2 .80,
(  .90)  (5.35)  (1.84)  (1.34)  (.654)
The errors  are free  of autocorrelation  and normally
distributed.  Given  the likelihood  of collinearity  between  the
inflation  variable  and the real interest  rate  variable,  we re-
estimated  the equation  without  the real interest  rate  term.
The results  are:
M - -3.34 +  .912 Ml(-1)  - .269w +  .328Y,  R 2 - .797
(.952)  (7.74)  (2.63)  (1.23)
The signs  of the coefficients  are as expected.  The
coefficients  on Nl(-l)  and r  are significant  at the five
percent  level  whereas  the coefficient  on Y is not.  An analysis
of the residual  correlogram  indicated  that  the residuals  are70
not highly  autocorrelated,  so that inferences  may be drawn
from  the above  results.
The estimation  indicates  that  the short-run semi-
elasticity  of MI with respect  to inflation  is relatively  low
at -. 269.  The equation  implies,  however,  a high long-run
semi-elasticity  of -2.99  indicating  that inflation  has a much
stronger  negative  effect  on money  demand  over  time.
We re-estimated  the  money  demand  equation  including  dummy
variables  in order  to account  for  the  government's
demonetization  actions  in 1979  and in 1982.  Given  that such
events  are not immediately  forgotten,  the  dummy  variables  were
set as zero  to the given  year  and then  to 1  thereafter.  The
results  indicated  that  the dummy  for 1982  was not at all
significant  and that for 1q79  was significant,  though  not at a
five  percent level.  The estimated  equation  is as follows:
M  -4.44 +  .801 Ml5-l) - .155r  +  .527Y - .113DUM79, R2 =  .829
(1.39)  (6.27)  (1.35)  (1.93)  (1.79)
Y  is now significant at a higher level whereas X  is no
longer as significant  as in the previous equation. This is
likely  to be due to the fact  that the equation  has difficulty
distinguishing  between  inflation  and  the dummy  variable.  The
short  run semi-elasticity  of money  demand  with respect  to
inflation  is  lower  than in the previous  equation  at  -. 155.
The long-run  semi-elasticity  seems  to be more reasonable  as71
well at -. 75. Because  of the  more plausible  nature  of the
long-run  elasticity,  the improved  significance  of GDP and
because  we would  like  to capture  the effects  of government
actions  on money  demand,  this last  equation  is the one we use
in the simulation.
The demand  for quasi-money  was estimated  based  on the
following  equation:
QMt  =  P 0 +  P 1QMt-l  +  p 2 r.  +  P3(r*+e)  +  P4wt  +  P5 Y  +  A,
where  QM equals  the log of real  quasi-money,  r equals  the real
deposit  rate  on 12 month  deposits,  r*+e  equals  the  US real
interest  rate  on Treasury  bills  adjusted  for  black  market
exchai1ge  rate  depreciation,  and  X  equals-the  GDP deflator
inflation  rate.  Tho interpretations  of the coefficients  as
semi-elasticities  holds,  but in contrast  to the base  money
estimation,  we expect  that  the coefficient  on the real  deposit
rate  will be positive  and that  the coefficient  on the US
interest  rate  will be negative.  The expected  sign  on the
inflation  variable  is less  clear  than in the previous
estimation.  An increase  in inflation  might  encourage  people  to
save  more,  but at the same  time it  might  encourage
substitution  into  real  goods.
Neither  of the interest  rate  variables  in the above
equation  were found  to be significant  so they  were  dropped.
The result  is as follows  (The  absolute  values  of the t-72
statistics  are in  parentheses.):
QM - -6.24 -.  .874 QM(-l) - .582w +  .605Y, R2 =  .9057
(2.05)  (11.73)  (6.35)  (2.46)
All variables  are significant  and of the expected  sign.
The short-run  semi  elasticity  of money  demand  with respect  to
inflation  is .582.  Again,  we find  that  the long-run  semi-
elasticity  is  very high  at -4.47.  The dummy  variables  were
incorporated  into  the equation,  but  were not even  close  to
being  significant  (  t-statistics  of about .6).  As a result  we
have  used the above  equation  in our simulation.
.
a% simulation results
The demand  for  money  and quasi-money  equations  discussed
in the  previous  section  were used in the  model set  out in
section  a) in order  to consider  the impact  of inflation  and
government  demonetization  policies  on seignorage  revenue  for
the period  from 1977-1988.  We consider  three  scenarios  which
are set out in Figure  3.4:  1) the base  case simulating
government  seignorage  revenues  given  the actual  rate of
inflation8,  2) the case in  which  the inflation  rate  is kept
X  Note that we are using  the inflation  rate derived from
the GDP deflator.FICURE  3.4 
SEIGNORAGE  REVENUE  UNDER  ALTERNATIVE
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at 20 percent,  and 3) the case in  which  the government  did not
pursue  its  currency  appropriation  policies  during  the currency
conversion  of 1979.
In the base case  we see that  seignorage  revenue  ranged
from  4 to 6.5 percent  of GDP in the beginning  of the period  to
about  three  percent  of GDP at the end of the  period.  Changes
in seignorage  respond  to changes  in inflation  with a one
period  lag.  For  example,  inflation  based  on the GDP deflator
rose  by almost  10 percent  from  1977  to 1978,  but seignorage
revenue  increased  by a little  over  two  percent  over  the same
year. Seignorage then dropped about 3.5 percent in the next
period  although  inflation  was declining  from 1978  to 1979.
Over  the period,  we see  a gradual  decline  in the amount  of
seignorage  revenue  to about  3 percent  of GDP with two
pronouncied  drops  in seignorage  revenue  in 1982  and 1985.
Despite  high rates  of inflation  in the early  eighties,
seignorage  revenue  did not reach  the levels  that it  had
obtained  during  the mid-late  seventies.  The reflects  the long-
run  effects  of inflation  (and  government  demonetization
policies)  on money  demand.  As high levels  of inflation  and
uncertainty  persisted,  money  demand  declined  and seignorage
revenues  remained  at about  three  percent  despite  the increased
rate of inflation.
This  is illustrated  by our second  scenario  in which  the
inflation  rAte is kept  at 20 percent.  Such  a reduction  in the
inflation  rate  might  be induced  by reducing  government75
expenditures  in order  to lower  the deficit  that needs  to be
financed  via money  creation.  Another  possibility  is that
development  of domestic  financial  markets  or improvement  in
access  to external  finance  might  reduce  the  government's
reliance  on money  creation  as a source  of finance.
We see from figure  3.4,  that  while seignorage  revenue  is
lower  when the inflation  rate is kept  at twenty  percent,
periods  of high inflation  do not provide  proportionate
increases  in seignorage  revenue.  Seignorage  revenue  during  the
late  seventies  is only about  1.5  percent  of GDP more than it
would  have  been had the inflation  rate  been  maintained  at 20
percent.  Moreover,  the long-run  effect  on money  demand  results
in little  gain in seignorage  in the 1980's.  In 1984  we see
that seignorage  revenue  at the inflation  rate  of twenty
percent  would  have  exceeded  seignorage  revenue  at the actual
inflation  rate  of about  40 percent.  In the period  after  1984,
the gain in seignorage  over  that  which  would  have  been
received  with inflation  at 20 percent  is negligible.  The
accumulated  effect  of inflation  on money  demand  contributed  to
reduced  seignorage  over time.
The disproportionate  increase  in seignorage  revenue  for
increases  the rate  of inflation  is confirmed  by Figure  3.5.
This figure  sets  out the seignorage  revenue  received  for  given
inflation  rates,  based  on our model.  It shows  a Laffer  curve
effect:  that beyond  a certain  inflation  rate (about  125 % for
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All of this  highlights  what is likely  to have occurred  in
Ghana  particularly  during  the seventies.  Financing  ever
increasing  deficits  by money creation  led  to higher  and higher
rates  of inflation  that  were not  met with  proportionate
increases  in seignorage 39. This in turn led  to even  higher
deficits  which  required  even further  reliance  on money  finance
given  the weakness  of domestic  financial  markets,  and the
inability  to obtain  finance  from  abroad.  Various  measures  were
undertaken  to try to reduce  the rate  of inflation  including
the appropriation  of currency  by the government  during  the
currency  conversion.
Our third  scenario  considers  whether  these  actions,  while
perhaps  reducing  inflation  in the  short  run,  really  led  to
e
higher inflation  in the long  run.  Figure  3.4  gives  an
indication  that  had the government  not  undertaken  such
measures,  seignorage  revenues  would  have  been higher
throughout  the period,  therefore  improving  the government's
fiscal  position  and lessening  the  need  to resort  to money
finance.  The increase  in seignorage  revenues  would  have been
on the order  of 1 to 2 percent  of GDP. Data  on how much
demonetization  took  place  is necessary  to evaluate  the
tradeoff  of gain  vs. loss  of the government's  actions.  It
seems  unlikely,  however,  that  the one-off  gain  the reduction
of inflation  would  offset  the negative  effect  on seignorage
39  As well as to a reduction  in other sources of revenue
such  as revenue  from  export  taxes  as discussed  above.78
revenues caused by the reduction in the demand for assets
induced by such actions.
3.} Conolusion
The first part of this section showed us that prior to
1984, Ghana relied heavily on money creation in order to
finance her deficit and that this contributed to inflation and
negative real interest rates. The second part showed us that
these high levels of inflation affected the demand for assets
in  Ghana which in turn affected theseignorage  revenue that
the government obtained. Increases in  the rate of inflation
did not have proportionate effects on  seignorage revenue.
Indeed, we found a Laffer curve effect where after a certain
point an increase in the inflation rate caused a reduction in
seignorage revenue. Demonetization by the government in  an
attempt to reduce inflation was shown to hove reduced
seignorage revenues on the order of 1 to 2 percent. In the
longer run, the increase in money financing necessary to
compensate the loss in seignorage revenues is likely to offset
the one-off gains in reduced inflation brought about by the
demonetization.79
IV.,  FISCAL  DEFICITS - ND  PRIVATE  CONOUMPTION  AND  PRIVATE
ZNmBuiMiNT
This section  will focus  on the effects  of fiscal  deficits  on
the real side of the economy.  In particular,  it will focus  on
the ways in which the fiscal deficit affects private sector
consumption  and investment.
Figure  4.1  shows  private  consumption  and  private  investment
as a share  of GDP  from  1969/70  to 1988.  We see  that in general
private  consumption  constitutes  a large  portion  of GDP.  At the
beginning  of the period  private  consumption  stood  at roughly  75
percent  of GDP. It rose steadily  until  1983  when it reached  91
percent  of GDP. Such a trend  reflects  the deterioration  in the
economic climate in Ghana  over  the  period. As  conditions
worsened  more  and  more  effort went  into  subsistence and
providing  for the present  than into investment  for the future.
After  1984,  private consumption levels  fell  somewhat but
remained  well above  the 1969/70  level.
The low  level  of  private  investment  in  Ghana  is immediately
obvious from  Table 4.1 and Figure  4.2.  Private  investment  as a
share  of GDP stood  at just under  12 percent  of GDP in 1969/70.
It fell  over  the next  three  years,  but rose  again  in  the period
between 1972/73  and 1974/75.  From 1974/75  until 1982,  private
investment  fell  reaching  a  low  of 2.3  percent  of  GDP in 1982.  It
has fluctuated  since  then,  reaching  4.4  percent  of GDP in 1988.
In the following  pages  we investigate  how fiscal  deficitsFICURE  4.  1
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have  affected  these  patterns  of  private  consumption and
investment.  We will consider first the relationship  between
fiscal  deficits  and consumption  followed  by that  i,etween  fiscal
deficits  and investment.
1.) Fiscal  Deficits  and Consumptioa
There  has been  a great  deal  of theoretical  debate  over the
years concerning the  effect of  fiscal deficits on private
consumption. The  Keynesian  tradition  holds  that  current
consumption  is determined  by current disposable income e.g.
present income minus taxes. The permanent income hypothesis
suggests  that  current  consumption  is determined  by the present
value of future income which implies that both present and
future tax  levels will  affect current  consumption. More
recently  the  debate  has focused  on the  validity  of  the  Ricardian
equivalence  approach  which  argues  that,  under  certain
conditions, private consumption determination will  not  be
affected  by the way in  which the  government  chooses  to finance
its deficit.  In other words, taking public expenditure  as
given, private consumption  will  not  be  affected Ly  fiscal
deficits.
The distinction  between the first two arguments and the
last  is  of  considerable importance to  policy-makers. If
Ricardian  equivalence  holds,  then  reductions  on fiscal  deficits
will  not affect  the level  of consumption  in  the economy  and  the
basis  for  deficit  reduction  as  part  of stabilization  programs  no84
longer exists.  In this  case, policies and programs  to reduce
fiscal  deficits  may  be  completely  misdirected.  However,  the
conditions necessary for Ricardian equivalence to hold are very
strict. They  include the following: no liquidity constraints;
household's  planning  horizons  must  be  infinite;  the  rate  of
discount applied to future income by consumers must be equal to
the rate at which the public sector can borrow; and consumers
must  act  rationally  in  forming  expectations  of  future  tax
liabilities.  Given  these  conditions,  particularly  that
concerning  liquidity constraints, we would not expect to find
evidence of Ricardian equivalence in Ghana where credit to the
private sector is highly regulated.
While most of the empirical work on Ricardian equivalence
concerns  developed  countries  (the early  literature  tended  to
support Ricardian  equivalence  whereas much  of  it now  rejects
it), there have recently been a few studies that have focused on
Ricardian equivalence in developing countries.
Haque and Montiel (1987) test for the empirical relevance
of  Ricardian  equivalence  in  sixteen  developing  countries  by
considering whether the liquidity constraint condition and the
Yaari-Blanchard  condition"  hold.  The  empirical  estimates
derived in their paper suggest that full Ricardian Equivalence
can be rejected  in 15 of the sixteen countries in the sample.
Their  model  found  evidence  that  the  prevelence  of  liquidity
0 This is  the condition that private and public discount rates
are equivalent. This  may not hold if  the government and the private
sector have different planning horizons. See Blanchard  (1985).85
constraints  in a large number of developing  countries is the
principal  reason  for  rejecting Ricardian  equivalence. No
evidence  was found  in support  of the Yaari-Blanchard  effect.
Leiderman  and Razin (1988)  test for Ricardian  equivalence
in Israel.  Their framework  considered  two channels  which  might
cause  deviations  from  Ricardian  equivalence: the  finite
horizons/Yaari-Blanchard  effect  and  liquidity  constraints.  Their
estimation  found  that  the restrictions  imposed  by the  Ricardian
equivalence  hypothesis  could  not  be rejected.  Expansion  of  their
model  to allow  for  public  goods  consumption  did not alter  these
results.
Haque (1988)  focused  on the Yaari-Blanchard  proposition  of
finite  horizons  for  consumer  planning  problems  as the source  of
deviation  from  Ricardian  equivalence.  The results  of his tests
found  evidence  in  favor  of  the  infinitely-lived  households  in 15
out of the 16 countries  tested.  Finally,  Rossi
(1989)  develops  an approach  that  emphasizes  real  interest  rates
and  liquidity constraints in the  determination  of  consumer
behavior.  He uses  pooled  data  of geographical  regions  and finds
strong  evidence  that  where  liquidity  constraints  are  substantial
they  do  have  an important  effect  on  consumer  behavior and  imply
that Ricardian  equivalence  does  not hold.
In sum, the evidence for developing  countries (with  the
exception of  Leiderman and  Razin) indicates that Ricardian
equivalence  does not hold and that the existence of  fiscal
deficits  and their  financing  will have  aconomic  effects.86
Our first  attempts  at estimating  the consumption  function
followed the  research proposal quite closely, variables on
public  tax  and  expenditure  composition.  Given  the  generally  poor
nature  of  Ghanaian  data  and  the  high  probability  that
significant collinearity exists among  some  of  the  fiscal
variables  discussed, we  decided to  abandon the  numerous
variables suggested  in the project proposal  and to opt for a
much simpler  estimation.  The  equation  estimated  i.
C-  +  a 1 YPt  + a2  rht  +  3  LCt  + 4 FISCDEF,  +  ,
where  Ct  is  current private  consumption, Ypt  is  current
disposable  income  as described  above,  LCt credit  to the private
sector and FISCDEF;  is th't  conventional  measure of the fiscal
deficit  as discussed  in  part  II.  All  variables  are  as in  percent
of GDP.
Ideally one  would use  a  measure of  labor income to
determine  permanent  income,  however,  no  data  on labor  income  are
available  for  Ghana.  Following  Haque  and  Montiel (1987)  we use
GNP  minus  taxes  as our measure  of disposable/permanent  income.
Dornbusch (1983)  makes a case for using the "home" real
interest  rate  or the "consumption-based"  real interest  rate.  He
argues  that the presence  of a home goods (nontradable)  sector
implies that the relevant real interest  rate appropriate  to
consumption  decisions  depends  on the  rate of change  of the real
price  of  home  goods.  This  "consumption-based"  real  interest  rate87
is thus the rate used in our consumption  regression.  It is
calculated  according  to  the  following  definition  (from
Dornbusch):
r  =  (1  +r*)  (Pt/P )1  ,  where r* is the world real interest  rate
(we  used  the  U.S. rate),  Pt  is the relative  price  of  home  goods
in terms of traded  goods,  and 1-a is the share of hom3 goods
(nontradables)  in consumption.
The domestic credit  to the private sector (from IFS) is
used as a proxy for liquidity  constraints.  The measurement  of
liquidity  constraints  in Ghana poses particular  difficulties
because there  is  an  extensive network of  informal credit
arrangements that  do  not  appear  in  any  of  the  official
statistics. The  measure used  may  therefore not  completely
capture  the effective  liquidity  constraint,  but it seems  to be
the best available  proxy.
The measure  of the fiscal  deficit  used is  the conventional
measure  as discussed  in Part  II.
In the estimation  of this equation  there was evidence of
autocorrelation  so a lagged  dependent  variable  was added  to the
equation.  The estimation  of this second equation found only
lagged  consumption  and disposable  4ncome  to be significant.  The
interest  variable,  the private  credit  variable  and the fiscal
deficit  variable  were  all  found  to be insignificant.  The results
of the final  estimation  are as follows:  (absolute  values  of t-
statistics  are in  parentheses)88
C =  .04999 +  .6668 C(-1) +  .3152 Yp,  =  86.13
(.005)  (5.24)  (2.24)
Neither pure Ricardian equivalence (in which case the
coefficient  of  Yp  would not be significantly  different from
zero)  nor  the  pure  Keynesian  theory  hold.  The significance  of Yp
indicates  that  some  consumers  are  liquidity  constrained  which  we
expect  to find in  Ghana.
Our  equation unfortunately does  not  allow us  to  say
anything  about  the  effects  of  the  fiscal  deficits  on
consumption.  Public expenditure  and public revenue variables
were incorporated into  other estimations,  but neither was
significant.  Further  research  on the interaction  between  fiscal
deficits  and  private  consumption  is therefore  needed.
2.) Fiscal  Deficits  and Private  layesta2nt
The issue  of private  investment  in  Ghana is  a particularly
important one at present when  it has become clear that to
sustain  high  growth  rates  while  simultaneously reducing
government  involvement  in  the  economy  would  require  a
substantial  increase  in private  investment.
The fiscal  deficit is expected  to affect private sector
investment  in a number  of ways.  Firstly,  higher  public  sector
expenditure  financed  by public  sector  borrowing  can crowd out
private  sector  investment.  There  are  two  channels  by  which  this
can happen: (i) if higher public sector  borrowing  raises the89
real interest  rate then this may lower  private investment  by
raising  the user costs  of capital  and (ii)  if there  are direct
credit  controls,  then  higher  credit  to the government  may mean
fewer  funds  available  for the government. The main problem  in
Ghana  has  been access  to credit  for  a large  number  of potential
investors;  this means that investment  has to be financed  by
retained  earnings  and net profits therefore  play an important
role.  The interest  rate  however,  has  been  controlled  in  Ghana:
nominal interest rate ceilings accompanied  by high rates of
inflation  have led  to negative  real interest  rates.  Table 4.2
shows  the  real  interest  rate  and  the  rate  of inflation  from  1965
to  1988.41
Public  sector  investment  may have an additional  effect  on
private  investment depending on  whether  or  not  it  is  a
substitute for or complement  to public investment.  If the
government (or government  entities)  invest in areas that the
private sector would invest in anyway or if they undertake
investment activities that  would  make  private  investment
activities  unprofitable  then  higher  public  investment  would  tend
to lower private investment.  On the other hand, if public
investment  consists  of activities  that raise  the profitability
of  private  investment  (for  instance-  investment  in  certain  kinds
of infrastructure)  and  which  the private  sector  itself  does  not
find  profitable  to engage  in then higher  public  investment  may
' tWe  have calculated  the rate  of inflation  using  the consumer
price  index.90
Tabl.2
Year  real  rate  of
interest  rate  inflation
1967  13.611  -8.4597
1968  -3.6098  7.8947
1969  -3.0909  7.3171
1970  0.94147  3.0300
1971  -2.7919  9.5588
1972  -3.2409  10.067
1973  10.565  17.683
1974  -10.907  18.135
1975  -17.003  29.825
1976  -30.966  56.081
1977  -50.219  116.45
1978  -35.298  73.100
1979  -27.470  54.419
1980  -25.380  50.093
1981  -45.263  116.49
1982  -10.463  22.296
1983  -49.299  122.87
1984  -16.372  39.665
1985  6.7943  10.306
1986  -3.8253  24.565
1987  -12.170  39.815
1988  -8.9521  31.359
Source:  International  Financial  Statistics
and  Quartarly  Digest  of  Statistics,
Bank of  Ghana.91
raise  private  investment.
Other  factors that  are  expected to  be  significant in
determining  private  investment  levels,  are  corporate  tax rates,
investment subsidies, and  the  general  investment climate
(uncertainty  regarding future economic policy, etc.) all of
which  determine  the overall  profitability  of investment. While
the  general  investment  climate  in  Ghana  has  not  been
particularly  encouraging  in  the  past, uncertainty  regarding  the
profitability  of investing  does not seem to be a problem :
agents are willing to invest  more given the current economic
environment  but are constrained  by other factors (access  to
credit).
The investment  equation  that  we have  estimated  for  Ghana
seems to confirm what we would expect from our analysis of
Ghana's  economy.  The variables  in equation (A)  are defined  as
follows:
PIDCGDP  =  the level  of private investment  in real terms as a
ratio  of gross  domestic  product.
PBICDGD  =  the level of public investment  in real terms  as a
ratio  of gross  domestic  product.
CPTCDGD  - corporate  tax revenues  collected  by the government  in
real  terms  as a ratio  of gross  domestic  product.92
Equation  a
LS //  Dependent  Variable  to  PIDCGDP
Dates  7-09-1990  /  Time:  17:40
SHPL  ranges  1967  - 1988
Number  of obsrevatione:  22
VARIASLE  COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIC.
C  -0.0022513  0.0234236  -0.0961106  0.925
PBICDCD  -1.1020574  0.3991700  -2.7608725  0.014
DV76  -0.0397535  0.0234011  -1.6987847  0.109
CDCDGDP  0.5569441  0.2297309  2.4243324  0.028
RINT3  -0.0001237  0.0003814  -0.3241632  0.750
CPTCDGD  3.9736432  1.7436781  2.2788858  0.037
R-squared  0.561419  Mean  of dependent  var  0.051058
Adjusted  R-squared  0.424362  S.D. of dependent  var  0.026364
S.E.  of re5ression  0.020003  Sum  of squared  resid  0.006402
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.041154  F-statistic  4.096258
Log likelihood  58.34770
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CDCDGDP  - credit  to the private  sector  in real  terms  as a ratio
of gross  domestic  product.
RINT2  3  the real  rate  of interest  .42
DV76  a dummy  variable  for 1976.
The flow of credit to the private sector  was used as a
proxy for liquidity  constraints  faced by investors  with the
assumption  that the higher the flow of credit  to the private
sector  the less  investors  will  be liquidity  constrained  and  thus
the higher  will be the level  of investment. A dummy  variable
has  been  included for  1976  since there was  a  large and
unexplained  drop in private  investment  in this  year.
We find  public  investment,  corporate  tax revenues,  and  the
liquidity  constraint  variable  to be statistically  significant.
We  see  that  public  investment affects private investment
negatively  and there seems  to be a one for one effect.  This
seems to indicate  that public sector investment  in Ghana has
mostly  substituted  for  private investment. This result  is not
surprising  since in fact,  the government  plays a large  role in
the  economy, and  traditionally  has  not  encouraged private
investment,  emphasizing, the  government's  role  in  many
'2The  real  rate  of  interest  was  approximAted by  the
relationship  r  - (((l+i)/(l+w))-l)*100  where  r is  the  real  interest
rate,  i  is  the  nominal  interest  rate  and  w is  the  rate  of inflation
calculated  using  the CPI.94
activities  that  could  be performed  by the  private  sector. This
suggests  that  if  public  sector  involvement  were  to be reduced  in
Ghana  or perhaps  the nature  of public  sector  investment  were to
change  (with  the  government  focusing  on  activities  complementary
to private investment)  we would see an increase in private
investment.  Therefore, the  current program stressing the
dibvestiture  of state  owned  enterprises  could  lead  to  an increase
in  private  investment by  substituting private  for  public
investors  and also  by indicating  to the  private  sector  that  the
government  wishes  to actively  encourage  investment. 43
We would  expect  an increase  in corporate  tax rates  to have
a  negative  effect  on private investment. Using corporate  tax
revenues  collected  by the government  as an indicator  of the ta)
burden  faced  by firms  we find  that it  has a  positive  sign. This
may  be because  the level  of revenues  collected  by the  government
is highly correlated  with the profits  of firms or with firms
income  and  growth. The  higher  the  profits  made  by investors  the
higher  will be the taxes  paid at any given  corporate  tax rate.
Thus our corporate  tax revenue  variable  is probably  picking  up
the effect  of higher  profits  on investment  which,  of course,  is
positive.  Unfortunately  we do not have separate  figures for
corporate  profits  and cannot isolate  the effect  of profits on
investmei:t.  Note that corporate  profits have a particularly
O3The  actual  effects  may  be smaller  than  expected  since  a  great
deal of funding  for  public  investment  comes  from  abroad  --  if the
private sector  has no access to funds  then investment  will not
rise.95
important role  in  Ghana  given  that  firms  are  liquidity
constrained  and cannot  borrow  as much as they  would like  to.
The flow of credit to the private sector  has a positive
coefficient  as expected. This result  tells  us that one way to
e.iable  higher  levels  of private  investment  in  Ghana  would  be to
ease the supply  constraint  on credit  to investors:  as long as
firms are liquidity  constrained  at the going interest rate,
there will be excess demand for credit and therefore excess
investment  demand.
The real interest  rate does  not have a substantial  effect
on private investment.  Nominal interest  rates in Ghana have
been strictly  controlled  and the real  rate  of interest  derived
from the inflation  adjusted  nominal interest  rate is negative
almost all throughout  the period of analysis.  With negative
real  interest  rates  there  will  be an excess  demand  for  credit  as
long as returns  to investment  are positive  and the supply of
credit  will  be the factor  determining  investment  demand.
Using  equation  (A)  we ran some  simulations  to see  what the
effect  of varying the supply  of credit  to the private sector,
and of reducing  public sector investment  would be on private
investment  levels. Table  4.3 shows  the  actual  ratios  of public
sector  investment  to gross  domestic  product,  of private  sector
credit  to gross domestic  product  and private  sector  investment
to gross domestic product.  Table 4.4 shows actual private
sector  investment  to  GDP  ratios  and  two  simulations:  in  one  case
we keep  public  sector  investment  (in  real  terms)  at one percent96
Table  4.3
MNmminmem-mmUininm_minumwinmmnina======min
obs  PU CDGD  PIDCGDP  CPTCDGD  CDCDGDP  RINT3
_J  --- winmminmmUm*Smmmminmnmim  mn  =====mminmm
1967  0.049857  0.053247  0.020408  0.075650  13.61121
1968  0.042348  0.068698  0.018762  0.086578  -3.609759
1969  0.032489  0.085420  0.018618  0.092118  -3.090906
1970  0.037180  0.104324  0.016532  0.082503  0.941473
1971  0.043183  0.097961  0.015154  0.125790  -2.791925
1972  0.036945  0.034103  0.015879  0.100604  -3.240903
1973  0.027413  0.062821  0.016191  0.053418  -10.56482
1974  0.036266  0.094206  0.016727  0.056768  -10.90680
1975  0.054136  0.073121  0.019525  0.105658  -17.00336
1976  0.067576  0.021269  0.018158  0.110896  -30.96554
1977  0.057064  0.053579  0.011153  0.094733  -50.21929
1978  0.033117  0.020633  0.007052  0.070564  -35.29763
1979  0.026929  0.038445  0.008415  0.060904  -27.47029
1980  0.013885  0.042354  0.007934  0.047518  -25.37970
1981  0.019139  0.026588  0.006905  0.042040  -45.26316
1982  0.010723  0.023054  0.007681  0.047222  -10.46282
1983  0.008778  0.028801  0.004111  0.037650  -49.29880
1984  0.024819  0.043953  0.007843  0.047452  -16.37150
1985  0.041580  0.054115  0.013330  0.067873  6.794303
1986  0.072826  0.023832  0.018886  0.079724  -3.825312
1987  0.079422  0.028519  0.019277  0.075758  -12.16987
1988  0.080766  0.044228  0.026560  0.064668  -8.952145
in  m  m  m  m  m,,  m  in  m  m  in  m  m  m.....X  a.ss-sssw-  ss---n97
Table  4.4
obe  PIDCGDP  'NVS.MI  INVSDM2
1967  0.053247  0.097720  0.1209L5
1968  0.068698  0.108071  0.133429
1969  0.085420  0.110789  0.143591
1970  0.104324  0.103827  0.136735
1971  0.097961  0.117103  0.121091
1972  0.034103  0.106219  0.1U9912
1973  0.062821  0.079748  0.138100
1974  0.094206  0.083324  0.130640
1975  0.073121  0.118373  0.121397
1976  0.021269  0.081647  0.067839
1977  0.053579  0.081385  0.087049
1978  0.020633  0.055157  0.098565
1979  0.038445  0.055413  0.110358
1980  0.042354  0.046888  0.122S10
1981  0.026588  0.039650  0.112625
1982  0.0?1054  0.047503  0.126595
1983  0.0LA1  0.027061  0.113195
1984  0.043953  0.048085  0.112275
1985  0.054115  0.088475  0.124415
1986  0.023832  0.107055  0.10403S
1987  0.028519  0.104408  0.096543
1988  0.044228  0.124730  0.121252
W.,_.m  .,_.._  ..  mm.S..  n_..  ._........98
of GDP (INVSIM1)  and in another  we raise  private  sector  credit
(INVSIM2)  to twenty  percent  of GDP.  We find  that if  we reduce
public sector investment  to  one percent of  gross domestic
product,  investment  as  a  rercentage  of  GDP  would  have  been  12.5%
rather  than  4.4%  in 19881  From  19.8  to 1983  private  investment
as a proportion  of GDP would still  have  been rather  low but in
most other  years  we would  have  seen  a definite  improvement."
When we raise the supply  of credit  to the private  sector
and  maintain  it  at 20%  of  GDP  we find  that  investment  would  have
been  a much larger  proportion  of GDP in all  years;  in 1983,  for
instance,  we would  have  had 12.1%  rather  than  2.9  percent  of GDP
accounted for by private investment.  During 1977 to  1985
availability  of credit seems to be the constraining factor;
during  these  years  even  lowering  public  sector  investment  does
not have a big effect  on private  sector  investment.
"During 1978  to 1983  the black  market  premium  was very high
and  rising  and  the  parallel  market  was flourishing.  It is  possible
that  during  this  period  legal  economic  activities  were  diverted  to
the  unofficial  economy  and  the  low  investment  ratios  mal  not  really
be indicative of overall private investment  activities in the
economy.99
V. FISCAL  DEFICITS  AND TEM EXTERNAL  SECTOR
This see ion of the study examines the implications  of
fisca) and exchange  rate policies for the external sector in
Ghana, in particular,  the implications  for the real exchange
rate, the black market premium, and the trade balance.  The
exchange rate of Ghana's currency,  the "New Cedi",  which was
created  in  1967  was  'fixed' until  April  1983;  several
devaluations  have been used in the intervening  16 years to
adjust  the  value  of the New  Cedis  relative  either  to gold or to
the US dollar.  The fixed  exchange  rate system  in conjunction
with foreign  exchange  rationing  and strict  capital  controls  led
to the development  of a large  black  market  in foreign  exchange.
The  black  market  in  foreign exchange  has  been  affected
considerably  by the government's  fiscal policies and reached
sizeable  proportions  by the latter  half  of the sixties.  Thus,
any study  of the public  sector  in Ghana  must,  for  completeness,
take into  account  the  parallel  market  and related  activities  in
Ghana.  This section  incorporates  models  of smuggling  with the
parallel market  in  foreign exchange and  draws  on  models
developed  by Lizondo (1987),  Pinto (1986)  and May (1985).
Ghana's parallel market for foreign currency  has been
growing  substantially  since  the mid 1960s  with the increase  in
cocoa smuggling.  tn addition,  the decline in export  earnings
during the  late 70s  and  early 80s and  the  strict foreign
exchange  controls  led to a large  expansion  of the black  market100
for foreign currency  and to an intensification  of export  and
import sat  4,l  ing.4 5 The  evolution of  the  parallel market
exchange rate from 1969 to 1987 is shown in Table 5.1 while
Figur^.s  5.1 and 5.2 show  the average (PREM2)  and end-of-period
(PREMIUM)  black market premium during the same period.  The
parallel market exchange rate, which represents  the marginal
cost of foreign exchange  and which was at 8.96 cedis to the
dollar in 1978  depreciated  to 76.58  cedis/dollar  by 1983  while
the official rate remained at 2.75 cedis/dollar.  Table 5.2
shows the volume of cocoa smuggled  out of Ghane from 1960 to
1982 while Table 5.3 shows the growing demand for foreign
exchange in the black market. 46 Estimates  of the demand for
currency  in  the  black  market  show  a  steady  increase  during  these
years.
During the late 1970s and the early 80s, Ghana's fiscal
deficits were financed  by printing money.  This led to hiqh
inflation rates during the same period with Ghana sufferitng
triple  digit inflation  in 1977,  1981  and 1983.  As can be seen
in Table 5.4 the rate of inflation  was around 116 during 1977
and 1981 and 122% during 1983.  There have been two currency
reforms,  one in 1979  and one in 1982  in  an attempt  to deal  with
the  effects  of high  inflation  on currency  values.  In the first
reform  cash  was  exchanged  at a rate  of 70% for  holeings  of  up to
5000  cedis  and at a rate of 50% for  holdings  above  5000  cedis.
45See,  for instance  Ernesto  May (1984).
"These estimates  are from  May, ibid.101
Table  5.1
Black  market  exchange  atea
Year  Average  black  End-of-period
market  premium  black  market  premium
1969  1.661L  1.6065
1970  1.6993  1.6610
1971  1.4727  1.0000
1972  1.2569  1.2207
1973  1.2893  i.4992
1974  1.5009  1.337ii
1975  1.7287  1.6696
1976  2.5270  3.7826
1977  8.0009  6.6870
1978  5.0777  3.6344
1979  5.6582  5.1964
1980  6.9102  4.0400
1981  9.5455  18.182
1982  9.8244  43.637
1983  8.6727  3.2330
1984  2.6862  2.000^)
1985  2.4142  2.4172
1986  2.2420  2.2220
1987  1.7979  1.6438
Source:  Pick's  Currency  Yearbook,  various  year.Figure  5.1
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Tables.2:Cocoa  Smuggling  and  Production
1960-1979
(Thousands  of  metric  tons)
Year  Production  Smuggled  Cocoa
1960/61  430  10
1961/62  409  8
1964/63  413  14
1963/64  428  11
1964/65  538  14
1965/66  401  17
1966/67  368  17
1967/68  415  21
1968/69  323  17
1969/70  403  25
1970/71  413  31
1971/72  454  37
1972/73  407  42
1973/74  340  34
1974/75  376  30
1975/76  396  38
1976/77  320  40
1977/78  271  45
1978/79  265  50
Source:  Ernesto  May  (1984)105
Table&3:The  Parallel  Market  Economy
(millions  of cedis)
Year  Illegal  Money  Parallel  Market  Parallel  Market
Economy  Economy  as  e
of official  GDP
1965  0.01  0.08  0.00
1966  1.66  9.71  0.64
1967  1.22  7.64  0.51
1968  0.87  5.71  0.34
1969  1.23  8.50  0.42
1970  0.96  7.15  0.32
1971  1.37  10.72  0.43
1972  1.27  7.73  0.27
1973  1.05  6.53  0.19
1974  3.65  24.54  0.53
1975  8.61  45.47  0.86
1976  15.74  72.68  1.11
1977  118.74  582.96  5.22
1978  282.71  1543.73  7.36
1979  483.15  3243.21  11.51
1980  1195.62  10024.37  24.45
1981  1313.16  12427.07  16.21
1982  2741.99  27827.27  32.41
Source:  Ernesto  Hay  (1984).
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Sourcc:  Derived  frou  p?ico  index  obtainee
from  International  Financial  Statistics,
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The real money supply fellI currency in  circulation also fell by
39e at the time of the reform.  In 1982, the 50 cedi note was
demonetized.  During  this  period  public  confidence  in  the
domestic banking system, and in the gwvernment declined.
During the last decade before the Economic Recovery Program
was  initiated,  when  the  black  market  exchange  rate  was
depreciating  and  the  public  sector  deficit  was  rising,  the
official  trade  balance deteriorated  from a  surplus of $212.9
million  in  1973  to a  deficit of  $60.6 million  in  1983. The
increase  in government  spending  led to  an  increase  in total
domestic spending and was partly responsible for the worsening
trade balance.  Another important factor was the deterioration
in Ghata'  s terms of trade which was 47% between 1973 and 1983.
From August  1978 to April  1983 the cedi was pegged to the US
dollar; as domestic inflation increased the Ghanaian currency
became  increasingly  overvalued  and  the  real  exchange  rate
appreciated.  The overvalued exchange rate combined with weak
demand for Ghana's main export, cocoa, led to a dramatic decline
in export earnings from $1066 million in 1979 to $439 million in
1983 and to a worsening of the trade balance even though imports
fell in the same period  from $780.3 million dollars to $499.7
million  dollars.
Table 5.5 shows the trade and  public sector deficits from
1970 to 1987. The public sector deficit reached a peak of US$
million  1277.82 in  1982,  just before the Ghanaian  authorities
embarked on the Economic Recovery Program.108
Tabli..S
year  t:ade  surplus  fiscal  deficit
1970  51.900  20.090
1971  -33.600  21.259
1972  161.40  74.247
1973  212.90  117.17
1974  -29.200  183.04
1975  150.40  490.87
1976  88.800  820.00
1977  29.400  1129.6
1978  112.50  1012.1
1979  262.60  674.55
1980  195.30  1097.1
1981  -243.60  1130.9
1982  18.300  1277.8
1983  -60.600  476.11
1984  32.900  40.960
1985  -36.300  119.19
1986  60.900  71.858
1987  -124.70  51.900
Source:  International  Financial  Statistics,  and  various
World  Bank  Reports.109
In 1983,  when  the  Ghanaian  government  adopted  the Economic
Recovery  Program  (ERP), the  cedi  was  devalued  from  2.75
cedis/dollar  to 30 cedis/dollar  and by 1986  to 90 cedis/dollar.
There was a dual exchange rate system  with some transactions
covered  under  the fixed  rate  system  and others  by the exchange
rate  determined  by the  demand  for  and  supply  of foreign  exchange
at government  managed auctions.4'  During  1983-86  exports  grew
76.1 % in dollar  terms and Ghana's foreign  exchange  earnings
increased.4 8 The trade  balance improvad,  from  a deficit of US
$60.6  million to a surplus  of US $60.9  million.  At the same
time  the  public  sector  deficit  improved  from  a  high level  of US
$476.1  million  to US $71.9  million  and  the  black  market  premium
imprc  ed steadily.  As  shown in Figure 5.3, higher fiscal
deficits had:  also been associated  with higher black market
premia. The black  market  real  exchange  rate  depreciated  during
this period, as did the official  real exchange  rate since  the
lower  domestic  absorption  (and  therefore  higher  trade  surplus)
led to a decrease  in the relative (domestic  currency)  price of
tradables  to home goods.  The paths of the black market and
official  real  exchange  rates  are shown  in Figure  5.4.
This section of the study tries to explain the stylized
facts  presented  above  in  the  context  of a  model  which  takes  into
47This  systam  was meant to reduce  the  spread between the
official  and parallel  market  rates,  and actually  achieved  this.
4BThis increase in export earnings was  due partly to  an
improvement  in the terms of trade and partly to an increase  in
export  volumes.110
Figure  5.3
Scatter  plot  of  the  fiscal  deficit  against  the
black  market  premium--1970  - 1987
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account  the  interrelationships  between  a  government  budget
deficit  financed  by  the  inflation  tax  on  domestic  currency
balances, the  demand for foreign currency in both the official
and  black  markets,  and  the  resultant  effects  on  the  trade
balance, and the real exchange rate.
Given  that  Ghana's  public  sector  deficit  was  rising
steadily up until 1983, and that the deficit was money-financed,
the rate of inflation was also high.  With an excess demand for
foreign exchange at the prevailing official exchange rate, the
black  market  premium  increased.  Higher  domestic  demand  and
rising  domestic  prices  caused  the  real  exchange  rate  to
appreciate.  The  higher  domestic  demand  also  had  a  negative
effect on the trade balance.
Several papers have attempted to explain the reason for the
high  black  market  premia  prevailing  in Ghana.  Pinto  (1985)
looks at the interactions between high black market premia and
inflation.  His paper is based on the notion that a more stable
foreign currency becomes a store of value in an environment with
high  and  volatile  inflation.  When  exchange  markets  are
officially  rationed this can  lead to high premia  in parallel
foreign  exchange  markets.  He  provides  an  estimate  for  the
inflation tax maximizing  rate of inflation in Ghana and finds
that the in the past the prevailing rates of inflation in Ghana
were higher than this optimum or maximizing  rate.  A paper by
Chhibber  and  Shafik  (1988)  looks  at  the  inflationary
consequences  of exchange rate devaluation  in the  presence of113
parallel markets for foreign currency.
May(1984) provides a theoretical  framework to examine the
way  in which  exchange controls and black markets  for  foreign
exchange  are  related to  lobbying  for  import  licenses and  to
smuggling activities.  He also develops a methodology  based on
a paper by Tanzi  (1982),  to assess the importance and magnitude
of  the  parallel  market  economy  in Ghana.  He  shows  how  the
incentive to  smuggle is related to the black market  premium:
smuggling will only occur  if the import premium outweighs the
black market premium.
Azam and Besley (1989)  present a simple general equilibrium
model determining both the parallel mairket  exchange rate and the
price of consumer goods, with particular application to Ghana.
The model developed in this section is based on paper's by
Lizondo (1984)  and Pinto (1988),  on the relationship between the
black market premium and government budget deficits.  It also
draws  on  May's  (1984)  analysis  of  black  market  premia  and
smuggling.  The  first part of this  paper  lays  out the model
focusing on exporters' and importers' maximization problems and
the financing of the public sector budget.  The second part of
the  paper  solves  for  the  determinants  of  the  black  market
premium.  The  premium  is  found  to  depend  on  the  levels  of
government  expenditure  and  tax  revenues  among  other  things.
From this analysis we derive an expression for the trade balance
and  for the  real  exchange rate  in terms of the black  market
premium  and  therefore  in terms of government  expenditure  and114
revenues.  The third  part is an application  of the theoretical
analysis  to Ghana.  The fourth  part concludes.
1.)  The Model
In this  paper,  as in Pinto (1985)  the  government  purchases
foreAgn  exchange  from  exporters  at  a  fixed  rate  of  e
cedis/dollar  and  sells  part  of its  foreign  exchange  to importers
at rate e.  The remainder  of the foreign  exchange is used to
finance government  consumption.  With a black market foreign
exchange rate of b cedis/dollar,  the marginal  cost of foreign
exchange  is  b; note  however,  that  the  government  obtains  foreign
exchange  at rate  e.  Thus  the official  exchange  rate,  e, acts  as
a conduit for real income  transfers  between  the government  and
the private sector.  When the government  is a net seller of
foreign  exchange  then  the black  market  premium  acts  as a source
of revenue for the government.  When the government  is a net
purchaser  of foreign  exchange  then  real  income  is  transferred  to
the private  sector  from  the government.49
The system  of exchange  rates  above  acts  as an implicit  tax
on  exporters who  must  sell  foreign exchange earned  from
49However,  the basic analysis  in this section regarding  the
effects of  higher government expenditure  on the  black market
premium is valid regardless  of whether the government  is a net
purchaser  or seller  of foreign  exchange. This  is  because,  in  this
model, an increase  government  expenditure  given other  sources  of
finance,  must  be financed  by money  creation. An increased  stock  of
money  will be held  only at a higher  premium  regardless  of whether
the government  is a net purchaser  or seller  of foreign  exchange.
However, the formal  analysis is more complex in the net seller
case.115
exporting  abroad to the government  at less than its marginal
cost.  This implies  that  there is a conflict  between  the goals
of  encouraging exports  and  raising  revenues  to  finance
government  expenditures.  If the implicit  tax on exports is
lowered (the official exchange rate is devalued so that it
equals  the  marginal  cost  of foreign  exchange)  then  total  exports
will increase. The government  is assumed  to get revenues  from
the inflation  tax  as  well  as from  conventional  taxes  and foreign
aid.  The inflation  tax finances  the residual  requirements  of
the government  net of the implicit  tax on exports and net of
conventional  taxes  and foreign  aid.
In  this  formulation, an  increase  in  public  sector
expenditure  raises  the reliance  on the  inflation  tax. We assume
that the inflation  tax is  given  by wm where:
e
N =  nominal  money  balances,  and  X  =  the rate  of inflation. At
the steady  state  the rate  of inflation  equals  the official  rate
of depreciation of  the  currency.  The  government'  s  budget
constraint,  at the steady  state  is shown  in equation  (1)  below:
(1) (gT-t-A)  - m Ae/e,
where  gT = total  government  expenditure  in  dollars  which  is  fixed
and which  equals  P.  gm/e  +  cl
qg  - government expenditure on nontradables
Pm  - the price of nontradables
g,  - government expenditure on importables116
t  - total government revenues in dollars which is also
fixed
gT-t  =  the real fiscal  deficit
Ae/e  =  the official rate of depreciation
9T  maMPHZ;-  +  g 1g 1=z  9TI  Z<1*
A  = aid flows to the government, in dollars.
Seignorage from the inflation tax is equal to Ae/e m, where Ae/e
is the official rate of depreciation and also the steady state
rate  of  inflation.  Given  that the marginal  cost  of  foreign
exchange  to  the  private  sector  is  b  and  that  the  private
sector's loss is  the government's gain, we can write the above
as:
(2) gT  M  M/b Ae/e +  et/b +  g(b-e)/b  +  eA/b
m  Ae/o  +  t/O +  g(l-l/0)  +  A/¢ 50
where 0  =  the black market premium
et/b=t/O  - the real tax burden to the private sector, and
eA/b-A/0  - the real value of aid flows to the private sector
and similarly for the expressions involving government spending
and the inflation tax.  The expression gT(b-e)/b represents the
implicit tax on exports. 51 The government sets e  arbitrarily,
and since it does not have reserves to deplete in maintaining
this exchange rate the official exchange market is rationed by
508ee Pinto  (1986).
51Pinto, ibid.117
capital controls and restrictions  on commercial  transactions.
As in Lizondo (1984)  we assume that there is no official  net
foreign  asset  accumulation  by the  government  so that
R - 0,
where  R =  official  reserves. The change  in the stock  of money
is  given  by
(3)  M  R + D
where D =  the change in domestic  credit  and N - the change in
the nominal  money  supply.
a.)-Production.  Exports.  and Imports
Agents  in  the  economy  produce  two  goods:  exportables  (X)
and  nontradables  (N).  Importables  (I),  are  not  produced
domestically  and are used only as inputa  in the production  of
nontradables.  The nontradable  good is consumed by both the
government  and  private  agents.  Exportables  are  not  consumed
domestically.  Exportables  and  importables  are  traded  on  both
official  and  unofficial  (illegal)  markets. Agents  maximize  the
following:
(4)  PMN  + e PXXO  +  bPxXu  - bC 1 (Xu)-eIo-bl"-eR(Io)  -bC2(Iu)  -W(1+L.+)
subject  to:
(a  N  - La  il-a
(b) L - L1 +  Lo+ Lu
(c)  It LiO-0
(d)  Xi$  Li118
where
Px  =  the world price of exports
Pt  =  the world  price of imports  which  has been  normalized  to
unity
p  =  price on nontraded goods
X  =  total exports
I  =  total imports
I*  =  imports coming through official channels
X.  =  exports going through official channels
C,(Xu)  -cost  of smuggling  exports
C2(Iu)r  cost of smuggling  imports
R(1 0)  cost of importing  through  official  channels  including
rent-seeking
1  - labor  employed  in  the  production  of the  nontradable  good.
Lo  labor  employed  in  the  production  of  exports  going  through
official  channels
Lu  - labor employed in  the production of exports going through
illegal  channels.
The cost functions  have the following  properties:
i) Cl(Xu)>O  ii)  C1(Xu)>O  iii)  R (I  )>O
C2  (Iu)  >°  c  1 (I  ) >0  Ro(I  ) >O
Condition (i) implies that the costs of smuggling  both
exports  and  imports  rise  with  the  volume  of  exports  and  imports
smuggled.  Condition  (ii)  implies  that  the  costs  of  smuggling
rise  at  an  increasing  rate.  Condition  (iii)  says  that  the  costs119
of lobbying  to import  through  official  channels increase  with
the  volume  of imports  and  at an increasing  rate. Any exports  or
imports  going through  illegal  channels  are valued  at the black
market exchange rate b, while those traded through official
channels  are valued  at the official  exchange  rate,  e.  The cost
of smuggling  is denominated  in dollars:  agsnts  have to give up
a portion of their export  earnings  through the black market.
Similarly one can think of the costs of smuggling  as bribes
(etc.)--  some imports  which are scarce  are given  up to pay for
the  privilege  of importing  illegally. Importers  lobby  to import
through official channels.  The actual cost of importing  is
higher by the cost of lobbying. We represent  these  as dollar
costs--  again  we can think  of importers  being  allowed  to import
at the official  exchange  rate by paying some of these import
goods  as bribes.
The  first  order  conditions  for  the  maximization  problem  are
given  below:
FO=:
(i)  -=°  aPN N=WL1 6LI
(ii) 6I  °  ~  N  (l-a)  (l+C2(I-I))I
(iii)  6I  0  '  (0-1)  =  R -C
102
6120
(iv)  SLu  0 "  -ePx+bPx-bC!(Xu)a 0
or  Xu- Xu(0Px  )
6LO  PX
FOC (i)  says  that  a fraction  'a'  of nontradable  production
is  equal  to total  wage  payments  in  the nontradable  sector. This
is characteristic  of the Cobb-Douglas  production  function:  a
factor's  share in total  output  is determined  by the production
coefficient,  'a'  in the case of labor.  FOC (ii)  says that  the
marginal  revenue  of the imported  input  must equal  the  marginal
cost of obtaining  it.  FOC (iii)  says that at the margin,  the
costs  of importing  through  official  versus  unofficial  channels
must  be equalized  otherwise  it  will always  pay agents  to switch
from  one  channel  to another. FOC (iv)  says  that,  at the  margin,
the benefits  from  exporting  through  official  versus  unofficial
channels  must  be equalized.  eP.  represents  the  revenues  obtained
in  cedis  per unit  of output  exported  through  official  channels.
This must be equal to the net revenue from smuggling  or the
difference  between  bPA,  which  represents  the  marginal  value (in
cedis)  of exporting  through illegal  channels  and the marginal
cost of smuggling  out exports,  bC,  (  X  ).  Again,  if this  were
not so,  it  would  pay  exporters  to switch  exports  from  illegal  to
legal  channels  or vice versa.  FOC (v) says  that the marginal
benefit  from  producing  (and  exporting)  must  be equal  to the  wage
rate.  Note that exports are produced with labor alone and121
according to a  linear production funrtion and the costs of
production  are therefore  determined  by labor  costs.  Since  all
markets  are  perfectly  competitive,  marginal  revenue  is  set  equal
to marginal  cost  to determine  the  wage  rate. The  world  price  of
exports in dollars is P.,  and the official  erchange  rate is e.
Thus  the  marginal  gain from  exporting  through  official  channels
in cedis,  is ePx. This determines  the  wage rate in cedis.
b.) Balance  of Payments
We assume that agents in this economy hold non-interest
bearing  assets  alone.  The balance  of payments  in this  economy
is shown in  equation (5)  below:
(i)F-PxX  - I - g =  PX(L-LI) - I -g
where  F  a  total  accumulation  of foreign  assets. We can  use  the
balance  of payments  equation (5),  equation  (c)  and first  order
conditions  (i)  and (ii)  to solve for L  aIid  I in terms  of F,g
U'I
x and  o  :
(6a)L2  =  Ll(PxI  gI''F)
+  _  - _
(6b)I  - I (P  ,  g ,  *  ,F)
x  I
An  increase in the black market premium increases the
allocation  of labor  in the  nontradable  sector. This is  because
an  increase in the  premium represents an  increase in the
implicit tax on exports; as the tax rises agents substitute
labor  towards the production  of nontradables. An increase  in122
government  spending  on importables  lowers  the  supply  of labor  to
the nontradable  sector.  There are two reasons for this: an
increase  in government  spending  on importables  in this model
must  be  met  by  a  decrease  in  government consumption of
nontradables  thus reducing  the total demand for nontradables.
Also, if government  spending on importables  increases  then,
given  the  trade  balance,  either  exports  must  increase  or imports
must fall or both.  Both these effects tend to reduce the
allocation  of labor  to the nontradable  sector.  Production  of
exports  must increase  at the cost of nontradable  production.
An increase  in  the  trade  surplus  will  reduce  the allocation
of labor  to the nontradable  sector.  An increase  in the trade
surplus implies a  reduction in domestic absorption or  an
increase  in  the production  of tradables  both  of which  will tend
to  reduce  nontradable  production  and  therefore  the  allocation  of
labor  to the nontradable  sector.
An increase  in the  terms  of trade  has ambiguous  effects  on
the labor  allocated  to the  nontradable  sector. On the  one  hand,
it raises  the return  to the production  of tradables,  while,  on
the  other  hand,  it lowers  the relative  price  of importables  and
therefore also raises the net return in the  production of
nontradables.
An increase  in  the  black  market  premium  raises  the  marginal
cost of foreign exchange and therefore  the cost of imports.
Thus imports fall as the premium rises.  An increase  in the
terms of trade lowers  the relative  price of importables  and123
therefore agents import more given the trade balance.  An
increase in the  trade surplus, ceteris paribus, implies a
reduction  in imports.  An increase in government  spending  on
importables  given the trade balance  must imply  a reduction  in
imports since the supply of foreign excbange to the private
sector  falls.
c.) Consumption
We  assume that  agents consume only nontradables: and
consume a constant fraction y  of their wealth. 52 Wealth is
defined  as the sum of domestic  and foreign  currency:
(8)  M+bF=W
where F is agents' holdings of foreign currency.  Therefore
consumption  spending  is  defined  as:
(9) PCN=y  (M+bF)
Using  equation  (9)  and Foc (i)  and (ii),  the  balance  of payments
equation  can be rewritten  as:
(7)  F=PX  (L-L1(O,PXIFIgT)) - gTz - I(mIFIODzDgT)
d.) Money  Demand
52The  assumption  that agents  consume  only nontradables  is a
simplifying  one;  the conclusions  do not depend  on this assumption
but the algebra  is simpler.124
As mentioned before, agents in this economy hold only non-
interest  bearing domestic and foreign currencies.  We denote the
fraction of money held in total wealth as A; this fraction A, is
a decreasing  function of the expected rate of depreciation in
the  black  market.  Following  Lizondo we  assume  that  agents
possess perfect foresight: the expected rate of inflation equals
the actual rate of inflation.  At the steady state this rate of
inflation is equal to the rate of depreciation of the domestic
currency.  Therefore money demand  (M) is given by equation (8):
(1)  M  - A(b/b) W
Assuming  that  private  agents  can  adjust  their  portfolio
composition instantly to the desired level:
(9) M  A  (b/b)  bF
(l-A(b/b))
Since the rate of depreciation  of the cedi in the black
market  determines  the  relevant  differential  rate  of  return
between money and foreign currency for the private sector A is
a  decreasing  function  of  the  black  market  rate  of
depreciation. 53
Using m =  M/e and 0  - b/e equation (9) can be rewritten as
equation  (10) below:
*  .
(10) m  . A(O/F+e/e)
Equation  (10) above is our differential equation in 0.
5 "There  are no interest bearing assets.125
.A Yhe  Steady  Stato
The dynamic  equations  of our system  are:
(11) F - Px(LE-L 1(OrPX'g1 F)) - ZgT-I(mIF*DzgT)
(12) m - gT-  t - em-A
*  S
(13) m =  A(OFb+e/e)
*  .
Equations (1l)-(13)  can be solved  for the steady  state  of
the economy.  The steady  state  system  is saddlepath  stable;  if
an increase  in the  black  market  premium  improves  the  unofficial
trade  balance.  This is  what we would  expect  since  an increase
in the  premium  raises  black  market  exports (the  tax  on official
exports increases)  while it reduces  black  market imports. The
steady state solution for the black market premium  is given
below: 54
(14)  0=*(g9,t,A,A) *gt>O,  Ot<O,  06<O,  OA<o
The derivative  of the  black  market  premium  with  respect  to
government  spending is of particular  interest:  an increase  in
government expenditure  will raise the black market premium.
This is because an increase  in government  consumption  reduces
the supply of dollars available  for the private sector since
part of the increase  in government  spending  is on importables.
54 Note that  there  are  bounds  on the level  of the black  market
premium *.  The maximum value *  can take is constrained  by the
condition  that  P. X0 =  g,  ,  or that  all  official  export  earnings
are spent by the government.  The minimum  value it can take is
unity  which  implies  that  there  is  no rationing  of foreign  exchange.126
This implies  that the black market price of foreign exchange
(which  is the  marginal  cost  of foreign  exchange)  will  be pushed
up.  A reduction  in conventional  tax revenues  will reduce  the
premium. This is  because  the lower  the  tax revenues  collected,
the  greater  will  be the  reliance  on inflationary  financing. The
higher is the rate of inflation  (and  therefore,  the inflation
tax) the higher  will be the associated  steady  state level of
money.  To restore  portfolio  balance,  the  premium  must rise.  A
improvement in  the  terms  of  trade will, given government
expenditure,  ease the supply  of dollars to the private sector
and therefore reduce the black market premium (which  is the
marginal  cost  of foreign  exchange).
An increase in aid flows to Ghana raises the resources
available to  the  government and  reduces its  reliance on
inflationary  financing. This lowers  the steady  state  level  of
money  balances  and  we therefore  need  a lower  premium  to restore
portfolio  balance.
An  increase in the  rate of  official depreciation has
ambiguous  effects:  the  direction  of the  effect  depends  upon  the
inflation  elasticity  of  the  share  of domestic  money  in  wealth,..
There are two distinct  effects  of an increase  in the expected
rate  of
depreciation  (  -e  ) (i.e.  an increase  in  the  expected  inflation
rate). Suppose  ae  is raised. The differential  rate  of return
between  cedis  and  dollars  rises  making  dollars  more  attractive.127
The greater  demand  for  foreign  exchange  would  tend  to raise  the
black market premium.  However there is another effect  which
works in the  opposite  direction:  with the real  deficit  given,  a
smaller  cedi  base  would  be required  for  the inflation  tax.  The
steady  state
inflation  tax is given  by  Ae M where  M is the nominal  money
supply,  or by A(W/e)  (Ae/e),  so  that  lAe/e  is  defined  as the  unit
inflation  tax.  We assume  that  rises  with e, but has the shape
of a Laffer  Curve as shown in Figure 5.5.  Suppose  Ae/e rises
but the inflation  elasticity  of A is less  than unity.  (We  are
on the left  hand  side  of the  curve  in  Figure  5.5.  Then  the  unit
inflation  tax will actually  rise (total  inflation  tax revenues
will actually rise)  , the supply of dollars  will ease and the
premium  will fall. However  if the inflation  elasticity  of A is
greater  than  unity  then  the inflation  tax revenues  will  fall  and
the  premium  will rise (we  will  be on the right  hand side  of the
Laffer  Curve-past  the revenue  maximizing  inflation  rate).
a.) The effects  of a devaluation
The effect  of a one  time  devaluation  in this  model is  only
temporary. A devaluation,  by raising  the  nominal  exchange  rate
will immediately  lower the real money stock, M/e=m.  At the
original  premium,  there  will be a portfolio  imbalance;  agents
will have a  greater proportion of  foreign assets in their
portfolio  than they desire.  To restore  portfolio  balance  two
things  happen:  (i)  the  black  market  premium  falls  immediately  to128
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reduce the  share of foreign assets  in wealth  and  (ii) as the
premium rises to its steady state level the rate of inflation is
higher and the desired ratio of foreign assets in wealth  (l-A),
increases. 55 Thus  a  devaluation  will  temporarily  reduce  the
black  market premium.  However,  if the fiscal deficit remains
the  same  the  premium  will  gradually  return  to  its  original
steady state level.
b. The real exchanae rate and the trade balance
The  official  real  exchange  rate  is defined  as  the
relative price of tradable to nontradable goods:
(15) ePX/PN  - a(L 1a¶/I)
Since  P  - eP"L 1/aN =  eP./a (L 1/I) 1-
Using  equations  (6a) and  (6b) we can write  the official
real  exchange rate  in terms of the black market  premium, the
terms of trade, the  trade surplus and government spending.  It
can be shown that the official real exchange rate is a negative
function of the black market premium so that an increase in the
premium  lowers  (appreciates) the  official  real exchange  rate
while  a  decrease  in  the  premium  raises  the  official  real
exchange rate.  This is because a higher premium raises the cost
of imports which are an input into nontradable production and
raises the relative price of nontradables.
55A  - X(O  +  e): with e given any increase in 0  will lower A.130
An increase  in the trade  surplus  leads  to a real exchange
rate depreciation,  given the premium, since a higher trade
surplus  implies  a lower  domestic  absorption  and therefore  lower
demand for nontradables.  This puts downward pressure  on the
price of nontradables  leading to a depreciation  of the real
exchange  rate.  An  increase in government consumption  of
tradables  also causes  a real  exchange  rate  depreciation. This
is  because,  under  the assumption  of a given  level  of government
expenditure,  any  increase  in  government  consumption  of
tradables,  given gT,  implies a reduction in the government's
consumption  of nontradables. The lower  demand  for  nontradables
lowers  their  price  and depreciates  the real  exchange  rate.
A terms  of trade  improvement  has ambiguous  effects. There
are two factors to consider:  an improvement  in the terms of
trade means an increase  in the relative  price of tradable  to
home goods. this tends to depreciate  the real exchange  rate.
However,  the  higher  relative  price  of  exports  induces
substitution  in  production  towards  tradables:  this  will  tend  to
raise  the  price  of nontradables  and  appreciate  the  real  exchange
rate.  The net effect could be either positive or negative,
however, one  can usually expect the  direct effect of  the
increase  in the premium  on the price  of exports  to exceed  the
indirect  effect  on the price  of nontradables.
The black  market  real  exchange  rate is  defined  as:
bPx  bPxa  L 1C10)  Li  °)
(16) pN  epx  (I  O  a(  I)131
The effects  of a change  in  the  premium  on the  black  market  real
exchange  rate  are  ambiguous. This is  because  an increase  in  the
premium  raises  the returns  from  exporting  in the black  market.
At the same time however,  nontradable  production  falls (since
imports  become  more expensive). This  tends to raise  the price
of nontradables. The net effect  on the black market relative
price  of exportables  to nontradables  may be either  negative  or
positive.  An  increase  in  government  consumption  of
tradables,  an increase  in  the terms  of trade  and an increase  in
the trade surplus  are all expected  to have similar effects  on
the  black  market  real  exchange  rate  as on the official  exchange
rate,  given  the premium.
When  we substitute  in for  the  steady  state  determinants  of
the  black  market  premium,  we  may  write  the  steady  state  official
real exchange  rate as a function  of the terms of trade, the
official  rate  of depreciation,  aid  flows  to  Ghana,  tax  revenues,
and  government spending.  The  effect of  an  increase in
government  spending  on the real exchange  rate is negative. An
increase  in  spending  has a negative  effect  on the real  exchange
rate  through two  channels: an  increase in  spending that
represents  partly  an increase  in spending  on nontradables  will
raise the  relative price of nontradables.  An  increase in
government  spending  will also raise  the black market premium.
This  will again  tend  to make imported  inputs  more expensive  and
therefore raise the price of nontradables  which  use these
inputs.132
An  increase  in  the  price  of  exports,  Px will  raise
(depreciate) the real exchange rate.  A higher  relative price
for exports implies a larger supply of foreign exchange premium,
given  government  spending,  and  therefore  a  lower  price  for
foreign exchange.  As explained previously, as the premium falls
the real exchange rate will depreciate.
An  increase  in tax  revenues will  tend to depreciate  the
real exchange rate.  Higher tax revenues will lower the black
market  premium and therefore  lower the price of nontradables.
The  effect  of  an  increase  in the  rate  of  depreciation  (and
inflation)  on the  real exchange  rate  is ambiguous  since  the
effect  on the premium  is ambiguous.  If 60/16< 0  i.e. if the
inflation elasticity of the demand for money  in wealth is less
than unity then the real exchange rate would rise  (depreciate)
with an increase in the rate of depreciation.5
An increase in aid flows is expected to depreciate the real
official  exchange  rate.  This  is because,  in  our  model,  an
increase in aid  flows to Ghana represents  an increase in net
resources available to the government  and therefore reduces the
government's reliance on money financing.  With a lower stock of
money,  the black  market  premium  has to  rise  less  to restore
portfolio balance.  Also, a reduction in the premium lowers the
cost of imports and therefore of nontradables.  This would put
downward pressure on the price of nontradables and depreciate
SSeparate  estimates  of  money  demand  indicate  that  the
inflation elasticity of money demand  is  less than unity.133
the real exchange rate.
Note that at the steady state the trade balance is zero. 57
While  it  is  useful  to  consider  the  steady  state
determinants  of the  real exchange  rate  and the  black  market
premium,  a  look at the non-steady state relationships between
the  premium,  the  trade  balance,  the  real  exchange  rate  and
public sector expenditure is particularly useful in the context
of this model.  This is because the analysis of the steady state
assumes that the rate of inflation equals the rate of official
depreciation.  This was obviously not true for Ghana in the last
decade and a half when the official exchange rate was kept fixed
with some discrete devaluations, but the rate of inflation was
very high.
The trade balance equation is reproduced below:
F = Px  (L  - L  zgT  - I(f, me,  F, gT, z)
The  black  market  premium  itself  is a  function  of  the  trade
balance,  the  stock  of  money,  the  stock  of  foreign  assets,
government  expenditure  and  the  terms  of  trade:
(17) *  - O(F, ml,  P,  , PX,  gT)
571f agents held interest bearing foreign assets then private
agents foreign asset accumulation would consist of the sum of net
interest payments plus the trade surplus/deficit.  F  would be  the
current account.  In this case the trade balance would not be  zero
at the steady state.134
An increase  in the stock  of  money  will require  an increase
in the black market  premium  to restore  portfolio  balance.  An
increase  in the stock  of foreign  assets  implies  an increase  in
private sector wealth and therefore an increase in private
sector  consumption. The  higher  consumption  demand  (and  thus  the
higher  demand  for  imports  and foreign  exchange)  raises  the  black
market  premium.  An increase  in government  expenditure  raises
the  black  market  premium since  part  of  the  increase in
expenditure  (given z)  is  spent  on  importables.  Higher
government  consumption  of importables  implies  that  less foreign
exchange will be available for the private sector and given
demand  will  have  -he  effect  of raising  the  black  market  premium.
An improv.4itent  in the terms of trade,  given F, the trade
balance, will have an ambiguous effect on the black market
premium.  On one hand,  it will tend  to raise  the production  of
tradables relative to nontradables.  On the other hand, by
raising wages, it will induce substitution  towards imported
inputs and away from labor in the nontradable  sector: thus
imports  rise.  This  may put upward  pressure  on the black  market
premium  depending  on the  relative  short  run  responses  of exports
and imports  given  the trade  balance.
An improvement  in the trade balance is accompanied  by a
lower premium.  This is because an improvement  in the trade
balance  implies  a larger  supply  of foreign  exchange  in  the  black
market.  The trade  balance  equation  can  be rewritten  in  terms  of
the stock of money, the stock of  foreign currency held by135
private  agents,  the  terms  of  trade,  and  public  sector
expenditure.  This is done by substituting  out for the black
market  premium  in equation  (18) below:
. .
(18)  F - F(Px,  m, F, Z, gZ)
The  trade  balance  depends  positively  on the  terms  of  trade.
This is  because  an increase  in the  terms  of trade  raises  export
revenues at  every  level of  exports, and  also  raises the
production  of tradables  by inducing  agents  to substitute  away
from nontradable  to tradable  production.  An increase  in the
stock  of money could  have  either  a negative  effect  or pop :ive
effect  on the trade  balance.  Firstly,  a higher  stock  of money
implies greater wealth for the private sector and therefore
greater  consumption  demand (for  nontradables).  This  will put
upward  pressure  on  the  relative  price  of nontradables  and  agents
will substitute  production  towards  nontradables. Since  imports
are used in nontradable  production  imports  must rise and the
trade balance tends to deteriorate.  On the other hand, an
increase  in  the  stock  of money  held  by the  private  sector,  given
the trade balance, is associated  with a higher black market
premium.  The higher  premium  reduces  imports (and  exports,  but
less so) and improves  the trade  balance."  This  makes sense  if
we  recall that  the  overall trade balance reduces to  the
unofficial  trade  balance since,  by construction,  the official
5 "This is the condition  for saddlepath  stability.136
sector  is always  in balance.  Thus an increase  in the stock  of
real  balances  may improve  the trade  balance.
An increase  in the stock  of foreign  currency  has similar
effects  since  it also represents  an increase  in wealth.
An increase in public sector expenditure  has a negative
effect  on the trade  balance  in two ways:  first,  an increase  in
the government's  consumption  of importables  has a  direct  impact
on the  trade balance.  Second, an  increase in government
consumption  of nontradables  raises  imports (which  are used in
nontradable  production)  and  deteriorates  the trade  balance.
The official real exchange rate can also be written in
terms of the terms of trade, the trade balance,  the stock of
real  money  balances,  the  stock  of foreign  currency,  total  public
sector  expenditure  and  public  sector  expenditure  on importables.
An improvement  in  the trade  balance  leads  to an appreciation  of
the real  exchange  rate. This is  because,  a  higher  trade  surplus
implies  lower  imports  or higher  exports  or both.  If the lower
imports/higher  exports  come  at  the  expense  of  nontradables
production  the  relative  price  of  nontradables  will  rise  and  this
will  lead  to appreciation  of the official  real  exchange  rate. 59
An increase in public sector expenditure  on importables
given total expenditure  (i.e.  an increase  in 'z' )  implies  a
reduction  in public  sector  expenditure  on nontradables. Lower
"The black  market  premium  will rise with an increase  in a.
This  is  because  higher  government  expenditure  on  importable  means
that  the supply  of  official  foreign  exchange  to the  private  sector
falls  and thus the  price  of foreign  exchange  increases.137
demand for nontradables implies downward pressure on the price
of nontradables and leads to real exchange rate depreciation.
If total public  sector  expenditure  increases, given  that the
share  of  imports  in total  expenditure  is fixed, part  of the
increase  will  fall  on  nontradables.  This  will  put  upward
pressure on the price of nontradables and lead to real exchange
rate appreciation.
An  increase  in  the  stock  of  real  balances  will  raise
wealth, and therefore consumption (of nontradables).  This will
put upward  pressure on the price  of nontradables and  lead to
real exchange rate appreciation.  The same holds for an increase
in the private sector's stock of foreign currency.
The effect  of the  devaluations and other  policy  changes
that occurred in Ghana from 1983 on can be analyzed through this
model. As discussed before, one-shot devaluation is expected to
reduce the premium temporarily by lowering the real money stock
instantaneously.  Thus we should expect to see a drop  in the
black market premium  (which we did).  For the following years
the exchange rate regime did not change significantly-- there
were a number of discrete devaluations from 1983 to 1987, tax
collection methods  improved and aid flows to Ghana started to
rise.  In  this  way  the  government  gradually  switched  to
alternative means of financing of a lowering level of government
expenditure.6  All these events would, in this model, lower the
'fHigher  aid flows means lower money financing and therefore
a  lower  steady  state  premium.138
black market premium.  This, in fact, happened-- the black
market premium started to fall in 1983 and continued  to fall
dramatically  thereafter,  as the fiscal  deficit  fell.  This can
be seen  in Table  5.1 and in Figures  5.1 and 5.2.
In 1987  the  government  undertook  policies  aimed  at unifying
the  official  and  black  markets  for  foreign  exchange. In  view  of
the  fact that the fiscal deficit has been falling, and the
reliance  on money financing  has been falling,  there  was not a
substantial  differential  between  the black  market  and official
exchange rates.  In fact,  by 1988 and 1989 the black market
premium  had fallen  dramatically.
In  the  context  of  the  current  model,  unification  could  lead
to  an  increase  in  the  rate  of  inflation under  certain
circumstances.  The higher the black market premium before
unification, the  larger the  implicit tax  on  exports and
therefore  the more important  is the black  market premium  as a
source of revenue for the government.  Upon unification  the
government  loses  the implicit  tax on exports  and  must rely  on a
higher  inflation tax.  In the case where  I  <  1 (which is the
case for  Ghana,  as discussed  previously)  and the exchange  rate
system is  unified so  that *  - 1  inflation may  rise  on
unification. If  the steady  state  rate  of inflation  was e  (=  b)
then  with  O,,  O  .,s  (e,  t, A, gTI  Px) the rate  of inflation  must
rise  when  0  falls  if  all other  factors  remain  the same.  If,  at
the  same  time,  however,  other  factors  change  such  as:  government
expenditure  falling,  aid flows rising or the terms of trade139
improving,  all of which  would  reduce  the steady  state  premium,
then unification  may not lead  to an increase  in inflation--  it
may even  be accompanied  by a reduction  in inflation. 61 In fact,
it may be that  the slight  increase  in inflation  after  1986  may
be partly  due to the gradual  unification  of the exchange  rate
regime,  and it is also  probably  true  that if  the government  had
tried  to unify  the exchange  rate  without  any fiscal  adjustment,
we would  have seen  higher  inflation  in 1988  and 1989 (inflation
was around  24% from 1988-III  to 1989-III).
3.) Lmairical  evidence
a.) The steady  state
This section  examines  the empirical  evidence  in  two parts:
first,  we consider  the regression  results  for the steady  state
determinants  of the black  market  premium,  and  the real  exchange
rate. The second  part looks  at the non steady-state  regression
results for the trade surplus,  and the official  real exchange
rate.  The  variables  used in the regressions  of part I are as
follows:
PREM2  =  the average  black  market  premium
611f  the  government  were  a net  seller  of foreign  exchange  this
may not be true.  In this  case  the black  market  premium  acts as a
conduit for transfers  from  the government  to the private  sector,
and a reduction in the premium would mean a net reduction in
subsidies  to the private sector and post unification  inflation
could  fall.140
FD2-public sector deficit in dollars
TOT-the terms of trade
AID-aid flows to Ghana in dollars
EXDEP=the official rate of depreciation using average exchange
rates
RER=  the  official  real  exchange  rate  calculated  using  the
average official exchange rate.
DV83=a  dummy variable  for 1983,  the beginning of the Economic
Recovery Program
In equation (a)  we see that both the terms of trade and the
fiscal deficit are significant  in determining the premium and
have  the expected  signs.  Aid  flows were  not econometrically
significant and have been dropped from the equation; we would
expect higher aid flows to be associated with lower black market
premia  since  aid  flows represent  a  source  of  revenue to the
government  and  reduce  the  government's  reliance  on  money
financing of the deficit.' 2 As expected, an increase in the
fiscal deficit will  raise the black market premium.  A higher
fiscal deficit must be  financed by printing  money.  A higher
stock  of  money  requires  a  higher  black  market  premium  for
portfolio balance: thus large deficits are associated with high
premia.  The coefficient on the official rate of depreciation is
negative implying that the inflation elasticity of money demand
'2Less of a reliance on money financing implies that a lower
premium is required to restore portfolio balance.141
Equation  a
LS 1/  Dopendent  Variable  ie  PREM2
Date:  7-09-1990  /  Times 10:31
SMPL  range:  1970  - 1987
Number  of  observations:  18
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIG.
C  4.5305050  1.5139230  2.9925598  0.010
TOT  -0.0249831  0.0107270  -2.3289956  0.037
DV83  5.7677072  6.9228176  0.8331445  0.420
EXDEP  -0.0023348  0.0070727  -0.3301128  0.747
FD2  0.0057277  0.0006620  8.6527109  0.000
R-squared  0.875364  Mean of dependent  var  4.128039
Adjusted  R-squared  0.837014  S.D.  of  dependent  var  3.133399
S.E.  of regression  1.265001  Sum of squared  resid  20.80297
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.219636  F-etatitic  22.82584
Log likelihood  -26.84341
Equation  b
LS l/  Dependent  Variable  is  PREMIUM
Date:  7-09-1990  !  Time: 10:24
SMPL  range:  1971  - 1987
Number  of observations:  17
mmmmmmmmmmmmmm._._........  _  .....  m_  m.,  _.,___
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIG.
c  27.318078  7.0921050  3.8518998  0.002
TOT  -0.2111033  0.0508114  -4.1546408  0.001
FD2  0.0157124  0.0032087  4.8967507  0.000
EXDEP  -0.0151802  0.0069070  -2.1978097  0.047
R-squared  0.735244  Mean  of dependent  var  6.082630
Adjusted  R-squared  0.674146  S.D.  of  dependent  var  10.48394
S.E. of regression  5.984616  Sum  of squared  resid  465.6031
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.887127  F-tatiette  12.03391
Log likelihood  -52.25798
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm.minmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm142
in  Ghana  is  less  than  unity,  however,  the  t-statistic  is
insignificant.  63  The  dummy  variable  for  1983  is  used  to
capture  the  effects  of  the  various  policy  changes  in  Ghana  in
1983  on  the  premium.64  The  dummy  variable  is
insignificant.  Equation  (b)  shows  a  similar  regression  with  the
end  of  period  b'lack  market  premium  (PREMIUM).  All  the  variables
have  the  expected  signs.  However,  aid  flows  are  insignificant
and  have  been  dropped  from  the  equation.
Equation  (c) shows  the  regression  of  the  official  real
exchange  rate  against  the  relevant  explanatory  variables  where:
RER= the  official  real  exchange  rate
TOT= the  terms  of  trade
FD2= the  fiscal  deficit
AID=  aid  flows
In equation  (c) we  see  that  the  public  sector  deficit,  is
significant.  The  expected  rate  of  depreciation  and  the  terms  of
trade  are  not  econometrically  significant  determinants  of  the
real  exchange  rate  and  have  been  dropped  from  the  equation.65
63This  is  consistent  with  our  estimates  of  the  money  demand
function  for  Ghana.
"We  have  used  rational  expectations  in  this  model  and  the
official  rate  of  depreciation  equals  the  expected  and  actual  rate
of  inflation  at  the  steady  state.
65First  differencing  the  relationship  gives  the  same  results
with  only  the  fiscal  deficit  significant.143
Equation  c
LS //  Dependent Variable is  RER
Date: 7-09-1990 /  Time: 10:26
SMPL  range:  1972  - 1987
Number of observations: 16
Convergence achieved after 2 iterations
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD. ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL SIG.
C  114.24041  7.4297634  15.376050  0.000
FD2  -0.0657257  0.0081465  -8.0679843  0.000
AID  -0.1328062  0.0348994  -3.8053979  0.003
DV83  -57.261645  16.427083  -3.4858073  0.005
------------------------------------------------------------ __------
AR(2)  -0.4269909  0.4278738  -0.9979366  0.340
R-squared  0.828371  Mean of dependent var  51.68565
Adjusted R-squared  0.765960  S.D. of dependent var  34.74519
S.E. of regression  16.80891  Sum of squared resid  3107.936
Durbin-Watson stat  1.810349  F-statistic  13.27291
Log likelihood  -64.85602
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An  increase  in the  flow of aid to Ghana  is expected to
depreciate the official real exchange rate but the coefficient
on  aid  flows  is negative.  We  expect  a  positive  coefficient
because higher aid means lower reliance on money financing, and
therefore a lower steady state money stock and a lower premium
to achieve portfolio balance.66  The negative coefficient can
be  explained  if we assume that part of the  foreign aid flows
represent  transfers  to  the private  sector.  In such  a  case,
private  consumption  of  nontradables would  increase as would
therefore the price of nontradables and the real exchange rate
would fall (appreciate).  A higher level of government spending
implies  a  greater  demand  for  nontradables.  Thus  higher
government spending is associated with a higher relative price
for nontradables and a more appreciated real exchange rate.  We
see  that  in  fact,  the  fiscal  deficit  is  by  far  the  most
important factor affecting the real exchange rate.
b.) Non-steady state
In  this  section  we  estimated  the  following  (non-steady
state)  relationships,  where  the  variables  are  as  defined
previoulsy in the text:
F  - F  (m, F, gT  ,  ,  z )'
"To recapitulate, a lower black market premium depreciates the
official  real  exchange  rate  because  it  makes  imported  inputs
cheaper and lowers the price of nontradables relative to the price
of exportables which are constant given the official exchange rate
and the world price of exportables.145
RER  RER  (m,  F,P  gT,  Px  z  ) and
0-  O(F  * PXI  m, F, gT)
Equations  (d),(e)  and  (f)  show  the  resulti  of  the
estimation with the variables defined as follows:
TS2= the trade surplus in dollars
PSD2 = public sector expenditure in dollars
TILMOND - the stock of privately held foreign assets in dollars
TOT =  the terms of trade
MONEYD - the stock of money in dollars (Ml)
WLTHD2 =  wealth in dollars
L denotes lagged values. 67
Data on the stocks of foreign currency held by the private
sector was not available.  The data up to 1982 was taken from
Ernesto May's estimates of the parallel market economy in Ghana
(or the volume of illegal money as he refers to it).  The data
for the  stock of foreign assets  after  1982 was  derived using
May's 1982 stock figure and the estimated change in the size of
the black market relative to the legal market for currency based
on the change in the black market premium.M
'7For variables  related to the stock of wealth  I have used
lagged values since it seems reasonable that the stock of wealth at
the  end  of  the  preceding  period  determines  consumption  in the
present period.
6This was done by assuming that the proportion of illegal to
legal  activities  fell/rose  in the same proportion  as the black
market premium.146
Equation  d
LS  // Dependent  Variable  is TS2
Date:  7-09-1990  /  Time:  10:27
SMPL  range:  1971  - 1987
Number  of observations:  17
Convergence  achieved  after  3 iterations
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIG.
C  -266.29253  129.33074  -2.0590042  0.064
TILMONDL  -0.8823213  1.0341880  -0.8531536  0.412
MONEYDL  0.0757216  0.0415255  1.8234968  0.095
PSD2  -0.0801810  0.0381832  -2.0999000  0.060
TOT  2.6078071  0.8553298  3.0488907  0.011
------------------------------------------------------------- __-----
AR(1)  -0.4851280  0.2783789  -1.7426896  0.109
R-squared  0.539113  Mean  of dependent  var  46.90588
Adjusted  R-squared  0.329620  S.D.  of dependent  var  130.4055
S.E.  of  regresslon  106.7718  Sum  of squared  resid  125402.4
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.362182  F-statistic  2.573409
Log  likelihood  -99.82355
Equation  e
LS  //  Dependent  Variable  is RER
Date:  7-09-1990 / Time: 10:28
SMPL  range:  1972  - 1987
Number  of observations:  16
Convergence  achieved  after  6 iterations
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIG.
C  115.16474  8.1844943  14.071088  0.000
TILMONDL  -0.2379984  0.0744803  -3.1954526  0.010
PSD2  -0.0338936  0.0044642  -7.5922894  0.000
DV83  -25.550855  8.0151391  -3.1878243  0.010
-----------------------------------  ------ ee  - ----------- e  --
AR(1)  0.8364084  0.2522426  3.3158887  0.008
AR(2)  -0.6428042  0.2574228  -2.4970754  0.032
R-squared  0.929535  Mean  of dependent  var  51.68565
Adjusted  R-squared  0.894302  S.D.  of dependent  var  34.74519
S.E.  of regression  11.29610  Sum  of squared  resid  1276.018
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.192499  F-statistic  26.38272
Log  likelihood  -57.73430
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Since the data for privately  held foreign  assets  must be
subject  to a great  deal of measurement  error,  a proxy  variable
was initially  estimated  and  used in  the regressions. The  use of
a proxy for private  sector  wealth  did not improve  the results;
therefore  the  final  equations  presented  are  based  on  the initial
estimated  figures.
Equation  (d) shows the  results for the  trade balance
equation. We see  that  both  the  terms  of  trade  and  public  sector
expenditure  are significant  while  private  sector  wealth  is not.
To recapitulate,  we would expect  public sector  expenditure  to
have  a negative  effect  on the trade  balance  since  a part  of the
increase  in  government  expenditure  falls  on importables  so  that,
ceteris  paribus,  total  imports  increase. The  terms  of  trade  are
also an important  factor  in determining  the trade  balance  with
an improvement  in the terms of trade being associated  with an
improvement  in the trade balance.  Considering  that Ghana's
export  base is very narrow,  this is cause  for concern  over the
longer  terms.  A long-term  downward  trend  in  cocoa  prices  could
lead to a prolonged  period  with a deteriorating  trade  balance.
We see that private  sector  wealth  enters  with a positive  sign.
An increase  in private  sector  wealth  has two effects:  it has a
direct  effect  on imports  (it  raises  them)  and it  also  raises  the
black  market  premium  which  has  an overall  positive  effect  on the
trade balance.  We see that the effect through the premium148
dominates.69
Estimation  of the equation  for  the official  real exchange
rate  (e), shows that the public sector deficit and private
sector  wealth  were  the  two most important  factors  affecting  the
official.  real exchange rate.70  Public sector expenditure  is
seen to have a negative effect  on the official real exchange
rate since an increase  in public sector  expenditure,  part of
which  is  spent  on  nontradables will  raise  the  price  of
nontradables  and appreciate  the official real exchange rate.
Thus  we  can  attribute  some  of  the  real  exchange  rate
appreciation that occurred (given a  fixed nominal official
ex-hange rate) from the early part of the 1970s to 1982 to
rising public sector expenditures.  Private sector wealth,
represented  by the stock of foreign  assets in this equation,
also appreciates  the real official exchange rate by raising
domestic  consumption  demand. 7 n
Equation  (f) shows that  the  black  market premium is
significantly  affected  by  both  public  sector  expenditure  and  the
stock of real wealth.  As expected, both variables have a
69 The error process  in this equation  has the following  form:
et- e  t+02e  .+v..  This process  is stationary  if  01+0 <  1,  (2-01  <
1  an-i  <  <  1.  These conditions  are  satisfied for our
equation.
"The terms of trade was found to be insignificant  and was
dropped  from  the equation. If  the sum  of the real  money  stock  and
the  private  sector's  stock  of  foreign  assets  is  used (wealth)  it  is
significant. When  the  money  stock  and  the stock  of foreign  assets
are entered separately  we find that only the stock of foreign
assets  is significant.
7 t Again,  the error  process  is stationary.149
LS //  Dependent Variable  is PREM2
Date: 8-08-1990 /  Time:  18:41
SMPL  range: 1970  - 1987
Number of observations: 18
Convergence achieved after 1 iterations
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD. ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL SIG.
__==w=s=  - ---  _=-__=__  a 
c  -0.2178981  0.3895180  -0.5594044  0.585
PSD2  0.0020751  0.0003033  6.8426687  0.000
WLTHD2L  0.0009491  0.0002265  4.1900329  0.001
TS2  -0.0016625  0.0018785  -0.8849832  0.392
…-----------------------------------------------------------_______
AR(1)  -0.2372703  0.2666116  -0.8899473  0.390
R-squared  0.926335  Mean of dependent var  4.128039
Adjusted R-squared  0.903669  S.D. of dependent var  3.133399
S.E. of regression  0.972522  Sum of squared resid  12.29539
Durbin-Watson stat  2.042507  F-statistic  40.86858
Log  likelihood  -22.11056150
positive  effect  on the premium.  Note that a devaluation  will
reduce  the existing  stock  of real  balances  and therefore  have  a
temporary  negative  effect  on the  premium.
4.) Conclusion
This  study  has  attempted  to  determine  the  importance  of the
government of Ghana's fiscal and monetary policies for  its
foreign  exchange  and  trade  sector. It  has  done  this  by focusing
on the effect  of the fiscal  deficit  on the parallel  market for
foreign  exchange  in Ghana  which  had achieved  large  proportions
during  the last  two  decades. Any  study  that  aims  to understand
the macroeconomy  by examining  the data  available  must take the
parallel  economy  and the effect  of the black  market  premium  on
macroeconomic  variables  into  account. At present,  the  Ghanaian
authorities  are attempting  to gradually  switch  to a completely
market determined exchange rate  system.  one  might  argue
therefore  that the model and  analysis  in this section  of the
paper  is  not  useful  for  analyzing  the  possible  effects  of future
government  policy.  While  this may be true,  any analysis  based
on historical  data and evidence  that ignored  the dual foreign
exchange markets would not  present a  true picture of  the
economy.  Also, (as  mentioned  above),  the exchange  rate system
has  still  not  been  unified:  there  are  still  three  exchange  rates
in Ghana,  the official  or auction  rate,  the rate  determined  at
the  various  privately  owned  foreign  exchange  bureaus (this  rate
is slightly  more depreciated  than the 'official'  rate) and a151
black market rate applicable  to a tiny fraction  of the tota:
foreign  exchange  market.
The main  conclusion  that  can  be derived  from  this analysis
is that  public  sector  expenditure  (and  hence the deficit) in
Ghana had a significant  effect on the official real exchange
rate,  the trade  balance,  and the black  market  premium.  It was
found  that  only  the  terms  of trade  and  public  sector  expenditure
have  a  significant  effect  on the  trade  balance  with  higher  terms
of trade being associated  with an improved  trade balance and
higher  public sector  expenditure being  associated with  a
worsened  trade  balance. To estimate  the  effect  of rising  public
sector  expenditure  on the  trade  balance,  we used  equation  (d)  to
estimate  what  the  trade  balance  would  have  been  if  public  sector
expenditure  had been kept at its 1970 level.  Table 5.5 shows
these results.  TBSIM7 is the estimated  txade surplus with
public sector  expenditure  constant  at the 1970 level.  TS2 is
the actual  trade surplus.  We see that in almost  all of the
years  the trade  surplus  would  have  been  substantially  larger  if
public sector  expenditure  had remained  constant.  We see for
instance,  that in 1981, instead  of a $244 million deficit  we
would have had a $313  million surplus.  TBSIM8 shows  what the
trade  surplus  would  have  been if  the  terms  of  trade  had  remained
at their  1970  level  and  TBSIM9  shows  the  trade  surplus  estimates
with the terms  of trade  held  at their  1974 (high)  level.
It  was  found  that  public  sector  expenditure had  a
significant  and  negative  effect  (higher  public  sector152
Table  5.6
obs  TS2  TBSIM1  TBSIM2
1972  161.4000  100.9095  140.5371
1973  212.9000  69.48497  37.99500
1974  -29.20000  145.8486  -2.365343
1975  150.4000  277.1313  84.74670
1976  88.80000  132.7098  -30.20210
1977  29.40000  274.7321  -34.94573
1978  112.5000  392.9107  62.61076
1979  262.6000  375.7671  112.6678
1980  195.3000  254.9200  -42.50335
1981  -243.6000  126.9057  -112.1375
1982  18.30000  320.5255  162.8363
1983  -60.60000  224.8574  226.6860
1984  32.90000  109.2007  191.9060
1985  L3 6 . 3 0 0 0 0 -20.62268  75.31867
1986  60.90000  46.93408  118.0571
1987  -124.7000  -6.206130  85.94793153
Table  5.  6
obs  TBSIM7  TBSIMS  TBSIM9
1971  65.21729  94.71545  260.4107
1972  108.8995  155.4391  321.1344
1973  114.2091  81.29379  246.9891
1974  20.00041  -129.2766  36.41867
1975  260.5240  -52.27610  113.4192
1976  326.0856  -22.41397  143.2813
1977  332.2414  -192.7995  -27.10421
1978  526.1377  -29.22338  136.4719
1979  713.68D7  91.61805  257.3133
1980  530.9646  -64.58118  101.1141
1981  312.9992  -185.1746  -19.47933
1982  573.7642  144.1943  309.a896
1983  485.6838  341.3074  507.0027
1984  354.2082  379.3806  545.0759
1985  136.9636  317.2038  482.8991
1986  151.4657  315.1128  480.8080
1987  11.75648  200.6308  366.3261154
expenditure  tending  to appreciate  the  real  exchange  rate)  on  the
official  real  exchange  rate. This  seems  to indicate  that  if  the
government  had allowed  the nominal  exchange  rate  to move freely
(depreciate) with  the  increase in  domestic public  sector
expenditure then Ghanaian exports would have  fared better.
Table 5.7 shows  how the estimated  official  real exchange  rate
(RERTl)  would  have  evolved  if  public  sector  expenditure  had  been
held at its 1970 level.n  In all cases where public sector
expenditure  was higher  the actual  (official)  real  exchange  rate
was lower  than the simulated  value holding public  expenditure
constant. We see in  fact,  that  the  appreciation  of the  official
exchange rate from 1972 to 1987 would not have occurred if
public  sector  expenditure  had remained  constant. The  empirical
results also show that the rising public sector expenditure
along  with  stringent  restrictions  on  foreign  exchange
transactions did  seem  to  lead to  very  high  black market
premia.Th  Table  5.8  gives  simulation  results  for  two cases:  one
in  which  the terms  of trade  are  kept fixed  at their  1974 (high)
level (PRESIM2)  and the other in which the fiscal  deficit is
kept  at its 1970  level (PRESIMl). In both  cases  we can see  how
the  premium  would  have  been  lower  in  both  cases  than  it  actually
was.  A glance  at Table  5.8 shows  us that in 1980  for example,
the  black  market  premium (plus  one)  would  have  been .54  instead
nl am basing  these  estimates  on equation (e).
"These high black  market  premia  were partly  responsible  for
the real  exchange  rate  appreciation.155
Table  5.7
obs  RER  RERTi
1972  114.3468  9S5.66856
1973  96.05199  llS5.9243
1974  95.35734  87.18728
1975  80.24221  98.03925
i  ~~1976  53.79918  85.56528
1977  26.38002  73.20646
1978  25.18789  65.30401
1979  28.62447  78.84112
1980  21.76503  85.17S24
1981  10.97164  66.48678
1982  9.151826  70.79918
1983  13.35075  31.51451
1984  39.88649  83.88363
1985  54.36500  95.39480
1986  69.53115  77.32159
1987  87.95859  99.37134156
Table  5.8
obs  PREf2  PRESDMI  PRESIH2
1970  1.699333  1.164673  0.296011
1971  1.472677  0.957904  0.120170
1972  1.256947  1.616774  0.675312
1973  1.289270  0.799401  0.875752
1974  1.500870  0.296010  1.229355
1975  1.728696  0.520858  2.992483
1976  2.526957  1.207894  4.877636
1977  8.000870  0.178S89  64650724
1978  5.077740  0.235994  5.653349
1979  5.658182  0.538346  4.044519
1980  6.910182  0.543343  6.464724
1981  9.545455  1.984870  6.658423
1982  9.824364  2.564479  7.499870
1983  8.672736  6.060825  6.361796
1984  2.686224  1.834254  0.259934
1985  2.414237  2.100621  0.817008
1986  2.242047  1.718127  0.475674
1987  1.797922  1.844114  0.010098
...............  .m..................................  m  m  ,_157
of 6.9 if  public  sector  expenditure  had remained  at its 1970  low
level. 74 From 1977  to 1983  the public  sector  deficit  seems  to
be the  most important  factor  affecting  the  black  market  premium.
Even  with a  very favorable  terms  of trade (the  1974  level),  the
premium  would have been high during  these years if the fiscal
deficit  had remained  at its  actual  level.
In summary, our empirical  results seem to indicate  that
high public sector  expenditure  (or  a high  fiscal  deficit)  has
contributed  to Ghana's  external  sector  problems  and that  if the
government  had  pursued  more  moderate  fiscal  (lower  public  sector
expenditure)  and monetary (less  money  creation  and therefore  a
lower  premium)  policies,  the  economy  would  have  done  better. In
particular,  there would have been a more favorable  exchange
rate,  the  trade  balance  would  have  improved  significantly  better
and there  would  have  been fewer  black  market  activities.
7 4 These  are based  on equation  (c).158
Definition of Variables used in Regressions, Part  v
ERAV=average exchange rate, cedis/dollar
PREM2=average black market premium plus 1
PREUMIUM=end-of-period  black market premium
RER=real official exchange rate
BMRER=black market real exchange rate




AID=aid flows to Ghana
EXDEP=expected rate of depreciation
TOT=terms of trade
MONEYD=money stock
TILMOMDL=stock  of foreign assets
TOT=terms of trade159
obs  BMRER  RER  ERAV  BMER  PREM2  PREMIUM
1970  166.2030  97.80481  1.020400  1.734000  1.699333  1.66,0999
1971  137.7694  93.55030  1.034850  1.524000  1.472677  1.000011
1972  143.7279  114.3468  1.333390  1.676000  1.256947  1.220703
1973  123.8370  96.05199  1.165000  1.502000  1.289270  1.499231
1974  143.1189  95.35734  1.150000  1.726000  1.500870  1.337838
1975  138.7144  80.24221  1.150000  1.988000  1.728696  1.669580
1976  135.9482  53.79918  1.150000  2.906000  2.526957  3.782642
1977  211.0631  26.38002  1.150000  9.201000  8.000870  6.687015
1978  127.8975  25.18789  1.763580  8.955000  5.077740  3.636403
1979  161.9624  28.62447  2.750000  15.56000  5.658182  5.196420
1980  150.4003  21.76503  2.750000  19.00300  6.910182  4.040044
1981  104.7293  10.97164  2.750000  26.25000  9.545455  18.18202
1982  89.91087  9.151826  2.750000  27.01700  9.824364  43.63684
1983  115.7875  13.35075  8.829970  76.58000  8.672736  3.233010
1984  107.1441  39.88649  35.98620  96.66700  2.686224  2.000000
1985  131.2500  54.36500  54.36500  131.2500  2.414237  2.417150
1986  155.8921  69.53115  89.20420  200.0000  2.242047  2.222000
1987  158.1427  87.95859  153.7330  276.4000  1.797922  1.643795
…=======2S===========…160
obs  AID  EXDEP  TOT  MONEYD  TILMOND
.........m==WW....WO  ...... a......  ....  mm....anw..........  me  ..
1970  59.10000  0.000000  139.3300  295.4822  0.553633
1971  56.90000  78.18133  140.3000  307.2716  0.898950
1972  58.50000  -29.59993  124.0000  344.3254  0.757756
1973  41.00000  -10.15703  154.9000  485.7940  0.699068
1974  36.50000  0.000000  174.1000  605.1826  2.114716
1975  125.7000  0.000000  165.1000  923.9479  4.504899
1976  91.50000  0.000000  137.6000  1314.922  5.416380
1977  120.5000  0.000000  178.8000  2236.374  12.90512
1978  151.4000  139.1299  163.5000  2579.798  31.57007
1979  204.3000  0.000000  164.4000  1870.214  31.05077
1980  234.1000  0.000000  164.2000  2461.309  63.75380
1981  187.5000  0.000000  106.5000  3752.884  53.91605
1982  175.8000  0.000000  83.30000  4528.087  105.1277
1983  139.1000  991.0301  81.60000  2121.681  151.0688
1984  241.3000  66.65000  106.3000  842.2896  31.31942
1985  293.7000  19.97600  100.0000  845.1982  25.78973
1986  410.5000  50.04502  112.5000  773.8212  19.68781
1987  419.1000  95.59821  103.2000  595.2808  34.43671161
ob.  FD2  TS2  PSD2
1970  20.09016  51.90000  452.2736
1971  21.25912  -33.60000  490.4092
1972  74.24684  161.4000  422.9820
1973  117.1674  212.9000  594.8498
1974  183.0435  -29.20000  855.2174
1975  490.8696  150.4000  1269.565
1976  820.0000  88.80000  1737.391
1977  1129.565  29.40000  2434.783
1978  1012.146  112.5000  2201.204
1979  674.5455  262.6000  1688.545
1980  1097.091  i95.3000  2357.637
1981  1130.909  -243.6000  3184.727
1982  1277.818  18.30000  3433.818
1983  476.1058  -60.60000  1744.853
1984  40.96015  32.90000  779.0209
1985  119.1943  -36.30000  897.6731
1986  71.85761  60.90000  842.4940
1987  9.141173  -124.7000  712.2127
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V.  CoNCLusioNs
Our  exploration of the  macroeconomic  effects of  fiscal
deficits  has made  a rather  broad  sweep  of the  Ghanaian  economy.
What are the principal  conclusions  that we can draw from the
study ?
The first  conclusion  is  that  the  public  sector  deficit,  as
measured  by the government  and the international  organizations,
underestimates  the claim  that  the public  sector  has on economic
resources.  This is  not only due to the difficulty  of obtaining
data,  but to the method  of measuring  the deficit  as well.  When
we consider  the financing  that the public sector  has received
from  both domestic  and external  sources,  we see that  while  the
government  has claimed  to reduce  fiscal  deficits  substantially
since 1984, in practice these deficits remained larger than
advertized.
The  Ghanaian government has  relied heavily on  money
creation for financing its deficit. This was not so much a
deliberate  choice  as a default  option.  Ghana  had  little  or no
access to external lending  prior to 1984. Domestic  financial
markets  were (and  still  are)  too  weak  to absorb  the  high levels
of debt that the government  might  have issued.  With  shrinking
reserves,  the only  option  was to turn  to money  creation.
Over-reliance on money creation did have an  impact on
macroeconomic variables. In the  seventies the  relationship
between  fiscal  deficits  and  inflation  was  quite  close.  Since  the
early  eighties,  the  relationship  between  the  two  has  become  less163
clear cut.  High  levels of  inflation also  led  to  negative
interest  rates,  given the extensive  controls in the financial
sector,  and overvaluation  of the official  exchange  rate.
These  high  levels  of inflation  combined  with  actions  on  the
part  of  the  government that  affected private holdings of
currency and deposits both had a  negative effect on money
demand. The negative  effect  in turn implied  reductions  in the
level of  seignorage  available to the government.  Given the
government's  dependence  on monetary finance  the reduction  in
seignorage  implied  yet greater levels  of money creation thus
feeding into fuzther  inflation.  Government  attempts  to reduce
inflation  by demonetization  also had the effect of reducing
money demand in the longer  run and hence, reducing  seignorage
revenue. These actions are  also  likely to  have  seriously
weakened  the domestic  financial  system  thus  making  it even  mtcre
difficult for  the  government to  finance its  deficits via
borrowing  in domestic  markets.
The effects  of fiscal  deficits  on consumption  are somewhat
harder to pin down.  The principal  conclusion  to be drawn from
the estimation  of the consumption  function  is that  neither  the
pure  Keynesian theory  nor  the  pure  Ricardian theory  are
validated. Our  first estimation, incorporating  a  number of
fiscal  variables  suffered  from collinearity  and the number  of
variables  is probably  too great  to provide  reliable  estimates.
Our  second estimation, though much  simpler,  found  lagged
consumption  and  disposable  income  to be significant  but did not164
find  any fiscal  variables,  interest  rates,  or private  credit  to
be significant
The results concerning  private investment  indicate  that
fiscal  deficits  did  crowd-out  rrivate  investment  and  constraints
placed  on private  credit  resulted  in  lower  investment  than  would
have otherwise  been  the case.
Fiscal deficits also had  a  significant impact on  the
official real exchange rate, the trade balance and the black
market  premium.  Increased  public  expenditure  worsened  the  trade
balance  and lead  to appreciation  of the real  official  exchange
rate.  The empirical  results  also showed  that the rising  public
sector  deficit  along  with  stringent  controls  of foreign  exchange
transactions  lead  to a high  black  aarket  premium.165
References
Ahmad, N. 1970. Deficit Financing. Inflation and CaRital Formation:
The Ghanaian Experience 1960-65. Weltform Verla, Munich.
Ando, A. and F. Modigliani.  1963. "The Life-Cycle Hypothesis  of
Saving:  Aggregate  Implications  and  Tests."  American  Economic
Review. 53: 55-84.
Aschauer,  David  A.  1985.  "Fiscal Policy  and Aggregate  Demand."
American Economic Review. 75:117-27.
Azam, J.P. and T. Besley. 1989. "General Equilibrium with Parallel
Markets for Goods and Foreign Exchange: Theory and Application to
Ghana." World Development. 17, no. 12:1921-30.
Barro,  R.  1974.  "  Are  Government  Bonds  Net  Wealth?  Journal  of
Political Economy. 82:1095-117.
Barro, R. 1978. The Impact of Social Security on Private Saving.
American Enterprise Institute.
Bernheim, B.D. 1987. "Ricardian Equivalence: An Evaluation of the
Theory and Evidence." NBER Macroeconomics Annual. NBER, Boston.
Blanchard, A. 1985. "Debt, Deficits, and Finite Horizons." Journal
of Political Economy 93:223-47.
Blinder,  A.  and  R.  Solow.  1973.  "Does  Fiscal  Policy  Matter?"
Journal of Public Finance.
--- I  1974.  "Analytical  Foundations  of  Fiscal  Policy."in  Ma.
Economics of  Public Finance. The Brookings Institution,  Washington,
DC.
Boskin,  M.  1982.  "Federal  Government  Deficits:  Some  Myths  and
Realities." American Economic Review: Papers and Proeceedings. 72
no. 2:296-303.
---.  1988.  "Consumption,  Saving  and  Fiscal  Policy."  American
Economic Review. 78 no. 2:401-7.
Brunner, K. 1989. "Fiscal Policy in  Macroeconomic Theory: A Survey
and Evaluation." in K. Brunner and A. Meltzer, Monetary Economics.
Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Brunner, K. and A. Meltzer.  1976. "An Aggregative  Theory  for a
Closed  Economy."  in  J.  Stein  (ed.), MonStarisA.  North  Holland,
Amsterdam.
Buiter, W.H. 1983. "Measurement of the Public Sector Deficit and
Its  Implications  for  Policy  Evaluation  and  Design."  nMP  staff
PaRers. 30, no.2 (June): 307-49.166
---.  1985. "A guide to Public Sector Debt and Deficits." Egonomig
Policy 1 (Nov.): 13-79.
1988.  Some  Thoughts  on  the  Role  of  Fiscal  Policy  in
Stabilization and Structural AdJuStment in Developing Countries.
NBER Working Paper 2603.
Chhibber,  A.  and  N.  Shafik.  1989.  Exchange  Rate  Policy  and
Inflation in Africa: The Case of Ghana. unpublished.
Christ, C. 1968. "  A Simple Macroeconomic Model with a Government
Budget Constraint." Journal of Political Economy. 76: 53-67.
Davidson,J., D, Hendry  ,  F. Srba, and S. Yeo. 1978. "Econometric
Modelling  of  the  Aggregate  Time-Series  Between  Consumers'
Expenditure and Income in the United Kingdom." Economic Journal.
88:661-692.  *
Dornbusch,  R.  1977.  "Inflation,  Capital,  and  Deficit  Finance."
Journal of Money Credit and Banking. part 2 (Feb.): 141-150.
---.  1983. "  Real Interest Rates, Home Goods, and Optimal External
Borrowing." Journal of Political Economy. 91, no.1: 141-153.
Easterly,  W.  1989a.  A  Consistency  Framework  for  Macroeconomic
Analysis.  Working  Paper  Series,  ZPS  No.  234.  The  World  Bank,
Washington, DC.
Easterly, W. 1989b. Fiscal Adjustment and Deficit Financing During
the Debt Crisis. Working Paper Series, WPS No. 138. The World Bank,
Washington, DC.
--.  1989c. How  Much  Fiscal  Adjustment  Is  Enough?  The  Case  of
Colombia. Working Paper Series, WPS No. 201.
Easterly  W.,  C.  Rodriguez  and  K.  Schmidt-Hebbel.  1989.
Macroeconomigs  of  the  Public  Sector  Deficit:Research  ProRosal.
Macroeconomic  Adjustment  and  Growth  Division,  World  Bank,
Washington, DC.
Feldstein, M.  1982.  "Government Deficits and Aggregate  Demand."
Journal of Monetary Economics. 9:1-20.
Feldstein,  M. 1988.  "The  Effects  of  Fiscal  Policies  When Incomes
Are Uncertain: A Contradiction to Ricardian Equivalence." American
Economic Review. 78, no. 1: 14 - 23.
Flavin,  M.  1984.  "  The  Adjustment  to  Consumption  to  Changing
Expecations  about  Future  Income." Journal  of Political Economy.
89:974-1009.
Friedman, M. 1957. A Theory of the Consumption Function. Princeton
University Press, Princeton, N.J.167
Green,  R.  1987.  Stabilization  and  Adjustment  Polcies  and
Programmes:Ghana  Case  Study.  World  Institute  for  Development
Economics Research.
Hall,  R.  1978.  "Stochastic  Implications  of  the  Life  Cycle  -
Permanent  Income  Hypothesis:  Theory  and  Evidence."  Journnal  gf
Political Economy. 86 (Dec.): 971-87.
Hall, R. and F. Mishkin. 1982. "The Sensitivity of Consumption to
Transitory  Income:  Estimates  from  Panel  Data  on  Households."
Econometrica. 50, no. 2  (March):461-481.
Haque, N. 1988. "Fiscal Policy and Private Sector Saving Behavior
in Developing Economies." IMF Staff Papers 35: 316-335.
Haque, N. and P. Montiel. 1987. Ricardian Equivalence. Liouidity
Constraints  and the Yaari-Blanchard Effect: Tests  for Developing
Countries. IMF Working Paper, IMF Washington, DC.
Hayashi, F. 1982. "The Permanent Income Hypothesis: Estimation and
Testing with Instrumental  Variables." Journal of Political. 90:895-
916.
---.  1985. "The Effect of Liquidity Constraints on Consumption: A
Cross-Sectional Analysis. Ouarterly Journal of Economics. 100:183-
206.
Host-Madsen,  P.  1979.  Macroeconomic  Accounts:  AU  overview.
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Hubbard, R.G. and K.1. Judd. 1986. "Liquidity Constraints, Fiscal
Policy and Consumption."  Brookings Papers  on Economic Activity.
1:1-50.
Huq, M.M.1989. The Economy of Ghana. St. Martin's Press.
IMF, various years, Recent Economic Development Reports: Ghana.
Ize, A.  and G. Ortiz.  1987. "Fiscal Rigidities,  Public Debt, and
Capital Flight." IKE Staff Papers, 34, 2 (June):311-32.
Keynes, J.N. 1936. The General Theory of Employment. Interest, and
Money. Macmillan, London.
Killick,  T.  1978.  Development  Economics  in Action:  A  Study  of
Economic Policies in Ghana. Heinemann Press, London.
Leiderman, L. and M. Blejer. 1988. "Modeling and Testing Ricardian
Equivalence." IMF Staff Papers 35: 1-35.
Levacic, R. and  A. Rebman. 1982. Macroeconomics: An Introduction to
Keesian-Neoclassical  Controversies, Macmillan, London.168
Lucas, R., Jr., 1976. "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique."
in K. Brunner and A. Meltzer, ed.s, The PhilliRs Curve and Labour
Markets.  Carnegie-Rochester  Conference  Series  on  Public  Policy,
Vol.1: 19-46.
Marshall, Jorge and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel. 1989. Economic and Policy
Determinants  of  Public  Sector  Deficits.  Mimeo,  Macroeconomic
Adjustment and Growth Division, World Bank, Washington, DC.
May, E. 1985. Exchange Controls and Parallel Market Economies in
Sub-Saharan  Africa:  Focus  on  Ghana.  World  Bank  Staff  Working
Papers, No. 711.
Mansfield, Charles. .1980.  "Tax-base Erosion and Inflation: the Case
of Ghana," Finance and Development. September.
Modiglianr,  F. and R. Brumberg. 1954. "Utility Analysis and the
Consumption Function: An Interpretation of Cross-Section Data." in
K, Kurihara,  ed.,  Post-Keynesian Economics.  Rutgers University
Press, Rutgers, N.J.
Modigliani, F. and A. Sterling. 1986. Fiscal Policy, Inflation and
Private Saving: Evidence from an International Cross Section. MIT,
Cambridge, MA.
Phelps,  E.  1973.  "Inflation  in the  Theory  of  Public  Finance,,"
Swedish Journal of Economics. Vol. 75.
Pinto, B. 1987. Black Market Premia. Exchange Rate Unification and
Inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Financial Operations Department.
World Bank, Washington, DC.
Rimmer, D. 1989. Poverty. Eguity and Growth  in Ghana:  1950-1988.
Manuscript.
Rossi, N. 1989. "Government Spending, the Real Interest Rate, and
Liquidity  Constrained Consumers' Behavior in  Developing Countries."
in Blejer, M. and K. Chu. eds. Fiscal Policy. Stabilization, and
Growth  in  Develoing  Countries.  International  Monetary  Fund,
Washington.
Sargent,  T.  and  N.  Wallace.  1981.  "Some  Unpleasant  Monetarist
Arithmetic." Federal Reserve Board of  Minneacolis Ouarterly Review:
1-17.
Seater,J. and R. Mariano.  "New Tests of the Life Cycle  and Tax
Discounting Hypotheses. Journal of  NonetaXy Economics. 15:196-215.
Tanner, J. 1979. "An Empirical Investigation of Tax Discounting."
Journal of Money. Credit, and Banking 11: 214-18.169
Tanzi,  V.  and M.  Blejer.  1984. "Fiscal Deficits and  Balance of
Payments  Disequilibrium  in  IMF  Adjustment  Programs."  in  J. Nuns,
e  Adjugtment.  Conditionality  and  International  Financing.
International  Monetary  Fund,  Washington,  DC.
Teijeiro,  N.  1989.  "Central  Bank  Losses:  Origins,  Conceptual
Issues,  and Measurement  Problems.  Macroeconomic  Adjustment  and
Growth Division,World Bank, Washington, DC.
Tobin, J. and W.H. Buiter. 1976. "Long-Run Effects of Fiscal and
Monetary Policy on Aggregate Demand." in  J. Stein, ed., Rmnstaxism.
North Holland, Amsterdam.
Van Wijnbergen, Sweder. 1982. "Stagflationary Effects of Monetary
Stabilization Policies: A Quantitative Analysis of South Korea."
Journal of Development Economics. 10: 133-69.
---.  1988. External Debt, Inflation, and the Public Sector: Toward
Fiscal Policy for  Sustainable Growth. Mimeo. World Bank Washington,
DC.
Van Wijnbergen, Sweder and Ritu Anand. 1988. Inflation, External
Debt  and  Financial  Sector  Reform:  A  Quantitative  Approach  to
Consistent  F.iscal  Policy  with  an Application  to Turkey.  Mimeo,
World Bank, Washington, DC.
World Bank, various years, Country Economic Reports for Ghana.
World Bank. 1988. World Develonment Renort 1298. Oxford University
Press,  Oxford.170
AnuendixA
The  system  of  equations  (F,  a,  f)  is  linearized  around  the  steady
state:
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For  saddlepath  stability,  we  need  the  determinant  of  the  above
matrix  to  be  greater  than  zero.  The  determinant  ist
[al  i*  0  6F
;F  11;  F;;
A
A sufficient  condition  for  saddlepath  stability  is  that  F  >  0.
Intuitively,  this  Implies  that  an  Increase  In  the  black  market  premium  must
improve  the  unofficial  trade  balance.  This  makes  sense  since  an increase  in
the  premium  raises  exports  In  the  black  market  and  lower& Imports.  In  other
words,  we  must  have:
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